



UNEG Evaluation of the Pilot Initiative for Delivering as One

Evaluability Assessment Report on Viet Nam

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CEB	Chief Executives Board
DaO	Delivering as One UN
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GoVN	Government of Vietnam
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NRA	Non-resident Agency
OP1	One Plan 1
OP2	One Plan 2
OPF	One Plan Fund
OPMP	One Plan Management Plan
RC	Resident Coordinator
TCPR	Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review
TNTF	Tripartite National Task Force
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
USD	United States Dollars
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

1. This report presents the first evaluability assessment of the United Nations (UN) reform that is taking place in eight countries designated as pilot countries under the ‘Delivering as One United Nations’ (DaO) initiative. It is based on a desk study and a subsequent mission, which visited Viet Nam from 29 October 2007 through 2 November 2007. The mission had a series of meetings with the government, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Heads of agencies, staff of the Resident Coordinator (RC) Office, and donors. In addition, the chief of the mission visited Bangkok and met with UNICEF Regional Directors and Deputy Regional Directors (based in Bangkok and Nepal respectively), the Regional Director of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the evaluation section of United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The mission consisted of two consultants, Ms. Alison King and Mr. Kees Tuinenburg. Mr. Jean Quesnel, Director of the UNICEF Evaluation Office and Co-Chair of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Management Group, overseeing the evaluation of the DaO pilots, joined the mission towards the end. The mission also participated in the meeting of the Tripartite National Task Force (TNTF), which met 2 November 2007. During the meeting, Mr. Jean Quesnel presented on the overall context and design of the evaluation, preliminary observations on UN reform in Viet Nam and evaluability, and change management (see Annex 4).

2. The mission thanks Ms. Kitty van der Heijden, Head of the RC Office and Senior Adviser on UN Reform and Mr. Joachim Aquino-Aleman, Planning and Development Results Officer for the RC Office, for the support they provided. We also thank Mr. John Hendra, the UN RC, and all the Heads of agencies and their staff for the time they gave to the mission. We hope that our contribution will be useful to the UN reform process in Viet Nam.

3. Since the DaO pilot was only initiated in early 2007, the crucial question facing the evaluability mission was to assess whether there was sufficient progress made in Viet Nam to allow for a meaningful evaluation of process, planned to take place in mid-2008. As defined in the Terms of Reference for this report, evaluability is a “technical assessment of the basic parameters that will make it possible to fully evaluate at a later stage both the results of the programmes and of the pilots, and of the processes that will lead to these results”, and should include an “initial appraisal of processes.”

4. The short answer is that progress in Viet Nam has been impressive. The DaO process is well documented and many of the parameters are or will be in place to allow for a meaningful evaluation of process in mid-2008 and the drawing of important lessons. However, the further operationalization of reform was encountering major challenges now that eight new agencies were joining the initiative (FAO, IFAD, ILO, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO, UNESCO, UNODC and WHO). While there was clarity of intent among the three Executive Committee agencies (UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF) and the three agencies (UNAIDS, UNIFEM and UNV) that subsequently joined the initiative in 2007¹, a lack of a common vision among all 14 agencies of what the end product of the reform would look like prevented the UN system in Viet Nam from agreeing on important issues. Intensive discussions are now taking place in order to agree on a common vision, a prerequisite for achieving substantial further progress.

¹ See Acronyms and Abbreviations.

5. Despite this challenge, different ways of programmatic collaboration between agencies in some thematic groups have already been set up through several joint programmes (AIDS, Avian Influenza, Kon Tum², Gender, and Youth) as well as in the newly set up UN Communications Team. On the funding side, a number of donors, called ‘like-minded donors’ are now financially supporting the One Plan Fund (OPF), rather than funding individual projects and agencies.

6. UN reform in Viet Nam, which predates the DaO initiative, has its origins in the March 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the July 2005 Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness, which bring together the government and its development partners. In September 2005, the then RC and the current UNICEF Representative presented a visionary perspective on reform in Viet Nam. The DaO initiative effectively started in February 2006 with a road map calling for One Management, One Plan, One Budget, and One Set of Management Practices, to which the One UN House was later added.

7. While all UN organizations in Viet Nam signed the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2006-2010, not all agencies were ready to collaborate and coordinate their efforts in the formulation of a One Plan. The One Plan initially brought together UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA, which were later joined by UNAIDS, UNIFEM and UNV. Given the political momentum following the publication of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence Report and the designation of Viet Nam as one of the DaO pilot countries, the time was ripe for other agencies (mainly the specialized UN organizations) to join the UN reform process as full partners. Currently, all agencies in Viet Nam (with the exception of UNHCR and IOM) are engaged in the reform efforts, including in the formulation of an enlarged One Plan.

8. During the mission, progress seemed to be stalled because it became clear that there was no consensus about what the end product would be. At the risk of simplification, the mission concluded that while the original six agencies were aiming at ‘One UN’ (being one), the agencies joining later were thinking of ‘Delivering as One’ (a strategic alliance of individual agencies). While an evaluation assessing progress is possible, as progress has been made in numerous areas, the ultimate question for an evaluation to answer is whether the process is on track and whether progress is being made towards a clearly identified end result, specified in time. Moreover, if UN reform is to engage all UN organizations in Viet Nam, it is crucial that all UN organizations are clear on what the UN reform in Viet Nam is about and subscribe to that vision. In the absence of this, it is difficult to make substantial progress on an operational plan.

9. An important aspect of reform is change management. This applies to attitudes of the people engaged in reform and also to whether agencies and New York (that is, the United Nations Development Group [UNDG] and the Chief Executives Board [CEB] and its working groups) are willing to change or to allow the countries the necessary space for piloting. It is also possible that those engaged in UN reform on the ground have not given themselves sufficient space for piloting either. The evaluation should assess the parameters for piloting, which implies that things are being done in new unexplored ways. References were made to decisions that were beyond the authority of UNCT and depended on Headquarters, UNDG

² In response and at the request of the Vietnamese Government, UNICEF, UNDP and UNFPA work together through a joint programme to deliver the first comprehensive and coordinated package of technical support to the people of Kon Tum.

and the CEB being made late or not at all. In terms of evaluability, it would be useful to record these events. It would be equally useful for the UNCT to map the key decisions that have to be made by agencies and at the systemic level over time. An important issue that should be assessed is the extent to which knowledge of UN reform and willingness to change within that context is a criterion in the selection of staff.

10. All stakeholders made reference to the extraordinary investments in staff time involved in the reform process, which came at the expense of something else and raises the question of opportunity costs. Smaller agencies received support in the form of short- and long-term staff to work on UN reform. A reduction in transaction costs and efficiency gains has been at the centre of UN reform and figured highly in the government's comments during the mission. This subject was also raised by donors and Heads of agencies, the latter being afraid that there was a risk of transferring transaction costs from the government to the United Nations.

11. While it is too early for the evaluation to fully assess the occurrence of savings resulting from doing business in a different way, at some point in the future, the evaluation will have to assess investment costs, ideally in relation to a future pay-off when the new management practices are in place and hopefully reflected in lower and sustainable transactions costs. The subject of efficiency gains was not prominently present in the documentation reviewed or in the design of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system. It is suggested that the M&E system keep track of investment costs, that is opportunity costs and additional costs (e.g. staff time and travel cost), perhaps on a trimestrial basis. Part of the costs of the RC Office should also be included. Regarding targets, future savings in overhead and administration should be quantified, based on a cost-benefit study as is being done for the One UN House. UNDG would be a useful area for support in developing a suitable methodology for measuring benefits.

12. Progress is being made in establishing an M&E system to monitor progress in terms of programmatic impact and the reform process: a One Plan 1 (2006-2010) M&E Framework has been developed; the M&E Working Group has been expanded to include the eight new agencies; the RC Office has been strengthened with a Planning and Development Results Officer; and process indicators for the DaO initiative have been identified as have several other elements, including roadmaps, an action plan to deliver management results, success indicators, and the Hanoi Action Plan (some of which include benchmarks, targets, and timelines). There is a definitive need for a comprehensive paper incorporating all the above elements. Apart from specifying indicators, targets and timelines for the five Ones, two overarching issues should be mentioned upfront—the overall objectives of UN reform in Viet Nam and the matter of efficiency and cost savings.

13. Given the short duration of the mission and the meeting of the TNTF, it was not possible to meet with the M&E Working Group or to conclude when the M&E system would be fully operational, but it is expected that this will be in time for the DoA process evaluation in mid-2008. It is understood that UNDG will provide further support to M&E in January 2008.

A. Introduction

14. In November 2006, the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment published its report titled 'Delivering as One'. Building on the 2004 Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR), the report recommends that, in order to become more coherent and efficient in the area of development, the UN system needs to 'Deliver as One' at the country level, "with one leader, one programme, one budgetary framework and, where appropriate, one office".

15. The report goes on to recommend the establishment of five One UN country pilots by 2007 and, subject to "continuous positive assessment, demonstrated effectiveness and proven results", 20 by 2009, 40 by 2010 and, where appropriate, expansion to all others by 2012. By February 2007, eight countries that had expressed their desire to participate were officially designated as pilot countries: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

16. Two months later, in preparation for the recommended roll-out, the CEB called on the UNEG to undertake an evaluation of the eight pilot initiatives. This evaluation would focus on progress, to be followed at a later date by an evaluation of results and impact on the ground. Subsequently, the UNEG decided on a three-phase approach: a) an assessment of the evaluability of the DaO by March 2008 at the country and UN systemic levels; b) an independent process evaluation of the pilot experience to be completed by September 2009³; and c) an independent evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilot experience by September 2011 (see Annex 1 for more details).

17. The UNEG launched the first phase of the evaluation, the evaluability assessment, in October 2007 with the fielding of a first evaluability assessment mission to Viet Nam (see Annex 2 for the Terms of Reference)⁴. Serving as a test case, the three main purposes and objectives of the mission were to:

- a. Assess whether and to what extent the DaO process in Viet Nam can be meaningfully evaluated in 2008-2009.
- b. Identify any shortcomings in order to inform corrective measures and improve readiness for the process evaluation.
- c. Learn from the Viet Nam experience in terms of assessing the evaluability of the other pilot countries and designing the process evaluation.

18. A team of two consultants, Ms. Alison King and Mr. Kees Tuinenburg prepared this report. It is based on a desk review of relevant documents (see Annex 6), followed by a mission to Viet Nam from 29 October through 2 November, which met with nearly all members of the UNCT⁵, the Ministry of

³ The Synthesis Report due in September 2009 will contribute to the preparation of the TCPR in 2010.

⁴ The present Terms of Reference may be revised in the light of results from the first evaluability assessment mission.

⁵ The mission could not meet with IFAD and UNODC.

Foreign Affairs and like-minded donors (see Annex 3 for the mission programme). The mission concluded with a brief presentation of the UNEG evaluation and the assessment mission's preliminary findings to the TNTF, a joint Government-UN-Donor Task Force on the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam, which met on 2 November (see Annex 4).

19. This technical report responds to the first two objectives of the mission. It considers the specific context in which UN reforms are being pursued in Viet Nam, then goes on to assess the evaluability of the Viet Nam pilot in terms of four basic parameters that UNEG has established to guide the evaluability assessment:

- a. Quality of the conceptual design of the pilot for enhanced efficiency.
- b. Readiness of the M&E system.
- c. Optimal involvement of relevant national and international stakeholders.
- d. Adequacy of information sources to evaluate the reform process.

20. This report presents the main strengths and possible shortcomings in terms of preparing the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam for the process evaluation in 2008-2009. Based on the findings, this report assesses whether there is a clear and sufficient basis for a future evaluation of the reform process in Viet Nam.

B. Country context

21. The Government of Viet Nam (GoVN) originated UN reforms well before the ‘Delivering as One’ Report was published. The GoVN strongly promotes the aid effectiveness agenda and is a leader among developing countries in implementing the March 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In July 2005, the GoVN and its development partners agreed on the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness. Early in 2007, Viet Nam joined the World Trade Organization and, it was nominated to the UN Security Council. Viet Nam is expected to acquire low-level middle-income status within the next two years.

22. The GoVN has historically attached great importance to the country’s relationship with the United Nations and has placed great trust in the organization’s work and advice. The GoVN perceives a continued role for a strengthened United Nations in Viet Nam. In addition, the GoVN is keen to reduce the transaction costs associated with aid delivery by the 15 UN organizations present in Viet Nam, which count for a combined contribution of less than 2 percent of total official development assistance to the country⁶.

23. Those donors that make up the Like Minded Donor Group, and who in view of Viet Nam’s rapid development and graduation to middle-income country status are gradually scaling back their presence, have shown a strong willingness to invest in the UN reform process in Viet Nam, both in substance and financially. In doing so, they have been very clear that they “want to see a UN doing better with the same resources, not to enhance programme and staff levels”⁷.

24. Both the GoVN and the Like Minded Donor Group have clearly communicated that without successful and speedy reforms, the United Nations will cease to play a role in Viet Nam, and that there will be no return to ‘business as usual’, with fragmented processes based on individual project funding.

⁶ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WHO are the financially strongest UN organizations in Viet Nam. In recent years, official development assistance has been averaging approximately 4 percent of gross domestic product in Viet Nam, according to the World Bank. Total official development assistance in 2006 amounted to USD 4.5 billion.

⁷ One UN in Viet Nam, Donor Joint Assessment of the One Plan/One Plan Fund, Final Version, 12 June 2007.

C. Main mission findings of the evaluability of the Viet Nam pilot

25. When assessing the evaluability of the Viet Nam pilot, it is important to note that the ongoing UN reform process is not a consequence of the November 2006 High-level Panel Report. Rather, it dates back to the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness of July 2005, which was elaborated in September 2005 in the context of the 2005 World Summit, when the then UN RC and the current UNICEF Representative presented their visionary perspective of UN reform in the country⁸.

26. The One UN Initiative in Viet Nam effectively started in February 2006 with a road map⁹ outlining the vision for the reform process and calling for One Management, One Plan, One Budget and One Set of Management Practices. The TNTF, newly established for the purpose of monitoring and guiding the implementation of the One UN Initiative, endorsed the road map and used it as the basis for a set of Agreed Principles, Objectives and Instruments of One United Nations in Viet Nam¹⁰. According to the Agreed Principles, the GoVN intends to “strengthen the UN as a competent and effective partner of the GoVN of VTN [Viet Nam] in support of national development for the benefit of the people of VTN”. The comparative advantages of the United Nations as formulated in 2006, and signed off on by the Prime Minister, are recognized to lie in “support for capacity building; impartial policy support and advice; the provision of objective monitoring and evaluation of development initiatives; access to international experience, expertise and best practice; the promotion of the principles of the United Nations; and support for programmes, projects and initiatives aimed at realizing these principles”. This document also included the fifth objective of One House at the request of the GoVN.

27. The One UN Initiative was initially confined to UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF but open to others to join on a voluntary basis. UNAIDS, UNFIEM and UNV joined the One Plan late 2006. The remaining resident agencies (with the exception of UNHCR) joined the reform efforts during 2007 following the release of the ‘Delivering as One’ Report.

28. UN reform in Viet Nam would have been vigorously pursued irrespective of the publication of the High-level Panel Report on Delivering as One and Viet Nam’s designation as one of the eight pilot countries¹¹. In fact, while the High-level Panel Report identifies four Ones, UN reform in Viet Nam is based on five: One Plan, One Budget, One Set of Management Practices, One Leader and One UN House. Therefore, this report assesses progress made in Viet Nam in the light of UN reform as it has been defined

⁸ Ryan J and J Morch, ‘United Nations Reform: A Country Perspective’, 16 September 2005.

⁹ ‘Harmonisation of UNDG Agencies: Towards One United Nations in Viet Nam’, February 2006.

¹⁰ ‘Agreed Principles, Objectives and Instruments to Achieve One United Nations in Viet Nam’, final version, 18 May 2006. Established by the GoVN, UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA and approved by the TNTF and the Deputy Prime Minister in May 2006.

¹¹ The future evaluation should try to establish the impact of the publication of the Delivering as One Report and the designation of Viet Nam as one of the eight pilots on the reform process in Viet Nam as it evolved. It should also address the inclusiveness of the process.

within the country by GoVN, donors and the United Nations, rather than as described by the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence.

29. Section C maps measures taken to support UN reform in Viet Nam as well as observed strengths of the process for the forthcoming process evaluation. It also suggests possible shortcomings that the UNCT could address in preparation for the evaluation. The findings are grouped around the four basic parameters that the UNEG established to guide the evaluability assessment.

Quality of the conceptual design of the pilot for enhanced coherence and efficiency

Key process indicators	Main Findings
Strategic intent of the pilot	<p>In order to measure the success of the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam, agree upon what changes are required to deliver more coherently and efficiently, and what that means for each UN organization, there needs to be one concise statement of intent. With eight new agencies joining the original six, this does not seem to exist in Viet Nam. When asked, different stakeholders referred to different documents. Moreover, there appeared to be two visions: ‘One UN’ (being One) versus ‘Delivering as One’ (a strategic alliance of individual agencies respectively). It also appeared that a number of interlocutors had diverging, and to some extent confusing or non-existent, views of the strategic intent of UN reforms in Viet Nam.</p> <p>In terms of preparing for the UNEG process evaluation, the UNCT (in consultation with others) should take the necessary time to formulate a consolidated statement of intent going beyond 2010, which can be articulated both internally and externally.</p>
One Plan	<p>Stakeholders in Viet Nam do not perceive the conceptual design of the original One Plan (OP1) 2006-2010¹², a legally binding document, to have made a great deal of change in what the six originally participating agencies do in Viet Nam, since the plan combines the Country Programme Action Plans and Country Programme Documents as they had just been approved by the Boards of the three Executive Committee agencies. Currently, the UNCT is working on a second version of the One Plan (OP2) to integrate the programmes, results and resources of the newly joining eight agencies. OP2 is not expected to become more strategic (views differ as to how strategic it already is) or more focused on system-wide priority areas and</p>

¹² ‘One Plan, Common Action Plan, 2006-2007’, July 2007.

	<p>comparative advantages of the United Nations in view of Viet Nam’s rapid development. To measure development impact, the One Plan M&E Working Group has drafted a comprehensive M&E Framework.</p> <p>In terms of the forthcoming process evaluation, the One Plan in Viet Nam (which the six original agencies are now beginning to implement) is as a step towards greater coherence, but as a transition document, it may not warrant an evaluation in 2008-2009 of whether the United Nations is doing the right things. However, it will be important to monitor and evaluate the flexibility of the system to include and reallocate existing resources for new priorities outside the context of the One Plan (if and when necessary). Also, since the One UN Initiative deals only with the operational activities for development of the UN system in Viet Nam, it may also be worthwhile, for learning purposes, to evaluate systems put in place to ensure coordination of the One Plan with the UN humanitarian response as appropriate.</p>
Strategic planning cycle	<p>Both the UNDAF and the One Plan are aligned with the GoVN 2006-2010 planning cycle. A Mid-Term Review of the UNDAF is tentatively scheduled for 2009.</p> <p>In terms of preparing for the forthcoming process evaluation, the TNTF should first focus on finalizing the One Plan Management Plan (OPMP), revise the road map and agree as soon as possible on a strategic planning process for the next cycle, including a common situation analysis and a strategic refocusing of the UN mission. The TNTF should also determine whether there is still a need to have both a UNDAF and a One Plan as parallel planning instruments.</p>
One Plan Management Plan (OPMP)	<p>Whereas the One Plan defines what the UNCT in Viet Nam is delivering, the OPMP defines how it delivers the One Plan coherently and efficiently. It is important to understanding how the United Nations will manage resources in future. The drafting of the OPMP has been a long and difficult process starting with the original six agencies, and trying to link up to the newly joining eight agencies, with the understanding that they should adhere to a (yet to be defined) “minimum compliance package.” However, since the incoming agencies are not homogenous—in terms of their understanding of the One UN Initiative, their expectations, real and perceived constraints, Headquarters support, and degree of flexibility—their involvement has delayed the finalization of the document. Running out of patience, the GoVN, at the 2 November 2007 TNTF meeting,</p>

	<p>suggested that the OPMP be finalized for the original six agencies.</p> <p>The successful translation of the One Plan into an OPMP and Harmonized Programme and Project Management Guidelines is a crucial phase in the conceptual design of the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam. Important lessons can be learned, and the 2008-2009 process evaluation will pay particular attention to the fundamental reasons why the reform process stalled in this regard and to practical solutions that the UNCT will have found in the meantime. Whether or not the OPMP and Harmonized Programme and Project Management Guidelines will make a difference in how the UNCT works on the ground depends on how much the UNCT is willing to challenge the status quo and how fast the agencies will achieve consensus on a minimum compliance package and start implementation.</p>
Change management	<p>The OPMP is about organizational change, for example, new work processes, new tools, and new technologies. However, successful change and UN reform requires more than this in order for the United Nations not to fade into irrelevance. Successful change combines organizational change with cultural change through the engagement and participation of the individual people involved. DaO also challenges existing longstanding protective institutional paradigms and the mindsets and motivation of individuals.</p> <p>In terms of readiness of the Viet Nam pilot for the process evaluation, it is crucial to develop—and start implementing—a change management strategy aimed at significant change in organizational culture and individual behaviour leading to greater system-wide ownership and reinforcement of the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam. In addition, a criterion for selecting new staff members should include knowledge of UN reform and openness to change within that context. Annual staff surveys could be undertaken to monitor motivation over time.</p>
Joint programmes	<p>The UNCT has designed and begun implementing several joint programmes, both before the publication of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence Report—on AIDS and on the Avian Influenza¹³—and after—on Kon Tum¹⁴, gender and youth.</p>

¹³ Government-UN Joint Programme to Fight Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), 2005-2010.

¹⁴ Addressing Disparities in the Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Regions, Kon Tum Joint Programme, 2007-2010.

	<p>In terms of reform and whether behaviours have changed (leading to enhanced coherence and efficiency), these elements of the UN reform process should be evaluated in 2008-2009 in a meaningful manner and compared with other pilot countries. In preparation for the evaluation, the UNCT should enhance its DaO efforts in pursuit of the commonly agreed goals within the framework of these joint programmes, including further harmonizing systems and procedures, joint visibility (One Voice), as well as reflecting on the number and composition (mandates) of agencies participating in the joint programmes. An external review of joint programmes will be undertaken early next year to assess whether joint programmes are an effective way to bring about UN reform in the Vietnamese context.</p>
<p>One Leader</p>	<p>The One UN Initiative in Viet Nam experienced an important setback when the UNDG, having considered 17 drafts of the 'RC Note', failed to reach agreement on a formula based on a far-reaching but logical interpretation of the One Leader concept (the RC as CEO of the UN system in Viet Nam)¹⁵. The RC Office, in consultation with the UNCT, is currently drafting a local Memorandum of Understanding between UNCT members and the RC, which seeks a workable consensus regarding representational functions, lines of reporting and decision-making authority on financial and policy matters. A draft Code of Conduct for the UNCT is intended to complement the Memorandum of Understanding.</p> <p>In terms of how the One Leader concept works in practice, it is too early to say, as the formal agreement is not yet in place. However, it is expected to be working by early 2008, thereby providing sufficient experience to be able to evaluate the difference this element of DaO makes. Moreover, in this context, UNDP in Viet Nam has established an institutional firewall between the management of its programmatic role and management of the RC system, including a physical separation of the two. The redesign of UNDP's organizational structure and the implementation of the firewall in Viet Nam could provide for a meaningful evaluation in 2008-2009.</p>

¹⁵ This long and inconclusive debate raises a number of questions that should be answered by the systemic part of the evaluation, such as why so many drafts and what was the essence of disagreement?

<p>One Budget/One Fund</p>	<p>The One Budget, linked to the OP1, is currently in place for the six original agencies. The corresponding One Plan Fund (OPF), the vehicle for new resources pooled by donors at the country level to support the unfunded portions of the One Plan, was finalized in June 2007. Several donors¹⁶ have signed the Letter of Agreement and transferred their contributions to the Fund, covering the unfunded resource requirements for implementing OP1 during the first 18 months. Currently, both the One Budget and the OPF are being revised to include the funding needs of the incoming agencies as per OP2. Since the OP1 is now fully funded, it is not expected that the RC will be faced with difficult decisions in allocating funds among the six agencies.</p> <p>There is a certain risk for agencies at the start of their planning cycle to inflate their budgets (and accordingly the unmet needs) in order to have a greater stake in the OP2. In addition, differences in the way agencies traditionally develop their budgets (resource-based versus needs based) could be controversial. Although the preparation of budgets was guided by past performance¹⁷ in the case of OP1 and is expected to be moving forward, the evaluation of process should assess whether it was possible to adhere to the principle of realistic budgeting in line with delivery capacity in the case of OP2, which incorporates eight new agencies. Moreover, it may be useful to define who mobilizes resources for the OPF (does only the RC have this authority?) as well as the space for agencies to engage in resource mobilization among donors not subscribing to the OPF, as this did not seem clear to a number of the interlocutors.</p>
<p>One UN House</p>	<p>There are currently 15 UN organizations spread across 10 different locations in Hanoi. UNDP, UNIDO, UNV and UNODC share common premises, as do UNFPA and UN-HABITAT, and UNICEF and part of WHO. Plans are underway to establish joint premises housing all UN organizations resident in Viet Nam in the current UN Apartment Building. Agreement on the potential benefit of One UN House is widespread. However, financial feasibility concerns exist, especially for those UNCT members</p>

¹⁶ Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Ireland, Canada, and New Zealand.

¹⁷ UN reform is not about mobilizing more resources but about strategic reform and improved efficiency (for example, see the Tam Dao agreement).

	<p>currently housed in free (GoVN subsidized) or low-rent offices. Innovative funding arrangements are needed and additional external support from donors and the GoVN will be essential. In addition, in Viet Nam, the notion of a One UN House has been enriched by an additional objective—to make it an eco-friendly office premise as part of the overall drive towards ‘greening’ the UN. The RC Office is currently recruiting a UN House Project Manager to supervise the design, budgeting and refurbishment and construction phases. The estimated costs, which need to be monitored in terms of investment and transaction costs, range between USD 7 million and USD 8 million. The One UN House is scheduled to be completed in 2009. Several donors are ready to contribute substantial funding towards the realization of the One UN House, but are unwilling to transfer these funds if a 7 percent overhead charge is applied.¹⁸</p> <p>2008-2009 will be too early to meaningfully evaluate the contribution of the One UN House to an enhanced role of the UN system in Viet Nam and increased efficiency.</p>
<p>External communication and corporate design</p>	<p>Many interlocutors from within the UNCT (especially the initial six organizations) referred to the UN Communications Team as an important element of change since the inception of DaO. The Communications Team has been operating since mid-December 2006 as a single unit, with staff members currently from UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF sharing a single office and working from a joint work plan. In June 2007, the members of the team reviewed their work¹⁹.</p> <p>In terms of the forthcoming process evaluation, the UN Communications Team is an interesting model in terms of increasing United Nations coherency and efficiency. In preparation for the evaluation, the Communications Team should clarify to the UNCT how it relates to the newly joining agencies and their agency-specific communication work, in order for it to be truly a One UN Communications Team. As was done by the six OP1 agencies for the RC Office and the One UN Communications, the UNCT should also agree on a corporate design for the One UN, showing how the members (with their own respective identities) connect via business cards and websites.</p>

¹⁸ In the meantime, an offer has been made to reduce this percentage.

¹⁹ ‘Review of the UN Viet Nam Communications Team’, June 2007.

Readiness of M&E system

Key process indicators	Main Findings
M&E of the reform process	<p>As part of the evaluability assessment, the mission was asked to review the M&E system of the reform process that is being put in place. According to the Terms of Reference for this first assessment, the mission should assess “the basic parameters that will make it possible to fully evaluate at a later stage both the results of the programme and of the pilots, and of the processes that will lead to these results.” In the absence of centrally produced guidelines and without the benefit of the experience of other pilots, the mission makes the following observations.</p> <p>Regarding the M&E system for monitoring programmatic impact and the reform process itself, good progress has been made. A One Plan 1 (2006-2010) M&E Framework has been developed, the M&E Working Group has been expanded to include the eight incoming agencies, and the RC Office has been strengthened with a Planning and Development Results officer.</p> <p>An impressive amount of work on M&E issues has been undertaken, albeit most dating back to the period before the initiative was joined by the eight new agencies. It has been prepared from different perspectives, inspired by different actors, and takes into account different formats regarding benchmarks, indicators, targets and timelines. Elements feeding into M&E were found in a number of documents, including the following: the M&E system developed under the auspices of the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness; the M&E framework of the One Plan 1 2006-2010; success criteria developed in collaboration with donors and the GoVN for the One UN Initiative covering the period July 2007-2008; roadmaps; an action plan to deliver management results on the five Ones; critical elements of change management; and indicators for the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam.</p> <p>For the sake of operational clarity, the time has come to prepare a self-standing comprehensive operational M&E paper incorporating all the above elements, specifying benchmarks, indicators, targets and timelines. That paper should not just be centered around the five Ones but should also be preceded by two important overarching issues—the overall objectives of UN reform in Viet Nam that are currently being revisited, and the matter of efficiency and</p>

	<p>cost savings. The objective of reform is not to achieve the five Ones. They are just instruments to reach the ultimate objectives of UN reform, that is, a strategic repositioning of the United Nations within the Vietnamese context, and greater coherence and efficiency both in conceptual terms and in terms of delivery.</p> <p>The M&E system should not just be seen in terms of evaluability in the context of the DoA evaluation, but in the wider context of the need for regular feedback to the RC, the UNCT, and the TNTF. M&E systems should establish whether intermediate targets have been met on time in order to assess whether the process is on track and to understand the reasons for any slippage that may occur in order to take action.</p> <p>This raises the question of proper intervals for reporting. Given management needs for regular feedback some sort of stocktaking should be done every six months. The first systematic reporting could perhaps be done by mid-2008 as an important building block for the evaluation.</p> <p>It is important to come to grips with efficiency issues and investment costs. As concerns opportunity costs, to retroactively establish benchmarks dating back to the time the reform process was put on the agenda is obviously not an option. However, it would not be impossible to try to capture these through a survey going back to mid-2007 for instance, and to follow up with regular intervals every three months.</p> <p>Given the short duration of the mission, the preparations for the TNTF meeting during the last day of the visit, and not having met with the M&E Working Group, it was not possible to arrive at a conclusion about the feasibility of collecting the large amount of data implied in the documentation (more than 40 indicators were identified in a recent document) or identify a date when the system would become fully operational.</p>
Investment and transaction costs	<p>All UNCT members confirm that their investment costs are extremely high, both opportunity costs and additional costs such as additional country-level focal points for UN reform and missions and other UN reform related travel. The question of costs and benefits was raised.</p> <p>The M&E Working Group has not yet come to grips with</p>

efficiency issues. Some savings should occur because of integrated services²⁰, but as far as savings connected with the One Set of Management Practices are concerned, the expectations seem to be a reflection on faith rather than financial or economic analysis. Will UN reform in Viet Nam result in efficiency gains, have they been quantified and when would they materialize? Investment costs are high and it remains to be seen whether future transaction costs (especially in terms of staffing) under new operating regimes would be lower. The fear is they may be higher and that while there may be a reduction in transaction costs on the government's side, they would de facto be transferred to the UN system. The recommendations of the 2004 TCPR emphasize the need for the continuous evaluation of transactions costs and for an analysis and assessment of costs compared with total programme expenditures. In the absence of cost-benefit analyses, it is difficult to determine targets. This essential work remains to be done.

In the current phase of UN reform, and for some time to come, it is more appropriate to refer to investment costs rather than to transaction costs. The M&E system should be equipped to capture them. Regarding benchmarks, it will be very difficult but not impossible to reconstruct these retroactively since the process was started approximately two years ago. Investment costs should include the following main elements:

- a. Opportunity costs in terms of staff time (pro forma salary costs) spent on reform regardless of which budget is being charged.
- b. The pro forma costs of additional short and long term staff mobilized by the UNCT and agencies in Viet Nam.
- c. The direct costs of support missions as well as pro forma salary costs, again regardless of which budget (in Viet Nam or elsewhere) has provided the funds.
- d. The costs of travel (and salaries) undertaken by staff in Viet Nam related to UN reform.
- e. All other (future) investment costs for new information technology connected to putting in place the One Set of Management Practices.

²⁰ Baseline data are available to monitor savings as a result of long-term agreements with suppliers, as well as for energy savings through the new One UN house.

	The M&E system should keep track of this on a very regular basis. To quantify opportunity costs of staff, regular surveys (perhaps on a trimester basis) would provide the necessary data.
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Optimal involvement of relevant national and international stakeholders in the UN reform process

Key process indicators	Main Findings
Country leadership	The GoVN clearly originated UN reforms long before the DaO Report. UN organizations joined the process on a voluntary basis. UNCT members feel that GoVN leadership is very strong with clear expectations, particularly on the part of the four government aid coordinating agencies. It is, however, unclear how the concerned line ministries are involved in reforming the United Nations. This is important to better understand the role of and working relations with the UN specialized agencies. In terms of establishing a clear basis for evaluating government ownership, this particular aspect should be addressed soon.
Headquarters level support	<p>Most UNCT members were satisfied with the support and interest from their respective Headquarters and regional Offices for the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam, including Headquarters-level focal points, task forces and mechanisms such as the intranet for sharing information between the eight pilot countries. However, pending decisions by agency Headquarters and by the UNDG and CEB on UN-systemic matters, have caused delays in the reform process at the country level.</p> <p>In terms of evaluating support from the Headquarters level, the UNCT should prioritize and map key decisions that Headquarters (both agency and UNDG and CEB) need to take, including decisions to take certain matters to their respective governing bodies. In doing so, it could set up a light monitoring system to keep track of which decisions were delayed, at which level and for how long.</p>
Inclusion of non-resident agencies (NRAs)	Certain UN organizations (IFAD, UNIFEM and UN-HABITAT) strengthened their presence on the ground early on in the UN reform process. Conversely, the One Plan and the OPF do not currently reflect the potential contribution of those agencies that are not resident in the country and did not sign a letter of intent to join the One UN Initiative.

	<p>According to the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence Report, the One Programme should “draw on all UN services and expertise, including those of non-resident agencies, in order to effectively deliver a multi-sectoral approach to development” In terms of evaluating the optimal involvement of NRAs in the UN reform process in Viet Nam, the UNCT and other stakeholders, in preparation for the next strategic planning cycle (UNDAF/One Plan), should develop a process for jointly identifying and approaching NRAs whose participation is considered essential for the UN to deliver a strategic multi-sectoral approach to development in the Vietnamese context. Mobilizing essential contributions by NRAs does not imply the opening up of new offices, something that would be met with widespread hesitation among all partners.</p>
<p>Involvement of national staff</p>	<p>In terms of job satisfaction and sustainability of the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam, it is important to consult and engage UN national staff members in the design process. The UNCT has taken a number of important steps in this regard, including a recent UN Staff Town Hall Meeting, the participation of a UN Staff Association representative in Heads of Agencies and OPMP meetings, and the weekly newsletter The One to Know.</p> <p>For the forthcoming process evaluation, a change management strategy should define milestones and timelines for greater involvement of national staff, not only in terms of classical staff interests but also in terms of empowering them as architects of change.</p>

Adequacy of information sources to evaluate the reform process

Key process indicators	Main Findings
<p>Interviews</p>	<p>The evaluability mission interviewed almost all UNCT members, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, donors from the Like Minded Donor Group and representatives of regional offices based in Bangkok.</p> <p>For the forthcoming process evaluation and further evaluability assessments in early 2008, national staff representatives, NRAs, other government aid coordinating agencies, concerned line ministries, donors who do not belong to the Like Minded Donor Group, and multilateral development partners (such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) should also be interviewed.</p>

Documentary review	<p>The UN reform process and progress made in Viet Nam is well documented. With the launching of a new UNCT website (www.un.org.vn) in October 2007, which features key UN reform and reference documents, the former document sharing website (http://unVietNam.wordpress.com) has been phased out. Annex 5 of this report provides key reference documents that are essential for the successful conduct of the evaluation of process.</p>
Other monitoring exercises	<p>Viet Nam is undergoing similar exercises in the context of aid effectiveness and UN reforms, such as the Independent Monitoring of the Hanoi Core Statement, a UNDG-led stocktaking exercise, External Stakeholder Perception Survey, Staff Survey and the UNDAF Mid-term Review.</p> <p>These exercises would be important sources of information for the 2008 evaluation. To the extent possible, the evaluation of the Viet Nam pilot should be timed in such a way that maximum benefit can be drawn from these undertakings.</p>

D. Readiness of the Viet Nam pilot for process evaluation in 2008-2009

30. The process of UN reform in Viet Nam, initiated long before the publication of the ‘Delivering as One’ Report and the designation of Viet Nam as one of the eight pilot countries, has arrived at an important juncture. The GoVN, donors and 14 agencies involved have made tremendous efforts. Although basic issues, such as clarity of intent, have to be revisited in order to reform the whole UN system in Viet Nam rather than just part of it, the landscape has irreversibly changed. Agencies, which in the past tended to work exclusively with partners outside the UN system, are now getting to know one another’s programmes and are engaged in programmatic collaboration - some joint programmes and the elaboration of the One Plan 2, integrating the mandates of all 14 agencies, are cases in point. Virtually all agencies subscribed to the five Ones in general terms, although there remain important differences about precise interpretation, operational tools, steps to be taken and timelines. Full integration of agencies and programmes under the leadership of the RC as Chief Executive Officer has turned out to be a bridge too far. This is illustrated by the unresolved discussions about the position and status of the RC. While virtually all interlocutors subscribed to the formula of an empowered RC, there remain different views on what would constitute an appropriate authority and accountability framework for the RC. Intensive discussions are ongoing in the UNCT about the end product of UN reform in Viet Nam with the aim of achieving clarity of intent, from which the operational steps would then logically follow.

31. Regarding evaluability, the mission was asked to address whether or not the parameters were in place to allow for a meaningful evaluation of the pilots as of mid-2008. Without clarity of intent and a clear articulation of the comparative advantage of the United Nations in Viet Nam, it was assumed that this would be difficult. This report disagrees, since an important output of the DaO evaluation would be to draw lessons based on progress assessed in all eight pilot countries, which vary greatly in terms of size, economic status, origins, design and start date of the reform process. It was understood that the government would drive the process, that each pilot country would be unique, and that the process would be a journey into uncharted territory. Not pre-empting the outcome of evaluability studies in other pilot countries, the history of UN reform in Viet Nam, which like elsewhere is also conditioned by UN-systemic constraints, will have a lot to offer in terms of lessons learned. Despite the absence of clarity of intent, important progress has been made, and the experience gained and preparations undertaken should accelerate the process of implementation once the vision is shared and owned by all agencies.

32. The reform process has been particularly well documented, transparent and has listed and analyzed set-backs and difficulties, as illustrated and documented during the TNTF meeting of 2 November 2007. The landscape of UN reform has changed and there are a number of new programmatic initiatives, which are clearly a departure from business as usual. While important work has been and is being undertaken to put into place a monitoring system, the challenge is to agree on targets and timelines, and to make that system operational in order to permit a first systematic reporting, if possible before the process evaluation of DaO is scheduled to begin. This, in turn, depends on achieving a consensus among the 14 agencies regarding clarity of intent, which should be based on a clear articulation of the comparative advantages of the United Nations in the Vietnamese context.

Annex 1: Background

Evaluation of the DaO pilot initiative

1. *Request to UNEG for the evaluation:* The CEB endorsed the recommendation of the High-level Committee on Programmes for an evaluation of the DaO pilots. The CEB called upon UNEG to urgently establish the substantive parameters and process for the evaluation of the pilots and requested to be kept informed. The evaluation results are to be reported to and considered by both the UNDG and CEB. In its recommendation, the High-level Committee noted that dedicated resources would be required for the evaluation.

2. *UNEG management structure to conduct the evaluation:* UNEG has established a management structure for the evaluation with Heads of Evaluation providing strategic guidance and oversight and supported by a Management Group co-chaired by the FAO and UNICEF heads of evaluation and having as members IFAD, ILO, UNCTAD, UNDESA, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNODC, WFP and WHO¹. The UNEG Secretariat will manage a trust fund and hire temporary evaluation staff and consultants for the conduct of the evaluation.

3. *The scope of the evaluation:* The UNEG proposed course of action recognized the experimental nature of the pilots and the need for a) the independence and credibility of the evaluation; b) evaluation to feed into decision-making processes; and c) national authorities in each country to be full partners. A process evaluation was structured that was designed to support inter-agency and inter-governmental decision making and provide accountability on the efficiency of processes and, in due course, on results and impacts. The scope of the evaluation included all phases of the process, the experience of the pilots and the global experience, and examining the interests of partners and stakeholders. Selected experiences in non-pilot countries, also working for more effective and coherent UN delivery, were to be examined both to draw additional lessons and supplement the before-and-after information on the pilots themselves in making comparative judgments.

4. *Approach and deliverables recommended by UNEG:* UNEG would provide the following deliverables to the CEB through the High-level Committee on Programmes (with reports also available to the High-level Committee on Management for discussion). In the interest of full transparency and accountability, these deliverables would also be public documents in their final form:

An assessment of the evaluability of DaO (to be delivered to the High-level Committee on Programmes in March 2008)

5. Guidelines are being developed for evaluability both at the level of the system as a whole and for the individual pilots. These require clear statement of objectives for the One UN pilot country initiative at the UN system and individual country levels and of indicators. Individual pilot initiatives will need to be

¹ See Acronyms and Abbreviations.

evaluated against both the intent set for country specific objectives as well as for the One UN pilot country initiative as a whole. UNEG proposes a) to carry out a study of the evaluability of each pilot as soon as its strategic intent and benchmarking is enunciated and, at the latest, for all pilots by February 2008; and b) prepare a synthesis report on the evaluability of the pilots and learning, and on the evaluability of the UN system guidance and support to the initiative.

A process evaluation of the pilot experience (to be delivered to the High-level Committee on Programmes in September 2009)

6. The process evaluation would make use of the self-assessments carried out in country by the national governments and UNCTs and country studies and analytical work by UNEG to assess such factors as the progress in implementing change, the extent of ownership by the system as a whole, the contribution of the various UN organizations to DaO and the potential for efficiency gains. It would draw lessons for good practice from both pilot and non-pilot countries and draw lessons for overall adjustment of the initiative and the scope for extended implementation. It would also provide a baseline of information for further evaluation. The report would inform the process of the TCPR of 2010.

An evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilot experience (to be delivered to the High-level Committee on Programmes in September 2011)

7. During 2009, UNEG would assess the plans developed by the national governments and UNCTs and by UNDG Office and UN organizations to inform them if the preparatory measures being taken are sufficient to provide the information required for the conduct of the results and impact evaluation of the pilot experiments as well as the initiative as a whole.

8. Throughout the evaluation, UNEG will provide the CEB through the High-level Committee on Programmes, High-level Committee on Management and UNDG, as appropriate, progress reports on the work undertaken and particular issues arising from the country evaluation work and global analysis which may be useful to management in making programme adjustments and for application in individual pilot countries.

9. It is assumed that, as is normal evaluation practice, national governments, UNCTs, and UN organizations will undertake the necessary work in support of the evaluation. It is also assumed that the necessary objectives and indicators will be specified at country and global levels and the pilots will undertake self-assessments as envisaged.

10. *Resources required for the evaluation:* UNEG is the network of Heads of Evaluation of the UN system. It operates in a voluntary fashion and has no resources. It has begun initial work drawing on the resources of individual agencies. It will require funding for the evaluation, which is estimated as USD 1.6 million over the period 2007-2009.

Deliverables	2007	2008	2009	Total
Evaluability assessment	200,000	28,000		228,000
Process evaluation		471,000	421,000	892,000
Scope of impact evaluation			210,000	210,000
Guidance materials and reports		55,000	35,000	90,000
Contingencies (10 percent)	20,000	55,000	67,000	142,000
Total	220,000	609,000	733,000	1,562,000

11. The proposed budget includes a senior evaluation manager (L6) for two years, the allocation of an L4 evaluation staff/consultants, a full time G4 research assistant and expenses for travel and report publication. UNEG will provide management oversight through the voluntary contribution of the participating UNEG members. The budget covers the full costs of evaluation.

Annex 2: Terms of Reference

UNEG Evaluation of DaO UN Pilots

Terms of reference for evaluability study in eight DaO Pilot Countries

(January -March 2008)

Background

In November 2006, the Secretary-General's High-level panel on UN System-wide coherence published the report 'Delivering as One'. It put forward a comprehensive set of recommendations including the establishment of One UN pilot initiatives at the country level, with One Leader, One Programme, One Budget, and where appropriate, One Office. The recommendations were largely grounded in General Assembly resolution 59/250 adopted in 2004, which provided guidance for joint offices and a rationalization of UN country presence.

The recommendations to establish pilots at the country level were met with great interest in the UN system, and by the end of December 2006, eight governments had expressed interest in joining this initiative. By February 2007, eight countries had asked the UNDP Administrator in his capacity of chair of the UNDG to support their pilot initiatives: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

Following discussions by the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) on 20-21 March 2007, the Chief Executives Board, in its meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 20 April 2007, called on UNEG to undertake an evaluation of the pilots that would focus on design and progress, to be followed at a later date by an evaluation of results and impact¹.

To this end, UNEG established a management group to oversee the design and implementation of the evaluation, co-chaired by the heads of the evaluation services of UNICEF and FAO². A comprehensive process of consultations was initiated that resulted in the basic design of the evaluation. Main elements of the design were, as a first step, an evaluability study to be reported in March 2008 covering country and UN systemic mechanisms put in place for implementing the reforms. A second step would be a process evaluation of the pilot experience to be accomplished by September 2009. The last step would be an evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilot experience, for delivery to the HLCP by September 2011.

¹ Exact phrasing "called upon UNEG to urgently establish the substantive parameters and process for the evaluation of pilots, and requested to be kept fully informed of progress."

² A DaO evaluation interim manager/coordinator was appointed as from 1 January 2008 who is a senior staff member of the Evaluation Office of UNICEF.

At its meeting on 20-21 September 2007, the HLCP endorsed the overall evaluation in its report to the Chief Executives Board as well as the first step, an assessment of the evaluability of the Delivering as One Initiative by March 2008. This study would assess the process to date, plans, targets and tools. The study would provide lessons and independent advice to country teams to improve the quality of their planning. UNEG agreed that “the evaluability study to be completed in March 2008 would be substantive and would examine both the scope of the plans drawn up by country teams and criteria such as those indicated by members of the HLCP (including, inclusivity, diversity, openness of the process and how the single programme corresponded to national priorities)”. This same meeting stressed the need for timely feedback from evaluation for management decision making on the future of Delivering as One.

The evaluability studies to be conducted by UNEG will benefit from a separate initiative launched by the Deputy Secretary-General to request governments of the eight pilot countries to provide additional information on the anticipated benefits and impact on national ownership so far. These assessments by governments will be complemented by a ‘stocktaking’ exercise to be conducted by the chair of the UNDG with UNCTs and organizations overseeing the pilots.

The new resolution of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2007 encourages the Secretary-General to support programme country pilots countries to evaluate and exchange their experiences with the support of UNEG. The emphasis is hence on UN system support to the evaluation by the programme countries themselves. In addition, the resolution calls for an independent evaluation of lessons learned from these efforts for consideration of Member States, without prejudice to a future inter-governmental decision.

The self-assessments of the DaO pilots by the governments of the eight countries are now fully mandated by the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review and provide an important frame of reference for the UNEG evaluability studies. On the one hand, the UNEG evaluation process will closely follow these self-assessments and possible exchanges of experiences among DaO pilot countries. On the other hand, emerging findings of the UNEG evaluability studies can be brought to the attention of DaO pilot countries and contribute to the self-assessments.

Evaluation of the DaO Programme and pilots (2007-2011)

The main elements of the evaluation design include the following:

- a) An evaluability study to be carried out at the country and UN systemic levels, that is, a technical assessment of design of the pilots and mechanisms put in place for implementing the reforms (mission reports are to be made available as soon as possible and the synthesis report is due in March 2008)³.
- b) In 2009, a synthesis of the self-assessments done by the pilots during 2008 and a UN systemic process evaluation of the pilot initiative for delivery to the HLCP (the synthesis

³ Due to a delay in the start-up of the DaO evaluation process and constraints to the planning of country visits the overall study is not likely to be completed before the end of April 2008.

report is due in September 2009 and will contribute to the preparation of the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review⁴ of 2010).

- c) An overall evaluation of the results and impacts of the pilot experience, for submission to the HLCP (due in September 2010/2011).

First step: Conduct of evaluability studies (January-March 2008)

The evaluability study of the Delivering as One of each of the pilots and as a whole is a technical assessment of the basic parameters that will make it possible to fully evaluate at a later stage both the results of the programmes and of the pilots, and of the processes that will lead to these results. These parameters comprise:

- a) Quality of the design for the achievement of results, that is, the existence of clear objectives and indicators to measure results at a later stage.
- b) Initial appraisal of processes for the optimal involvement of relevant national and international stakeholders (including the governments of recipient countries; civil society; the private sector; UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies; and external aid agencies).
- c) Existence of adequate sources of information to assess the achievement of results and indicators as well as of the required processes.
- d) National ownership and leadership in the evaluation process, identification of independent and credible evaluators in pilot countries who can be involved in the evaluation of process and results of the Delivering as One pilots at a later stage.

The purposes and objectives of the evaluability study include the following:

- a) Support governments and other stakeholders in the pilot countries as well UNCTs and the UN development system in identifying strengths and weaknesses in the design of their respective Delivering as One initiatives to inform immediate corrective measures, monitor progress and enable self-assessments.
- b) Allow governments, other stakeholders as well as the UNCT and the UN development system to receive immediate feedback on processes for the involvement of relevant and international stakeholders.
- c) Allow stakeholders to establish baselines and progress measurement during the implementation of the pilots for the assessment of results achievement.
- d) Allow governments, other stakeholders, and the UN development system as well as UNEG to identify national evaluators in pilot countries.

⁴ The Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review was undertaken by the Economic & Social Committee of the United Nations.

- e) Allow UNEG to compile information from all eight pilot countries and to synthesize information as part of a comprehensive evaluability study that will facilitate the planning of subsequent stages of the overall evaluation.

Conduct of evaluability study field missions to pilot countries (January-March 2008)

The field missions to pilot countries will take place within a very short timeframe (January-March 2008). Due to time constraints, some will have to take place in parallel.

The field missions to pilot countries will be consultative of the national government, other national and external stakeholders, all members of the UNCT and, where possible, NRAs and funding agencies.

The mission will begin its work with a series of briefings on the UNEG evaluation and will hold wind-up sessions to share its main findings and conclusions with the main stakeholders in line with purposes and objectives described above.

The reports of the missions will be provided to the UNEG coordinator within 10 days of the completion of the country visit (period to be adjusted where country visits are organized back-to-back). The reports will be structured around the parameters of the evaluability study described above. UNEG will share the reports with concerned stakeholders as soon as possible.

Requests from UNCTs to address weaknesses and shortcomings in the design and process of the Delivering as One will be shared with appropriate support mechanisms, for example UNDGO.

Conduct of the evaluability study of the UN system support to Delivering as One (January-March 2008)

Measures taken by the UN organizations to support the Delivering as One initiative will be mapped. The evaluations done by UN organizations in order to distill lessons and best practices will be reviewed. The information gathered will enable UNEG to prepare the evaluation design of the process evaluation to be conducted during 2008-2009 on the readiness of the whole UN system to support the Delivering as One Initiative.

The report to be submitted in March 2008 will cover the adequacy of the scope of the plans drawn by the UNCTs and the UN system as a whole. It will include the criteria indicated by HLCP (for example, response to national needs and priorities, inclusiveness, diversity and openness of the process).

Annex 2.a Mission checklist and coverage of the reports of the field missions

A. Basic facts—history, context and scope of the DaO pilot

- a. What was the pre-pilot situation with respect to CCA, UNDAF and the RC system?
- b. When and how was the DaO pilot conceptualized and how has it been implemented? Which national stakeholders are involved in the process (government, civil society, private sector)?
- c. What are the priorities of the government concerning DaO?
- d. What has changed since the pilot started? What has been the progress in the implementation of the ‘Ones’?
- e. What organizations are members of the UNCT? What is the role of NRAs?
- f. What is the size of the UN programme, its main characteristics and its relative importance to the country (taking into account ODA, South-South cooperation, etc.)?

B. Assessment of the substantive design of the DaO pilot (4-5 pages)

- a. What is the vision of the government and other national partners concerning DaO and what are specific expectations?
- b. To what extent does the UN system respond to specific needs and priorities of the country? How ‘tailor-made’ is the UN contribution?
- c. What is the relationship of the DaO pilot with national development plans and strategies (including poverty reduction strategy papers, sector-wide approaches, and national plans related to internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs)?
- d. To what extent is there a strategic intent for the totality of the contribution of the UN development system?
- e. What is the relationship of the DaO pilot with other forms of external aid (e.g., budget support)?
- f. How ‘SMART’ (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time bound) are the objectives and indicators of the DaO pilot?
- g. How adequate is the M&E system?
- h. What other parameters need to be taken into consideration to assess the design of the DaO pilot?

C. Initial assessment of the DaO pilot processes and implementation (4-5 pages)

- a. To the extent that there is a formal agreement between the government and the UN development system concerning the objectives, the plan, and at what level in government decisions are being taken, what are the scope and main features of that agreement?
- b. What is the process in place at the national level to plan and develop the pilot concerning, for example, interaction between various parts and levels of government and the UN system, interaction of the UN system with other national stakeholders (civil society, private sector), and interaction between the UN system and other external aid agencies?
- c. How does the UN system interact with other forms of external aid (OECD-DAC and South/South)? How is the UN system perceived by other partners?
- d. How are needs and priorities of the countries reflected? What needs to be responded to by NRAs of the UN development system?
- e. How is joint programming conducted (CCA/UNDAF)? What is the importance of joint programmes?
- f. What support has there been to the process from UNDG, UNDGO and from UN regional teams and Headquarters?
- g. What has been the progress in the implementation of the Ones (One Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Framework, One Office)?
- h. To what extent do the support systems (for example, financial and administrative procedures, human resources, information technology, procurement) support the DaO?
- i. How can the cost of the DaO pilot be assessed? How is the cost perceived by different stakeholders?
- j. What are the basic parameters that need to guide an ulterior evaluation of process?

D. Assessment of the adequacy of sources of information

- a. What are the key documents that guide the DaO pilot (government policies and strategies, UN programme documents, budgetary frameworks, documents of individual UN organizations, etc.)?
- b. What national and international stakeholders need to be interviewed for a full-fledged process evaluation?
- c. What other methods (apart from document review and interviews) should be considered to allow for greater triangulation and objectivity of information (e.g., field visits, surveys)?

Note: The mission will also contact national institutions and individuals that are specialized in evaluation and that can potentially play a role in subsequent stages of the evaluation process.

Annex 2.b Views of stakeholders on the start-up process

The mission will meet with representatives of government, the UN system and other major stakeholders, including donors and seek their views on the following.

Objectives and strategic intent of the One UN pilots and the coordinated or joint programme:

- a. Are all agencies and the government well aware of the objectives and strategic intent?
- b. Do all agencies and the government agree on what the objectives of the pilot are?
- c. If not, what are the divergent views?
- d. Do all partners fully subscribe to the objectives?

With respect to plan(s) for achieving the objectives of the pilot, the coordinated or joint programme, budget and relationship to the government and UN priorities:

- a. Are all partners fully aware of the content and the implications?
- b. Do all partners subscribe to the plans, budgets, etc.?
- c. If any, what are the divergences of view?

One Leader:

- a. How is this working in practice?

Participation and process:

- a. What is the level of participation as viewed by each of the stakeholders, for their own participation and for the participation of others?
- b. What is the level of satisfaction of each of the stakeholders with the system in place for development of concepts and plans and for decision making?

Support:

- a. What is the level of satisfaction with the central UN system guidance, support with tools and methods, and monitoring and reporting requirements?
- b. Individual agencies of the UN system?
- c. How do concerned government departments view their roles in the pilot?

Annex 3: Evaluability mission programme (29 Oct-2 Nov 2007)

TUESDAY 30 OCTOBER 2007			
Time	Activity	Location	Remarks
9:30-10:30	Meeting Mr. Andrew Speedy/FAO Rep	FAO Office (tel: 84-4-9423239 ext 12) 3 Nguyen Gia Thieu Str., Hanoi	Ms. Oanh (Andrew's Secretary)
10:45-11:45	Meeting with Mr. Eamonn Murphy/UNAIDS Country Director	UNAIDS Office (tel: 84-4-7342824 ext. 101) No. 24, Lane 11 Trinh Hoai Duc Str., Hanoi	Ms. Chau (Eamonn's secretary)
13:30-14:30	Meeting with Ms. Nilgun Tas/ UNIDO Representative	UNIDO Office (tel: 84-4-9421495 ext. 127) 72 Ly Thuong Kiet Str., Hanoi	Ms. Van (Nilgun's Secretary)
15.00-16.00	Meeting with Mr. Le Hoai Trung/General Director of International Organizations—MOFA	MOFA Office 6 Chu Van An Str., Hanoi	Mr. Hai (Assistant) tel: 84-902008263
WEDNESDAY 31 OCTOBER 2007			
8:30-9:30	Meeting with Mr. Andrew Bruce/IOM Chief of Mission	IOM Office (tel: 84-4-7366258 ext. 111) Ground Floor, Horison Hotel, 40 Cat Linh Str.,	Ms. Oanh (Andrew's Secretary)
10:00-11:00	Meeting with Dr Olivé/WHO Representative	WHO Office (tel: 84-4-9433734 ext. 83821) 63 Tran Hung Dao Str., Hanoi	Ms. Van (Olive's Secretary)
11:15-12:15	Meeting with Mr. Christophe Bahuet/UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programme)	Christophe's office (tel: 84-4-9421495 ext. 280) 72 Ly Thuong Kiet Str., Hanoi	Ms. Thinh (Christophe's secretary)
13:30-14:30	Meeting with Mr. Nguyen Quang/UN-HABITAT Programme Manager	UNHABITAT Office (tel: 84-903279363) Room 501, 2E Van Phuc, Hanoi	
15:00-16:00	Meeting with Ms. RoseMarie Greve/ILO Director	ILO Office (tel: 84-4-7340902 ext. 201) 48-50 Nguyen Thai Hoc Str., Hanoi	Ms. Nga (RoseMarie's Secretary)

THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER 2007			
9:30-10:30	Meeting with Ms. Suzette Mitchell/UNIFEM Country Programme Manager	UNIFEM Office (tel: 84-4-7345391) Room 317, No. 11 Le Hong Phong Str., Hanoi	Ms. Tra (Suzette's Secretary)
13:30-14:30	Meeting with UNESCO O.I.C.	UNESCO Office (tel: 84-4-7470275 ext. 21) 23 Cao Ba Quat Str., Hanoi	
16.00-17:00	Meeting with Mr. Jesper Morch/UNICEF Representative	Jesper's Office (tel: 9425706 ext. 220) 81A Tran Quoc Toan Str., Hanoi	Ms. Tu (Jesper's secretary)
FRIDAY 2 NOVEMBER 2007			
10.45-11.45	Meeting with Donors	UNDP Conference Room 72 Ly Thuong Kiet Str., Hanoi	Ms. Trang - RC Office tel: 84-4-9421495 ext 244
14:00:1700	Tripartite National Task Force Meeting	Sofitel Plaza Hotel No. 1 Thanh Nien Road, Hanoi	Ms. Trang - RC Office tel: 84-4-9421495 ext 244

Annex 4: Key documents

Global

GA/RES/A/59/250 Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development of the UN System.

UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, 'Delivering as One', November 2006.

UNEG Evaluation of the Pilot Initiative for Delivering as One.

Viet Nam specific

'Agreed Conclusions UNCT Viet Nam Retreat', Tam Dao, 13-14 September 2007.

'Agreed Principles, Objectives and Instruments to Achieve One United Nations in Viet Nam', final version, 18 May 2006.

'DaO Initiative in Viet Nam, Success Criteria', Version 1, 4 July 2007.

Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness, 2 July 2005.

'Harmonisation of UNDG Agencies: Towards One United Nations in Viet Nam', February 2006.

One Plan, Common Action Plan, 2006-2010, July 2007.

'The One Plan in Viet Nam: One Step towards Greater Coherence, A Background Paper', May 2007.

'One UN in Viet Nam, Donor Joint Assessment of the One Plan/One Plan Fund', final version, 12 June 2007.

'Process Indicators for the DaO Initiative in Viet Nam'.

Review of the UN Viet Nam Communications Team, June 2007.

Ryan J and J Morch, 'United Nations Reform: A Country Perspective', 16 September 2005.

'Terms of Reference for the Evaluability Assessments of Delivering as One Pilot Initiative: Visit to Viet Nam'.

Annex 5: Viet Nam Pilot Synopsis

1. The One Programme in Viet Nam started out before the recommendations of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence Report were publicized. In 2005, the UN RC and the UNICEF Country Representative wrote a paper on UN reform for Viet Nam that lay the foundation for the One UN Initiative, which effectively started in February 2006.
2. The One Plan (Common Action Plan 2006-2010) was approved in July 2007 and signed soon after (23 August 2007), thus becoming a binding document for the six signatory agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNV, UNAIDS).
3. It is expected that by early 2008 a revised One Plan will be finalized with all 15 UN organizations operating in Viet Nam fully integrated.
4. At the moment, the internal debate seems to focus on three issues: a) the official acknowledgement of the One Leader's authority and accountability; b) the financial feasibility of the UN House; and c) the M&E of the reform process.
5. The participating UN organizations are reporting greater support from Headquarters. Together with the UNEG mission on evaluability assessment, they expressed satisfaction for the recruitments of the Advisor on Non-Resident Agencies (UNDP funded) and the UN Gender Adviser (co-funded by UNDP and UNIFEM regional office). Moreover, the WFP Deputy Executive Director went to Viet Nam as Observer, as the UNDG Adviser on Change Management was a facilitator to UNCT retreat in Tam Dao.

UNDAF

6. The UNDAF formulation process got its analytical inputs from the Common Country Assessment for Viet Nam, published in 2004, and the government's Five-Year Strategy for Socio-Economic Development. Both the Common Country Assessment and UNDAF adopted a rights-based approach to development.
7. The UNDAF document develops three main themes and outcomes: a) quality of growth, that is government economic policies supporting a more equitable, inclusive and sustainable growth; b) improved quality of delivery and equality in access to social and protection services; and c) policies, law and governance structures conducive to the promotion and protection of human rights for development. Cross-cutting issues include equity and the inclusion of vulnerable groups; Vietnamese youth in transition; participation for empowerment and accountability; the challenge of HIV/AIDS; and gender mainstreaming.
8. The UNCT estimates that approximately USD 425 million is required for the United Nations contribution to the achievement of the UNDAF outcomes (38 percent, 30 percent and 32 percent to be respectively allocated to the three outcomes).
9. The UNCT proposed the formation of three Technical Working Groups, one for each of the UNDAF outcomes. Joint programming is also facilitated by the appointment of lead agencies to manage specific Country Programme Outcomes. Although the resources to these Outcomes will not necessarily be allocated through the lead agency in every instance, the lead agencies will take primary responsibility for technical matters in their respective spheres of operations. Moreover, a number of coordination mechanisms exist in Viet Nam to facilitate the exchange of information among development partners,

such as the Consultative Group between the Government and donors, the Monthly Donor Group Forum organized by UNDP, and the Inter-Agency Programme and Administrative Groups among UN organizations Heads.

10. A UNDAF evaluation framework is established to provide up-to-date and reliable information on progress and challenges without imposing an undue reporting burden on UNCT or the government. It is stated that M&E should not divert human and financial resources from the main development tasks of the UNDAF and country programmes. An independent assessment of progress towards the UNDAF outcomes will come in the form of a joint government and UN mid-term review to be held no later than end 2008. The mid-term review will be synchronized, to the extent possible, with the mid-term reviews of individual UN organizations to save time and money. The UNCT and the government will also jointly organize a final evaluation as input into the formulation of the subsequent UNDAF.

One UN

General

11. The One Programme in Viet Nam started before the recommendations of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence Report were publicized. In 2005, the UN RC and the Country Representative of the UNICEF wrote a paper on UN reform for Viet Nam that lay the foundation for the One UN Initiative, which effectively started in February 2006.

12. The country specific objectives of the One UN Initiative are clearly stipulated in ‘Agreed Principles, Objectives and Instruments to achieve One UN in Viet Nam’, signed by the Vietnamese Prime Minister in May 2006. This document clearly states that the One UN Initiative strives for inclusion, but on a voluntary basis, with UN organizations joining “if and when they choose.”

13. The One Plan (Common Action Plan 2006-2010) was approved in July 2007 and signed soon after (23 August 2007), thus becoming a legally binding document for the six agencies that signed it (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNV, UNIFEM). The Plan comprises of five elements: One Plan, One Budget, One Leader, One House and One Set of Management Practices. As stated in the Agreed Principles, Objectives and Instruments to achieve One UN in Viet Nam’, the One Management Structure was the first objective (to be realized in the second half of 2006), followed by One Programme and One Budget (end of 2006), and One Set of Management Practices and One House (end of 2007).

14. Similar to UNDAF, the One Plan is based on Viet Nam’s Social Economic Development Plan and related national sector plans. The One Plan is conceived as an instrument for making the UN contribution to some of the principles of the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness (July 2005)¹ more visible, by focusing on alignment, harmonization, simplification and managing for results.

15. It is expected that by early 2008, a revised One Plan will be finalized with almost all UN organizations operating in Viet Nam fully integrated.

¹ In 2005, the Government of Viet Nam and donors produced the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness, which translates the Paris Declaration into Partnership Commitments for Viet Nam. The Core Statement includes 14 indicators with indicative targets for 2010.

Actors

16. In early 2006, the UNCT agreed on a ‘two track’ approach, in which Executive Committee agencies would go ahead and others opt in or out depending on their specific circumstances and within their own time-frames.

17. The One Plan 2006-2010 currently encapsulates the country programmes of the six organizations (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNV, UNAIDS and UNIFEM) that signed it. However, as agreed during a retreat of the Heads of Agencies of the UNCT as a whole (February 2007), the One Plan would be opened up in early 2008 to allow UN organizations to join the One Plan if they wished. The government has since received letters of intent from IFAD, UNESCO, ILO, UNIDO, FAO, WHO, UNODC, UN-HABITAT and IOM. The current focus is thus on the integration of eight organizations from the UNCT into the second phase of One Plan².

18. The government aid coordinating agencies, the RC and the Heads of participating UN organizations guide the overall implementation of the One Plan. A range of partners implement UN-funded interventions (including government agencies, research institutions, and civil society organizations). Partnerships with and engagement of the private sector will be pursued for fostering corporate social responsibility as part of the collective efforts in supporting inclusive development of Viet Nam.

² On 11 June 2007, the representatives of the five specialized agencies (FAO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO and UNIDO) sent the Minister of Planning and Investment a letter, because they were concerned that the draft One Plan was not addressing the stated objectives and was not supporting the sustainable development of activities that are part of the specialized agencies’ mandate. They formally requested to be included in all exchanges and discussions related to the One Plan and that the Plan be adapted to include the contributions of these organizations in the outcomes, outputs and budgets and that allocation from the One Fund would take place only once this has happened. The Minister of Planning and Investment replied by stating that all UN organizations had been invited to join the TNTF, which oversees the implementation of the One UN initiative in Viet Nam, as observers as early as May 2006. But only ILO and UNAIDS formally asked to be included in the TNTF.

One Programme

19. Under the strategic leadership of the RC, the One Plan combines the Country Programme Action Plans and Country Programme Documents of the Executive Committee agencies and the three other participating agencies. The One Plan is based on the analysis in the UN Common Country Assessment for Viet Nam, within the overall framework of the UNDAF and in keeping with general pillars of the Social Economic Development Plan.


20. Since the One Plan is the specific contribution to UNDAF of just the six participating UN organizations, it does not cover the whole of UNDAF. However, links to the higher level results of the Social Economic Development Plan and the UNDAF remain straightforward, as shown by the One Plan outcomes: a) social and economic development policies, plans and laws supporting an equitable and inclusive growth; b) universally available and high quality social and protection services; c) environmental protection and a rational use of natural resources for poverty reduction and economic growth; d) accountable, transparent and participatory governance; and e) adequate policies and capacities to effectively reduce risks of, and vulnerability to, natural disasters.

21. The One Plan will be made operational through the development of Detailed Project Outlines, project documents and Annual Work Plans, which describe the specific results to be achieved.

One Budgetary Framework and One Fund

22. The draft terms of reference for the One Budgetary Framework and the One Fund were developed during a mission of the Resource Mobilization Managers of UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA to Viet Nam in December 2006.

23. Approximately USD 218 million is required in order to reach the programme outcomes. UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF Executive Boards have approved a total commitment not exceeding USD 70 million for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2010. UNV, UNAIDS and UNIFEM expect to be expected to provide USD 3 million.



24. Of the total resource requirements, USD 126 million has already been mobilized. The Terms of Reference for the One Plan Fund (USD 92 million—the gap between resources already secured and those needed to implement the Plan until 2010) was finalized in June 2007 and later subscribed by the agencies on 10 July 2007. Memorandums of Understanding and Letters of Agreement between Administrative Agent (UNDP) and participating agencies followed.

25. The Joint Donor Assessment contains a commitment to provide full, non-earmarked funding for the One Plan through the One Fund for an initial phase (1 July 2007 to 31 December 2008). The funding needs for this period are USD 33 million.

26. The Budgetary Framework will be modified in 2008, as soon as the other UN organizations join the programme. With this regard, it is worth noting that the following:

- a) The Director General of WHO openly stated the organization’s readiness to become part of the One UN Plan in 2008 and plans to modify its two-year programme budget to align it with the five-year planning cycle of the Government of Viet Nam and the One UN. However, the Director General also pointed out that a revision of the One Plan and of the budgetary framework in favour of health sector policies would be essential.
- b) The Director of IFAD specified in the letter of intent that, as IFAD resources are extended to the government as loans, pooled funding may not be an immediate choice. Rather joint programmes would be an area where IFAD can work with two or more UN organizations.

One Leader

27. The UNCT supports the RC system based on the accountability framework that has been developed for the RC by the RC Issues Group of UNDG in consultation with all agencies of UNDG and the CEB. The accountability framework, which is outlined in the document ‘Principles for Enhancing the

Leadership Role of the Resident Coordinator' was agreed by members of UNDG at its Executive Committee retreat in 15 July 2005.

28. Attempts to operationalize the RC authority, responsibility and accountability (RC Note) have stalled in UNDG for lack of agreement beyond the six principals of the participating agencies of the One Plan 1.

29. In addition to the above, taking into account the context of the One UN Initiative in Viet Nam, the UN organizations with presence in the country agreed to strengthen the authority, responsibility and accountability of the RC function with a view to addressing the challenge of UN system-wide coherence (agreement reached at Tam Dao, Vietnam in September 2007).

30. The UNCT is currently developing a local Memorandum of Understanding that will contain the following principles regarding the One Leader: has the authority to give guidance on One Plan; is the ultimate decision maker on the allocation for funds; and will speak with One Voice.

One Office

31. All UN organizations in the UNCT have confirmed their support for establishing One UN House, once financial feasibility concerns are met. With the limited budget for construction purposes in UN organizations, financial feasibility remains a challenge. External support from donors and the government is essential for successful completion of this project.

32. The RC Office has begun a process of analysing the costs associated with converting the UN Apartment Building, located in the Van Phuc diplomatic compound and currently used for UNFPA office spaces and for apartments for UN staff. The preliminary cost figures run from USD 1.2 million (renovation of current building) to USD 5.6 million (constructing new premises). However, the UNCT has indicated that retrofitting the building plus adding two floors on top is the minimum needed (minimum costs of USD 2.8 million).

33. A mission from UNEP and the UN Working Group on Common Premises established the technical feasibility of an eco-friendly UN House. Moreover, a short term financial and real estate analyst and a full term UN House Project Manager have been recruited with funding from Executive Committee (on reimbursable basis) and RC Office. Contributions from the national government, the UN organizations and donors are being sought.

One Set of Management Practices—OPMP and One UN Support Facility

34. In line with the Hanoi Core Statement, the UN system has intensified efforts to rationalize its implementation arrangements and to simplify and harmonize programme management, administrative and financial procedures.

35. A UN-wide Operations Management Team in Viet Nam was established in November 2006 and prepared an Action Plan for Common Services to achieve greater efficiencies. The following common services are considered priority: developing long-term agreements for procurement; common cost norms; learning and training services; travel services; and a shared translators pool.

36. A One UN Support Facility has been established to facilitate the transformation process and provide support for: a) organizational diagnosis, change management expertise and teambuilding during the implementation of UN reforms; b) UN-wide instruments to enhance coherence; and c) tracking and measuring the results of the One UN Initiative towards a more coherent and efficient UN. All agencies

participating in the One UN Initiative will benefit. The initial resource requirements are USD 2 million over a two-year period from mid-2007 to mid-2009.

37. A Management Plan (OPMP)—primarily conceived as an internal management tool—is being prepared to ensure that the One Plan is matched by the appropriate management structure, human resources, and improved business practices and common services. Progress has been made in several areas including Daily Subsistence Allowance calculation practices, long-term agreements for copying services and information technology equipment; a common learning plan; and uniforms for UN drivers.

38. Harmonised Programme and Project Management Guidelines have been developed to decrease transaction costs for partners and UN staff. All chapters have been reviewed and commented upon at least once by the national government and three Executive Committee Agencies. Agreement was reached on some key points: UN programme cycle, financial reporting requirements, and M&E. The second complete draft is expected in December 2007.

Communication

39. Since mid-December 2006, the UN Communications Team has been operating as a single unit, with staff members from UNFPA, UNDP and UNICEF sharing a single office and working from a joint work plan. This is the first example of a collocated, fully functioning team formed as part of Viet Nam's One UN Initiative.

40. During the retreat in Johannesburg (May 2007), the Viet Nam Communications Team made a presentation to colleagues from all the other pilot countries, showing the difference between 'communicating about One UN' (as is being done in most pilots) and 'communicating as One UN' (as is being done in Viet Nam). But many issues relating to how to prioritize the growing and ever-diversifying workloads still remain. Team members often expressed the challenge of knowing how to fit together agency tasks, UN tasks and other demands on their time.

41. Key products include One UN Information Brief, Common Goals Collective action document-sharing website ([http://unViet Nam.wordpress.com](http://unVietNam.wordpress.com)), One UN folders and business cards solidifying the UN brand.

M&E

42. The government and participating UN organizations agreed to proceed with an annual review of projects as per clusters of the One Plan and an annual review of One Plan (starting from 2008) under the guidance of the Steering Committee. This will aim to make adjustments based on the findings, outline programme priorities for the coming year, and discuss overall funding allocations and other issues. The Review of the One Plan results should, to the extent possible, be planned and conducted in conjunction with UNDAF.³ Moreover, in mid-2009, an independent evaluation of the One Plan will be carried out by external consultants. Findings, conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation will feed into planning of the next One Plan cycle, 2011-2015.

³ This is consistent with Viet Nam's Decree 131 on management and use of official development assistance by the Government of Viet Nam.

43. An inter-agency M&E Working Group was established at the end of March 2007 to develop a comprehensive M&E Framework for the One Plan. The Working Group, composed of M&E officers from the participating agencies, was strengthened by the arrival of a Development Results and Planning Officer in March 2007 working in the Office of the RC. The M&E Working Group assists the One Plan Steering Committee in measuring the results from the One Plan towards a more coherent and efficient UN. The M&E Working Group is also expected to contribute to the M&E of One Plan implementation at the output and outcome levels.

44. The M&E Working Group has suggested a comprehensive M&E Framework based on the Results and Resources Framework of the One Plan. The Evaluation Framework includes impact indicators that help track the progress in the OP1 results (the same will be done for OP2) and the value added of the United Nations working together in the One Plan, such as reduced transaction costs and enhanced impact in line with the Hanoi Core Statement. A range of M&E instruments are expected to be used, including regular government surveys, sectoral baseline and end-line surveys, studies (especially at the provincial level), joint periodic reviews and monitoring, and independent assessments and evaluations as well as data management systems, such as DAD and VietInfo⁴.

45. The Donor Joint Assessment states that the One Plan progress should be reviewed against success criteria between months 12 and 18 in order to provide a sound basis for moving forward with full funding for the remainder of the One Plan period. An informal tripartite meeting was held on 28 June 2007 to finalize a set of success criteria that relate to activities to be undertaken by (and to the immediate release of funds that will be earmarked for) the six participating UN organizations in the period from July 2007 to December 2008. These success criteria are not to be regarded as conditions for donor support. Rather they are the actions that all three parties consider necessary for success and against which they can monitor progress. When progress is not as fast as anticipated, success criteria will be retained, but the time-frame for their achievement extended. It was agreed that the success criteria would be shared with the specialized agencies that already signed their Letter of Intent. The success criteria will be reviewed in the TNTF when the specialized agencies join the One UN in the first quarter of 2008 and donors make additional funds available to implement the revised One Plan.

⁴ The Development Assistance Database for Viet Nam (DAD Viet Nam) application is an automated information management system which is designed to improve efficiency and coordination of donor activities within the country. VietInfo is a local adaptation of DevInfo.

<i>One UN Initiative - Success Criteria July 2007 to December 2008</i>	
<i>By end</i>	<i>Criteria</i>
June 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government, donors and the participating UN Agencies agree <i>One UN Initiative Success Criteria</i> for the period July 2007 to end December 2008.
October 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Draft <i>One UN Management Plan</i></u> shared with GoV and donors and including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Current staffing breakdown ○ fund flow information ○ One UN support facility proposal ▪ TNTF agree update of the original <i>One UN Road Map</i> of February 2006. ▪ <i>One Plan M&E Framework</i> in place. ▪ <i>RC Note</i> approved and UN participating agencies outline how Country Directors will relate to the RC ▪ RC's authority reflected in One Plan Fund allocation/prioritization
December 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Joint Progress Report</i> on UN reform process (HCS-related and others) presented to annual CG meeting. ▪ <i>UNEG/UNDG benchmarks</i> reviewed by TNTF, and adapted if necessary. ▪ TNTF happy with design and budget for One UN House ▪ Donors agree to provide funding for One UN Support Facility and One House.
March 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Specialized Agencies that have signed Letters of Intent have all joined Revised One Plan based on their comparative advantage. ▪ <i>Revised One Plan</i> agreed by TNTF. ▪ Government and donors support <u>final <i>One UN Management Plan</i></u> including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ capacity mapping of staff ○ revised staffing plan ○ analysis identifying potential reduction of costs (opportunity, transactional, financial) ○ explanation of organizational changes. ▪ <u>Revised <i>One Plan M&E Framework</i></u> in place ▪ <i>Harmonized Programme Management Guidelines</i> operational and related HCS indicators in place. ▪ UN participating agencies reporting greater support from HQ ▪ One UN process being documented in Viet Nam and shared with other One UN pilots in the context of UNEG and UNDG benchmarking initiatives.
September 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shared TNTF understanding of UN's comparative advantage in Viet Nam. ▪ Outcome of TNTF review of "Success Criteria" signals sufficient progress to allow donors to seek approval for remaining One Plan/One Plan Fund period.
December 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Joint Progress Report</i> on UN reform process presented at CG meeting ▪ One UN House opened ▪ Donor approval of un-earmarked full-funding for remaining One Plan/One Plan Fund period

Outstanding/pending issues

46. *One Leader*: Urgent action is required. As more agencies are joining the pilot, there are anxieties among the local team about the need to re-open the discussion on One Leader.

Financial feasibility of One UN House.

47. *Re-focussing the UN role in supporting Viet Nam's development*: Donors see it as important that the scale of operations and the number of UN organizations in Viet Nam does not increase as a result of the pilot. Emphasis will be upon the United Nations as policy adviser executing its normative function and working as one. This will mean a marked shift away from service delivery and from project funding.