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EVALUATION OF UNESCO'S ACTION TO PROTECT CULTURE IN EMERGENCIES

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Abstract & Acknowledgements

ABSTRACT

UNESCO's General Conference adopted the 2015 Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict ([38C/49](#)). As the Strategy entered into its fifth year of implementation, an evaluation was requested by the Culture Sector to generate findings, lessons learned and recommendations regarding the relevance and the effectiveness of its work to support countries in protecting culture in emergencies. This evaluation thus assesses the full breadth of UNESCO's work in this area, spearheaded by the dedicated Culture and Emergency Entity, including the activities of the Emergency Preparedness Unit, those of the Organization's six Culture Conventions and related programmes.

Member States find UNESCO's work in protecting culture in emergencies to be highly relevant and indicate that UNESCO is the lead UN organization in this sphere and the only one with a clear mandate. Moreover, Member States believe that the 2015 Strategy has strengthened UNESCO's mandate in this area. At the strategic and structural levels, supporting Member States with protecting culture in emergencies is a priority for UNESCO's Culture Sector. UNESCO has furthermore been relatively effective in achieving its intended targets under the Expected Result dedicated to protecting culture in emergencies. In terms of challenges, the evaluation found that there is no overall results framework for UNESCO's culture in emergencies work as a whole which can guide staff in designing programmes that lead to long-term change. As a result, there is no single organization-wide definition of an emergency and no collective trigger mechanism to guide UNESCO staff in determining whether to intervene or not. Another consequence of this is poor evidence collection, which means that UNESCO often does not have the information required to effectively communicate meaningful results to Member States and the public. UNESCO's capacity to respond in a timely manner is also hampered by both limited regular programme funding for emergency work, as well as heavy administrative processes.

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Bert E. Keuppens, Director a.i., UNESCO Internal Oversight Service

List of Acronyms

39C/5 and 40C/5	Approved programmes and budgets for 2018-2019 and 2020-2021	RPBA	Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment
CLT/CEM	Culture and Emergencies Entity	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit	SMART	Specific, Measureable, Attainable, Realistic and Time Bound Indicators
ER5	Expected Result 5 in the 39C/5 Programme and Budget	STAB	Scientific Technical Advisory Board of the 2001 Convention
EU	European Union	ToC	Theory of Change
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	UN	United Nations
HEF	Heritage Emergency Fund	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HRBA	Human Rights-based Approach	UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ICC	International Criminal Court	UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
ICH	Intangible Cultural Heritage	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites	UNIDROIT	International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group	UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization	USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
IOS	Internal Oversight Service	WB	World Bank
KII	Key Informant Interview	WCO	World Customs Organization
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	WHC	World Heritage Centre
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization		
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee		
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights		
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment		
QIP	Quick Impact Project		
RF	Results Framework		

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	6
Management Response	9
1. Introduction	12
Background	12
The Evaluand	12
Scope of the Evaluation	12
Objectives and Use	13
Evaluation Questions	13
Evaluation Methodology	13
Value Addition	15
Limitations	15
2. How relevant is UNESCO's work to protect culture in emergencies?	16
Member States	16
External Actors	18
Human Rights Based Approach	19
Community Voices and Marginalised Groups	20
3. Situating UNESCO's Mandate and Capacity to Deliver in Emergencies	21
Strategic and Organizational Set-up for Emergency Work	21
Institutional and Operational Challenges	22
4. When to Intervene in Emergencies	26
External Actor Perspectives	26
Case by Case Approach	28
Missing Elements	28
5. Results	30
Overview of Culture Conventions' Contributions	30
International Agenda Setting	30
Post-Disaster Needs Assessments	32
A Human Centric Approach	32
Intangible Cultural Heritage	32
Diversity of Cultural Expressions	34
Expected Result 5	34
6. Evidence, Learning and Communication	37
Review of Guiding Documents and Known Frameworks	37
Potential of Culture 2030 Indicators for Emergencies Work	39
Impact on Learning and Reporting	40

Impact on Data Storage	40
Power of Quality Data	40
Definition of Success	42
Communication	42
7. Sustainability of Efforts	44
Entry Points for Partnerships	44
Exit Strategies	45
Knowledge Retention	45
8. Conclusions and Recommendations	46
Conclusions	46
Recommendations	47
Annexes	48

List of Tables, Figures and Focus Boxes

Table 1: UNESCO Funds to Protect Culture in Emergencies	23
Table 2: Draft Intervention Checklist	29
Table 3: 39 C/5 ER5 Targets and Results Summary	34
Table 4: Strengths and Weaknesses of Known Emergency-Related Guiding Documents Linked to Emergency Evidence Collection	38
Table 5: Examples of Linkages between UNESCO's Work and SDG Contributions	39
Figure 1: Stakeholder Interviews by Group	14
Figure 2: Deep Dive on Member State Perspectives	17
Figure 3: Heritage Emergency Fund Authorisation Process	25
Figure 4: Examples of Definitions of Emergency	28
Figure 5: Draft Culture in Emergencies Logic Model	41
Figure 6: Power of Quality Data Example	43
Focus Box 1: Impact of New Players on UNESCO	19
Focus Box 2: Lombok: ICH as a Tool for Community Recovery	33

Executive Summary

The Evaluand

1. This evaluation assesses UNESCO's work to protect culture in emergencies including the Organization's six Culture Conventions¹ and related programmes. UNESCO's work in emergencies spans a wide range of modalities, from capacity building activities, such as the First Aid Course to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis delivered in Mali, Post-Disaster Needs Assessments, awareness raising campaigns, support to Member States in the development of emergency response plans, and interventions, when requested, to stabilise built heritage, safeguard moveable heritage as well as intangible heritage, preserve underwater cultural heritage, and promote cultural diversity and expressions.

Purpose of the Evaluation

2. UNESCO's General Conference adopted the 2015 *Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict* (hereafter the 2015 Strategy) (38C/49), which was followed by the 2017 Addendum (39C/57) which integrated natural and human-induced hazards into the broader framework of emergency work for culture and a related Action Plan (2015-2021) and was welcomed by the Executive Board in 2017.
3. As the 2015 *Strategy* enters into its fifth year of implementation, an evaluation was requested by the Culture Sector to generate findings, lessons learned and recommendations regarding the relevance and the effectiveness of its work to support countries in protecting culture in emergencies. The evaluation aims to help UNESCO strengthen, refocus and better coordinate the Organization's work in the protection of culture in emergencies. The intended users of the evaluation are UNESCO's senior management, particularly in the Culture Sector, Culture Programme Specialists and other UNESCO staff working in the field of emergencies. Secondary users are Member States and the Organization's extensive networks of partners.

¹ 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property; 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 2001 Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage; 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage; 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

Methodology

4. The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach to collect data from a wide variety of sources. These included: a document review to draw emerging themes and inform the research framework in the form of an evaluation index; a quantitative Member State survey to determine country perspectives (51 responses received - 25% response rate); qualitative key informant interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with 144 people in-person and remotely: UNESCO staff (both at Headquarters and in the field), representatives of UN sister agencies, implementing partners, donors, NGOs, academia, expert practitioners, representatives of national and local governments, the private sector, community members and other direct beneficiaries; a thematic case study on UNESCO's use of digital technology in strategies for the protection of culture; a field mission to Lombok, Indonesia for a case study to assess UNESCO's early-recovery support project to weaving communities in response to a natural disaster; and, a field mission to Bamako, Mali for a case study to assess a sample of the latest preparedness and response interventions during a protracted conflict.
5. A participatory approach was applied throughout the evaluation from inception to the final workshop on preliminary findings. The evaluation applied a gender lens to its methodology and examined the role of women in project design and implementation, particularly in the case study on earthquake response in Lombok, Indonesia.

Key Findings

6. Member States find UNESCO's work in protecting culture in emergencies to be highly relevant and indicate that as UNESCO is the lead UN organization in this sphere, it is uniquely placed to catalyse collective action, mobilise funds, coordinate a response and identify appropriate technical interventions. Moreover, Member States believe that the 2015 Strategy and subsequent Action Plan have strengthened UNESCO's mandate in this area.
7. In 2015, the UN Security Council declared the protection of culture a security issue (Resolution 2249). Thus, followed related Resolutions 2199 and 2347, which outlined that threats to and the destruction of cultural sites, objects and practices represent a menace to people's identity and collective memory, and therefore their 'ontological security' or ways of being in the world. These shifts in the understanding of illicit trafficking and heritage destruction as a security matter have made way for emergencies work by the 1954 and 1970 Conventions, in particular.

8. While contributions of the 2003 and 2005 Conventions to emergency work remain at initial stages, the evaluation noted a shift in UNESCO's approach from focusing on tangible heritage alone to defending culture as a whole. There is also broad recognition amongst UNESCO Culture Staff and external experts that intangible cultural heritage has a significant role to play in both disaster mitigation and recovery.
9. UNESCO has been relatively effective in achieving its intended targets under the dedicated Expected Result 5.² The Organization has conducted a broad range of activities across all stages of emergencies (preparedness, response and recovery) and can demonstrate that the intention of these activities was to strengthen Member State capacity and to incorporate the protection of culture into international security, humanitarian and peace-keeping operations (two objectives of the 2015 *Strategy*).
10. At the strategic and structural levels, supporting Member States with protecting culture in emergencies is a priority for UNESCO's Culture Sector. The 2015 *Strategy*, the 2017 *Addendum* and corresponding *Action Plan* are coordinated by the Culture in Emergencies entity (established in late 2018), which includes the Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit as well as the Secretariats of three Conventions (1954, 1970 and 2001). The entity also manages the Heritage Emergency Fund (HEF) and reports on the cross-cutting Expected Result (ER) 5 from UNESCO's C/5 Programme dedicated to protecting culture in emergencies.
11. The evaluation also found a number of challenges with the first one being that there is no single organization-wide definition of an emergency and no collective trigger mechanism to guide UNESCO staff in determining on whether to intervene or not. This also causes confusion among staff, who also do not always know which funding mechanism to turn to for their emergency work.
12. There is general consensus amongst Member States that UNESCO is relevant at all three stages of emergency interventions: preparedness, response and recovery. However, UNESCO's capacity to respond in a timely manner, an issue raised across all Sectors and in previous evaluations and audits, is hampered by a number of challenges related to both limited regular programme funding for emergency work, as well as heavy administrative processes. In addition to the HEF which aims to address this issue, UNESCO can draw on various funding modalities set up by the Culture Conventions. Yet these all depend on their respective governance processes and, with the exception of the Rapid Response Facility under the 1972 Convention, can take six months to a year to operationalize.
13. UNESCO has limited human resources (very few fixed-term staff in the Culture in Emergencies Entity) and technical in-house emergency-related expertise, and lacks the operational deployment mechanisms to quickly respond to emergencies. A roster of experts has recently been set up to address these gaps, but has only recently become operational. Despite all this, Member States continue to rely on the Organization to intervene upon request. In order to respond effectively in an emergency, UNESCO needs to have the relevant technical expertise and in-country experience and its internal capacity should be known in advance to facilitate bottom-up decision-making.
14. An example to this challenge can be seen in the response to the recent destruction and looting of cultural sites across the Middle East and North Africa. Satellite imagery, a reliable tool for the monitoring of sites in inaccessible areas, and other digital technology is increasingly being used for cultural protection during emergencies by UNESCO and others. However expertise in digital technologies is in short supply at UNESCO, making it difficult for the Organization to be a relevant actor in the digital sphere.
15. In light of the challenges cited above, Member States and other international actors in the field of culture (i.e. Advisory Bodies) believe that UNESCO should place more emphasis on preparedness with training on heritage management, emergency response planning, post-disaster needs assessments, and awareness raising campaigns.
16. Finally, the evaluation found that there is no overall Theory of Change or results framework for UNESCO's culture in emergencies work as a whole which can guide staff in designing programmes that lead to long-term change. Currently, activities, associated targets and expected evidence are guided by the key performance indicators found within ER5. However, ER5 does not provide details on how interventions within the stated areas will lead to sustained long-term change. Furthermore, the current monitoring framework only records what has been done (outputs), as opposed to what change has been achieved (outcomes).
17. As a consequence of poor evidence collection, UNESCO often does not have the information required to effectively communicate meaningful results, in particular to Member States and the public. Human stories from the ground are rarely communicated, which hampers UNESCO's ability to provide evidence to substantiate its advocacy for the role of culture in emergencies. Donors and partners remark that they are interested in people-centred results, which bring a 'human face' to UNESCO's work and are considered crucial to delivering compelling stories.

² Culture protected and cultural pluralism promoted in emergencies through better preparedness and response, in particular through the effective implementation of UNESCO's cultural standard-setting instruments.

Recommendations

18. The analysis of the findings has led to the development of six recommendations for the Culture and Emergencies Entity, the Executive Office of the Culture Sector and for Field Offices.

1	<p>Develop a simplified definition of 'emergency' to ensure a common understanding among Culture staff members of what constitutes an emergency intervention, when to pursue emergency channels of funding and implementation.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with the Executive Office and the Culture Conventions' Secretariats</i></p>
2	<p>Develop an overarching Theory of Change that consolidates UNESCO's culture in emergencies work under one framework, outlining causal pathways from activities to outputs to outcomes and impact. The impact ambition should consist of a SMART people-centred vision statement for its culture in emergencies work.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity</i></p>
3	<p>Elaborate a communications strategy for culture in emergencies work focused on human stories. Stories posted on the UNESCO website and messages posted on social media should focus on the importance of protecting culture for the lives of women and men.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with the Department of Public Information</i></p>
4	<p>Create unique checklists to guide field staff in emergency intervention decision-making. A checklist is needed for armed conflict and another for disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity</i></p>
5	<p>Establish clear statements of capacity for each Culture Unit at the field office level – managerial and/or technical. A statement of capacity should include an internal reflection on staff expertise, language skills and experience; as well as for Member States, external organizations and experts.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: each Field Office in coordination with the Executive Office and the Culture and Emergencies Entity</i></p>
6	<p>Develop a strategy for the use of digital technology, outlining a clear vision for integrating solutions into emergency preparedness and response.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with Legal Affairs and the Division of Knowledge Management and Information Systems</i></p>

Management Response

Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

Develop a simplified definition of 'emergency' to ensure a common understanding among Culture staff members of what constitutes an emergency intervention, when to pursue emergency channels of funding and implementation. Emergency could simply be defined as in response to a situation caused by armed conflict and disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards. Preparedness and recovery activities could be considered outside this scope and have their own definitions and subsequent channels for funding and implementation.

Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with the Executive Office and the Culture Conventions' Secretariats

Recommendation 2:

Develop an overarching Theory of Change that consolidates UNESCO's culture in emergencies work under one framework, outlining causal pathways from activities to outputs to outcomes and impact. The impact ambition should consist of a SMART³ people-centred vision statement for its culture in emergencies work. Figure 5 (in chapter 6 on Evidence, Learning and Communication) represents a first draft of the culture in emergencies intervention logic. This was designed in collaboration with the EPR Unit and the next step is for Culture Sector Staff at HQ and in the field to provide feedback to ensure it captures the right linkages and articulates assumptions. The vision statement should work to unite UNESCO and its staff towards a common purpose of serving communities as a measurement of 'success'. It should be simple and specific so it is easily understood by staff and realistic and measurable (within a specified period of time) so it can be achieved. A working draft could include language such as '*UNESCO will enable up to XXX people to benefit from the protection of culture and promotion of cultural pluralism by 2029*'. Culture includes built, intangible, and moveable heritage and various forms of cultural expressions. Benefit also needs to be defined and understood and should include elements such as access, visits, practice, transmission, and employment.

Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity

Management Response (Accepted or Not Accepted as well as the way forward)

Not accepted

Preparedness and recovery activities are at the core of the Culture Sector's work on emergencies. It is critical to invest in, and plan for, preparedness in order to improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of future response and recovery operations. As such, it is therefore not desirable to disassociate preparedness from response and recovery. In this context, rather than pursuing the development of a simplified definition of 'emergency', the Culture and Emergencies Entity, in coordination with the Culture Conventions' Secretariats, will, in the first instance, undertake a review of the current definition of 'emergency' used in the context of the Culture Sector's work and will widely disseminate it, with the view to promote, in coordination with the Executive Office, a more common understanding among Culture staff members.

Accepted

Building on the monitoring & evaluation framework and practices which have been set up for the UNESCO Heritage Emergency Fund - including an intervention logic, corresponding results framework, and annual reports that highlight key lessons learned - and which have been positively assessed in the present evaluation, the Culture and Emergencies Entity will develop an overarching Theory of Change that consolidates UNESCO's work on culture in emergencies, including its activities which are guided by the 2015 Strategy, the 2017 Addendum, and the Action Plan, as well as its activities and associated targets as per Expected Result 5 (ER5) of the 40C/5, with a concerted effort to strengthen outcome-based management and reporting specifically.

³ SMART: specific, measurable, actionable, realistic and time bound.

Recommendation 3:

Elaborate a communications strategy for culture in emergencies work focused on human stories. Stories posted on the UNESCO website and messages posted on social media should focus on the importance of protecting culture for the lives of women and men. How has UNESCO's work impacted their lives and the lives of their families (women, girls, men, and boys) and the community? This will give a 'face' to UNESCO's work, support fundraising capabilities and ultimately deliver a message coherent with longer-term impact aims, including the SDGs.

Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity For the Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with the Department of Public Information

Recommendation 4:

Create unique checklists to guide field staff in emergency intervention decision-making. A checklist is needed for armed conflict and another for disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards. The checklists should enable field office staff to make a 'go/no go' decision based on five main pillars: impact, expertise, funding, operations, and opportunity. The evaluation team suggests starting with impact to better facilitate bottom-up decision-making and the overarching 'people-centred' approach to working in emergencies. Some suggestions on how to formulate this checklist can be found in Table 2 of Chapter 4. It is suggested that the Culture and Emergencies Entity work with field office staff to ensure the checklists incorporate all of the right elements.

Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity

Recommendation 5:

Establish clear statements of capacity for each Culture Unit at the field office level – managerial and/or technical. A statement of capacity should include an internal reflection on staff expertise, language skills and experience; as well as for Member States, external organizations and experts. Strengths and weaknesses will be identified within thematic areas and this would provide clarity of roles and responsibilities across implementing partners, strengthen coordination and speed-up decision-making and response times. Vendor IDs can be created in anticipation of an emergency.

Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity Field Office in coordination with the Executive Office and the Culture and Emergencies Entity

Accepted

The Culture and Emergency entity will develop a communication strategy for culture and emergencies, in cooperation with the Culture Sector Communication, Cities and Events Unit and the Department of Public Information, which will include target audiences, objectives, key messages and communication channels, as soon as the overall communication framework for the Organization will have been revised, notably in the context of UNESCO's ongoing Strategic Transformation.

Accepted

Building on its experience in intervening in a range of emergencies, the Culture and Emergencies Entity, in consultation with Field Offices, will create two checklists to guide decision-making for emergency interventions in situations of armed conflict and disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards. As every emergency is unique, the checklists will aim to identify a set of overarching principles and guiding questions across the proposed five main pillars, with the view to remain operationally relevant and flexible across different emergency contexts, rather than being too prescriptive in their approach.

Accepted

Each Field Office will establish clear statements of their capacity at the Culture Unit level, as well as of Member States under its purview and their local partners and experts. The Culture and Emergencies Entity will coordinate this effort with the Executive Office, with the purpose to identify and implement internal capacity-building activities, to frame the conceptualization of emergency response operations and consider possible temporary deployment of UNESCO or external staff, as needed.

Recommendation 6:

Develop a strategy for the use of digital technology, outlining a clear vision for integrating solutions into emergency preparedness and response. This would include (i) Developing policies to strengthen current practices around data storage, data sharing and data ownership. These policies could also be shared with Member States to ensure close institutional alignment between relevant ministries and national-level stakeholders; (ii) Developing templates/guidance for terms of reference for digital technology services, to ensure that elements such as copyright, data ownership, file types, image resolution, and deliverables are specified clearly. Related to this, UNESCO could develop a standardised legal contract for service providers with a section on data ownership; (iii) Strengthening and clarifying quality standards for all digital data, building on the list already developed by the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Unit. For example, when crowdsourcing images, parameters should be set (such as a minimum of pixels or specifying the type of smartphone device to be used); (iv) Building a centralised platform for sharing data internally and externally, optimised for large file formats.

Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with Legal Affairs and the Division of Knowledge Management and Information Systems

Accepted

The recommendation on the development of a strategy for the use of digital technology goes beyond the scope of the Culture Sector's work on emergencies and is currently being pursued at the Organizational level. In contributing to this Organization-wide effort, the Culture and Emergencies entity will develop guidelines for the use of digital technology in emergency preparedness and response operations concerning culture, including the different components mentioned in the Evaluation, in consultation with Legal Affairs and the Division of Knowledge Management and Information Systems.

Introduction

Background

1. In today's world, cultural heritage, including cultural practices and expressions, face new and increasingly complex challenges. This is particularly true in countries affected by disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards and conflict, which are often closely inter-related. The consequences of this have been extensive.
2. In the last two decades alone, extremist groups have targeted and destroyed cultural sites in Mali, Afghanistan, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Iran, to name but a few. Disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards and rapidly changing ecological and environmental conditions have also contributed to the general destruction and decay of significant monuments and sites, such as in Tonga in which historical buildings (e.g. Old Zion Chapel) and archaeological sites (e.g. Ancient Tombs of Lapaha) were severely affected after Tropical Cyclone Gita in 2018. Similarly, a fire at the National Museum of Brazil in 2018 led to the significant loss of most of its precious collections and archives.
3. In addition to the destruction and loss, there is the comparatively 'invisible' decline in intangible cultural heritage (ICH), such as traditional practices, ceremonies and rituals. For example, a series of earthquakes struck Lombok, Indonesia, in 2018 and severely affected the livelihoods of weaving communities, particularly women, and their capacity to transmit their traditions. Symbols of cultural identity, including books, manuscripts, film and art were targeted by Daesh during the armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, with the aim of eradicating cultural diversity.
4. Recognising these trends, in 2014, UNESCO established the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Unit to coordinate preparedness and response interventions to address emergencies affecting culture with the Secretariats of the Culture Conventions and Field Offices, and to develop new partnerships. Soon afterwards, UNESCO's General Conference adopted the 2015 Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereafter the 2015 Strategy) (38C/49), which was followed by the 2017 Addendum to the Strategy (39C/57) which integrated natural and human-induced hazards into the broader framework

of emergency work for culture, and built consensus with Member States on an Action Plan. In late 2018, UNESCO established the Culture and Emergencies Entity (CLT/CEM) which comprises the EPR Unit, the Secretariats for the 1954⁴, 1970⁵ and 2001⁶ Conventions, as well as the Museums Programme.

The Evaluand

5. **The subject of the present evaluation is UNESCO's work on culture in emergencies** which is a crosscutting theme that touches upon the mandate and scope of all of UNESCO's Culture Conventions and related programmes. This evaluation is therefore broad in nature as UNESCO's work in emergencies spans a wide range of modalities, from the creation of strategies and policies, leveraging standard-setting instruments such as the Conventions, to direct interventions ranging from preparedness to response and recovery activities in both conflict and disaster situations.
6. UNESCO conducts a range of capacity building activities, such as the First Aid Course to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis delivered in Mali, it carries out Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA); develops awareness raising campaigns such as Unite4Heritage; supports Member States in the development of emergency response plans; and intervenes, when requested, to stabilise built heritage, safeguard moveable heritage as well as intangible heritage, preserve underwater cultural heritage, and promote cultural expressions.

Scope of the Evaluation

7. The evaluation assesses UNESCO's work in the field of culture in emergencies within the framework of both the regular and extra-budgetary programmes from 2015 to the end of 2019 from a macro perspective. This includes the emergency work of the EPR Unit; the Secretariats of the 1954, 1970, 1972⁷, 2001, 2003⁸ and 2005⁹

⁴ 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

⁵ 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property

⁶ 2001 Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage

⁷ 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage

⁸ 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage

⁹ 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions

Conventions; and extrabudgetary mechanisms such as the Heritage Emergency Fund (HEF). As UNESCO is the only UN Agency with a mandate in this field, its reach is global and therefore has an impact on the work of many external parties, as well as the lives of the communities it serves. As such, the scope of this evaluation aims to include as many external voices as possible such as those of Member States, academia, cultural practitioners, partner organizations such as the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), NGOs, donors, and community beneficiaries. The evaluation also integrates UNESCO's global priorities Gender Equality and Africa by providing insights on the role of women in project design and implementation and by including a case study on UNESCO's recent emergency work in Mali as part of the data collection process. This evaluation does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of each modality, activity or actor, but rather to provide a review of each and ensure as many perspectives as possible are included before drawing conclusions on UNESCO's performance in emergency situations.

Objectives and Use

8. As UNESCO's 2015 Strategy entered its fifth year, an evaluation was requested by the Culture Sector to generate findings, lessons learned and recommendations regarding the relevance and the effectiveness of its work to support countries in protecting culture in emergencies. Following the recent completion of evaluations of UNESCO's six Culture Conventions¹⁰, this evaluation also aims to assess the contribution of these instruments to emergency preparedness and response.
9. The intended users of the evaluation are UNESCO's senior management, particularly in the Culture Sector, Culture Programme Specialists, other UNESCO staff working in the field of emergencies, and the Organization's extensive networks of partners. The evaluation aims to help the UNESCO Culture Sector to strengthen, refocus and better coordinate the Organization's work in the protection of culture in emergencies. The evaluation will aim to inform the next quadrennial programme and budget (2022-2025) as well as the Organization's future Medium-Term Strategy for 2022-2029. It also aims to serve as a learning exercise for all UNESCO staff and partners working in the field of culture in emergencies. The final evaluation report is submitted to the UNESCO Culture Sector, will be presented to the autumn session of the Executive Board in 2020 and made publicly available on the IOS website.

¹⁰ The evaluations of all six UNESCO Culture Conventions are available at <https://en.unesco.org/about-us/ios>

Evaluation Questions


10. The evaluation questions measure the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNESCO's work related to culture in emergencies. Some insights on UNESCO's impact, planning and contributions are also included. The questions were elaborated through a consultative process with the Evaluation Reference Group during the Inception Phase. They are set out in the Terms of Reference attached in Annex A and cover the following:
 - The relevance of UNESCO's work in the field of culture in emergencies from the perspective of Member States and other external actors, including communities;
 - The application of a human-rights based approach to consider people with disabilities, older people, women, children, youth and other disadvantaged groups;
 - The prioritisation of this theme within UNESCO, and in particular determining when UNESCO is best placed to intervene;
 - The capacity of UNESCO to deliver in an efficient manner;
 - The effectiveness of UNESCO in achieving its objectives and targets;
 - The effectiveness of UNESCO in measuring and learning from its results and communicating in a meaningful way; and
 - The sustainability of UNESCO's work in this field as it pertains to partnerships for effective implementation; exit strategies from projects and handover to relevant authorities for continuity and sustainability, and knowledge retention of intended beneficiaries.

Evaluation Methodology

11. This evaluation was commissioned by UNESCO's Internal Oversight Service (IOS) Evaluation Office and conducted together with Aleph Strategies between November 2019 and April 2020. The methodology included:
 - An **extensive literature and UNESCO document review** to draw emerging themes and inform the creation of the research framework. The list of documents can be found in Annex B.

- **Preliminary key informant interviews** with the Evaluation Reference Group and staff working in the field of emergencies to inform the research framework.
- An **Evaluation Index** (available upon request) was constructed based on the industry-standard criteria for relevance and coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. It contains the indicators, associated research questions and a succinct analysis of UNESCO's work in response to each question and indicator. Each indicator is scored on a scale of 1=poor, 2=average and 3=good. The scores have been colour-coded using a traffic light system and the Index contains a summary, or aggregate score against the evaluation criteria. The Index serves as the evaluation's research framework and was used as a basis to design tools and collect information.
- A **participatory inception workshop** was held in late November 2019 with the Evaluation Reference Group to build consensus on the evaluation methodology, stakeholder consultation and case study selection.
- The literature review, preliminary key informant interviews, inception workshop and Evaluation Index resulted in an **Inception Report** which was delivered in December 2019 that outlined the agreed methodology, stakeholder groups to be interviewed and the selection of three case studies outlined below.
- A quantitative **Member State Survey** (available upon request) was administered to determine country perspectives on the relevance and effectiveness of UNESCO's culture in emergencies work. A total of 51 responses were received from 204 UNESCO Member States and Associated Members. This constitutes a 25% response rate.
- **Qualitative key informant interviews and focus group discussions** were conducted with 144 people in-person and via Skype. A wide range of stakeholders were interviewed, including UNESCO staff (both at Headquarters and in the field), representatives of UN sister agencies, implementing partners, donors, NGOs, academia, expert practitioners, representatives of national and local governments, the private sector, community members and other direct beneficiaries. Unique qualitative guides were created and are available upon request. This allowed the evaluation team to cover as diverse a range of perspectives as possible of relevant culture actors to triangulate meaningful insights in response to the agreed questions found in the Evaluation Index. Figure 1 represents an overview of the number of stakeholders interviewed by group. Interviewees were selected based on a stakeholder analysis, recommendation by the evaluation reference group and were interviewed based on their availability.

Figure 1: Stakeholder Interviews by Group



- A thematic Case Study on UNESCO's use of digital technology in strategies for the protection of culture (see Annex D) was conducted for a detailed assessment of UNESCO's ambition to utilise innovative technologies in the implementation and monitoring of activities.
- A field mission to Lombok, Indonesia, was conducted in January 2020 for a case study (see Annex D) to assess UNESCO's early-recovery support project to traditional weaving communities in response to a natural disaster. The evaluators interviewed beneficiary women and men separately to ensure that all voices were heard.
- A field mission to Bamako, Mali, was conducted in February 2020 for a case study to assess a sample of UNESCO's latest preparedness and response interventions during a protracted conflict (see Annex D).
- A participatory workshop on preliminary findings of the evaluation was held in late February 2020 for Culture Sector staff. Feedback received from this workshop fed into the final evaluation report.
- Finally, the aforementioned data collection process and analysis ensured complete coverage of the evaluation criteria found in the Evaluation Index and culminated in this final evaluation report. In drafting this report, the evaluation team followed the established guidelines of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), in particular the Evaluation Norms and Standards as well as the Quality Checklist for

Evaluation Reports. It also respected the standards specific to UNESCO as reflected in UNESCO's Evaluation Policy. The draft report was shared for comments with all UNESCO staff working on culture in emergencies and was peer reviewed by an external evaluator to ensure compliance with UNEG standards.

Value Addition

12. The Evaluation Index provides a rigorous analytical framework, allowing large volumes of diverse and complex information to be analysed and presented in a structured format. Moreover, it provides transparent performance measurement indicators to reduce subjectivity and bias. This approach allowed the evaluators to include both empirical evidence and qualitative impressions gathered during fieldwork.
13. The evaluation team employed a wide range of qualitative, quantitative and observational tools allowing for the triangulation of findings and to generate practical and actionable recommendations.
14. The IOS Evaluation Office and Aleph Strategies worked closely together throughout the evaluation. This approach provided good opportunities to test early hypotheses, discuss key findings and co-design actionable recommendations for strengthening UNESCO's work in protecting culture in emergencies.

Limitations

15. This evaluation was commissioned early on in the implementation of the 2015 Strategy, in order to guide future work. Given the short time frame, the large scope of the evaluand, the necessity to include multiple research components, as well as the fact that many of the activities and projects were still ongoing, the research team has been cautious about assessing longer-term outcomes or impact. Rather, the evaluation focused on UNESCO's efforts to date (early 2020) on the road to meet its stated objectives and its planning efforts towards possible 2030 Agenda impact contributions.
16. This study was constrained by a short timeframe of three and a half months from inception to final report delivery. The research aimed to include as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, but undoubtedly there have been some omissions. In total, 144 key informants were consulted and each key stakeholder group was covered. This was more than double the anticipated number of key informants outlined in the Inception Report.

17. This evaluation includes both broader insights into culture in emergencies with more detailed analyses of selected case studies. The evaluation team recognises that, due to the complex nature of emergency work, each case reflects a very different set of circumstances. Rather than focus on each case study in intricate detail, the aim is to use findings from each to indicate broader achievements and recommendations about how UNESCO's work on culture in emergencies can be further improved.
18. Security restrictions limited the evaluation team's travel, and thereby affected the scope of the case study, in Mali, as the team could not travel to Bandiagara. As this was anticipated, the team had planned for mitigation strategies once the decision not to travel to Bandiagara was made. Many official representatives from the Bandiagara region who had participated in one of UNESCO's key interventions, were present in Bamako during the evaluation period, and were thus interviewed face-to-face. Remaining key stakeholders were interviewed via telephone. However, unlike for the Lombok case study, the evaluation team could not organize focus group discussions with direct beneficiaries in the villages in Bandiagara even remotely as they were not reachable. Bandiagara was however only one of three interventions reviewed. All relevant stakeholders from the other two interventions, which took place in Bamako, were consulted.

How relevant is UNESCO's work to protect culture in emergencies?

19. This chapter assesses whether UNESCO is deemed to be a relevant player by its Member States and other external actors such as key partners, advisory bodies and 'culture at risk' organizations. In addition, it examines whether UNESCO takes social dimensions such as human rights and community voices into account when designing its interventions, thereby giving an indication of the relevance of UNESCO's work on culture in emergencies to affected populations. Community voices include traditionally marginalised groups, such as women and youth. Gender equality is of a particular focus, given that it is a global priority area of UNESCO.

Member States

20. A survey of Member States, completed by 50 Member States and one Observer State, revealed that **41 Member State respondents consider the protection of culture in emergencies to be a priority. Yet, in practice this is superseded by immediate needs, such as saving lives and responding to the health, safety and security of citizens, as well as rebuilding key infrastructure.** This was the case after the earthquakes in Lombok, Indonesia in August 2018, where UNESCO's support to weaving communities was an early recovery project, not an emergency response. The request from local government officials did not come until October, two months after the disaster, giving a clear indication of how culture was prioritised in comparison to other needs. In the case of Mali, when UNESCO intervened within weeks of conflict at the Cliffs of Bandiagara in summer 2019, the response was not considered to be timely since community members had lost loved ones, experienced significant trauma and were requesting food and shelter, not the protection of their culture.

21. **Member States perceive UNESCO's work to be highly relevant**, given that the Organization can only intervene in a conflict or disaster situation when *requested* to do so and after consultation with relevant government authorities. Member States indicate that as UNESCO is the lead UN organization in this sphere, it is uniquely placed to catalyse collective action, mobilise funds, coordinate a response and identify appropriate technical interventions. Moreover, Member States believe that the 2015 Strategy and subsequent Action Plan have strengthened UNESCO's mandate in this area.
22. **Interestingly, Member States also deem UNESCO's preparedness-oriented activities to be highly relevant and have requested UNESCO to place more emphasis on this stage of intervention;** in particular given their own admission of a lack of expertise to plan for an emergency. Almost all of the 51 countries that responded to the survey would welcome preparedness-oriented support from UNESCO, with training on heritage management, through the First Aid Course to the protection of Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis for instance, and training on the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) methodology, emergency response planning, and awareness raising campaigns with the general public at the top of the list. Figure 2 on the next page shows some consolidated feedback from respondents to the Member States survey. Some of the information presented in the figure will be examined in subsequent chapters.

*'In order to achieve more effective protection and conservation, it is necessary to establish and **promote prevention protocols and make them known**, both to civil and military responsible authorities, as well as to communities, so that immediate response actions can be correctly implemented.'*

Source: Member State Respondent

23. **Finally, Member States remark that they are largely unaware if marginalised groups such as youth, the elderly, girls and women were consulted in the design of emergency interventions.** This does not mean that they were not, but at a minimum it means that UNESCO has not been communicating if such groups were consulted.

Figure 2: Deep Dive on Member State Perspectives



External Actors

24. **Advisory bodies, such as ICCROM and ICOMOS, and 'culture at risk' organizations state that UNESCO's power to convene and mediate a response at the national and international levels is unique and therefore highly relevant.** The UNESCO brand can make a significant impact, as in coordinating and sending a rapid response mission to Brazil following the fire at the national museum in September 2018 and raising an 'international' alert which encouraged additional support from both the Brazilian government and other Member States.
25. UNESCO has established effective partnerships with key 'culture at risk' organizations, such as the ALIPH Foundation, the Global Heritage Fund and the Prince Claus Fund, as well as ICCROM that are working in the field of emergencies at all three stages (preparedness, response and recovery). See Focus Box 1 on the next page for a deep dive on UNESCO's relationship with these organizations. As UNESCO is getting increasingly involved in emergency interventions, there is potential for overlap and competition. Going forward, partner organizations state that more communication between them and UNESCO over roles and responsibilities would be welcome so that resources are used as efficiently as possible.
26. **There is concern amongst these partners and advisory bodies that UNESCO's shift towards the operational aspect of projects - as a result of a specific request from the Executive Board - means the organization is less likely to focus on the oversight and coordination that emergency situations typically need at the national level.** Through its national and regional networks, UNESCO is uniquely placed to provide more oversight and follow-up for trainees and workshop participants after capacity-building activities for disaster risk management, for example. Through these national networks, UNESCO has the opportunity to provide more of a crucial 'guiding light' for trainees to ensure their skills to prepare for and respond to emergencies are used, maintained and built upon. Some of UNESCO's partners, along with a number of Member States, feel that UNESCO should concentrate its efforts on these aspects rather than on response activities.
27. This is particularly true given the limited amount of funding traditionally available for cultural programmes. The funding landscape for cultural preservation is changing with several 'donors becoming doers'. **UNESCO is therefore sometimes seen as a competitor, rather than a facilitator**, whose involvement in direct implementation is perceived as creating additional competition and less transparency in an already highly competitive field when the culture sector as a whole could be further supporting local NGOs and national cultural institutions. If UNESCO is also competing for funds for activities, partners sense it is less inclined to provide the crucial oversight the sector needs for multi stakeholder interventions.
28. **In order for the implementation of activities to be more efficient and effective, partners asked for deeper engagement between UNESCO, partners and national cultural institutions in order to co-create and co-implement emergency activities.** These respondents asked for UNESCO to go into 'co-creation, rather than consultancy mode' in order to ensure that the capacity of national cultural institutions is built up.



Focus Box 1: Impact of New Players on UNESCO

In the short term, given the limited amount of funding available for culture in emergencies, this is already a 'crowded space'. New players in the 'culture at risk' field, such as ALIPH Foundation, Cultural Protection Fund, the Prince Claus Fund and Global Heritage Fund are agile and therefore consider they can respond to emergencies quicker. Key stakeholders remark that new players offer a 'solution to UNESCO's bureaucratic hurdles' and could emerge as donors' technical partners in regards to project implementation.

On the other hand, the emergence of these new actors creates opportunities for collaboration. Indeed, there is already strong institutional alignment between ALIPH and UNESCO. ALIPH uses UNESCO's normative frameworks and standard setting instruments for its work. Organizations such as ALIPH and Global Heritage Fund, which tend to focus on tangible cultural heritage, create operational space for UNESCO to focus on intangible heritage.

There are already good examples of strong collaboration between ALIPH and UNESCO, such as the rehabilitation of the Tomb of Askia, in Gao, Mali, when UNESCO helped negotiate relationships between ALIPH and the Malian authorities. In addition, ALIPH works to finance projects and UNESCO has secured funds from them, with the Minaret of Jam project in Afghanistan being a good example. However, there is room to improve communication. Systematically sharing lessons and best practices will bring the organizations closer together, draw further attention to the threats faced by heritage in conflict situations and ultimately improve the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency work.

In the longer-term, the emergence of new actors may help drive cost competition between sub-contractors, offering better value for money to UNESCO. Similarly, in a market space dominated by new technologies (satellite imagery, drone surveys, 3D scanning etc.) the emergence of new actors will likely encourage further innovation in the digital sphere as firms seek to build unique capabilities, services and products.

Source: Authors

Human Rights Based Approach

29. A human rights-based approach (HRBA) to cultural protection entails the protection of the rights of communities to express themselves through customs, practices, places, artistic expressions and values. **While UNESCO has historically focused on the value of more tangible forms of heritage such as buildings, monuments and archaeological sites, more recently the Organization has placed more emphasis on the human dimensions of culture, through the adoption of the 2003 and 2005 Conventions.** Other actors increasingly embrace this approach. Between 2009 and 2019, two key resolutions have been adopted by the UN Human Rights Council concerning cultural rights. Resolution 33/20 is focused on cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage. In 2016, the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights issued a report focused on the intentional destruction of cultural heritage as a violation of human rights. In the report, she examines the impact of such destruction on a range of human rights, including the right to take part in cultural life and recognises the relevance of UNESCO's work in this regard, referring to the Organization's 2015 Strategy. She outlines her intent to closely collaborate with UNESCO on the theme of cultural rights and human rights.
30. In July 2017, a seminar on cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage was convened by the OHCHR and attended by a representative of the EPR Unit. The seminar focused on ways to prevent, contain and/or mitigate the detrimental impact of the damage to or destruction of cultural heritage on the enjoyment of human rights, including cultural rights, and on best practices in this regard. During the seminar, the Head of the EPR Unit highlighted the 2015 Strategy and Action Plan and underlined the aspects which promoted the protection of cultural heritage from a human rights perspective, such as: (a) preparedness in times of peace, including by documenting cultural heritage; (b) strengthening of national institutional, legal and judicial frameworks; (c) adopting measures to strengthen resilience; (d) strengthening capacity-building in the cultural heritage sector and integrating culture and heritage within humanitarian, security and peacebuilding operations so that cultural rights are considered in conflict prevention and recovery processes; and (e) mainstreaming cultural rights and cultural diversity into education. The Head of the EPR Unit asked for further support from the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights on a manual for the application of a cultural rights approach to humanitarian, security and peacebuilding operations, as well as a human rights approach to heritage conservation.

31. **The 2015 Strategy is focused on cultural diversity and promoting cultural pluralism and the related Action Plan contains several elements linking cultural heritage protection with a human rights approach**, such as: strengthening capacity-building in the cultural heritage sector and integrating culture and heritage within humanitarian, security and peacebuilding operations so that cultural rights are considered in conflict prevention and recovery processes, and, mainstreaming cultural rights and cultural diversity into education.
32. However, UNESCO Field Office Staff seek clarity on what a human rights-based approach entails. In terms of including a HRBA in emergencies work, this is still at a nascent stage, but some examples are worth mentioning. This is evident in interventions such as in Lombok, where female weaving communities were supported, and in the “Wassla (Connection) Reviving cultural life in the city of Mosul” project which includes support for Iraqi music and musicians, funded by the HEF, and implemented by the local NGO Action for Hope. This project focused on researching diverse music traditions and developing teaching materials for training musicians in order to bring communities together. The beneficiary groups include young women and men living in Mosul. Further, in the Columbian village of Conejo, elements of intangible cultural heritage were mobilised by communities in order to help former combatants rebuild their civilian lives following the sixty-year armed conflict with the FARC¹¹. Here, beneficiary groups included young men and women in the community and the older male ex-combatants.

Community Voices and Marginalised Groups

33. **Community perspectives are taken into consideration in the design of interventions by UNESCO, in particular when it comes to the global priority of the promotion of gender equality.** Interviews reveal that the inclusion of women, youth and other disadvantaged groups had historically been a box-ticking exercise, but UNESCO has made progress in this area. This is most evident in preparedness and early-recovery work, in which UNESCO has the time to adequately ensure their inclusion. In Lombok, female weaving groups and youth were consulted in the design of the early recovery project, ensuring a highly relevant and contextualized approach, with strong positive outcomes (see the Case Study Report found in Annex D). Ensuring the presence of a woman among the experts attending an intervention at the Cliffs of Bandiagara in Mali allowed

¹¹ The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC) was a guerilla movement in Colombia that began in the 1960s. In September 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC signed a peace deal.

the mission to understand how women and youth groups had been affected by the crisis (see the Case Study in Annex D). In the traditionally male-dominated armed forces, UNESCO organized a first-of-its-kind workshop for female military personnel from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon on cultural property protection in armed conflict situations. Another example can be seen in the HEF application form, which makes specific reference to the 'promotion of gender equality' and for applicants to explain their approach. The Intangible Cultural Heritage Fund also requests information on 'community involvement' and makes direct reference to gender dimensions. The election process of the experts of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Body of the 2001 Convention also encourages gender equality. In contrast, the application form for the Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict does not make reference to community voices or gender.

34. **During an immediate response, the inclusion of community perspectives in the design of activities can prove more challenging at UNESCO. Furthermore, social dimensions that exist at policy level may not be perceived as relevant on the ground.** For example, the culture chapter of the PDNA methodology explicitly supports the inclusion of women and men of all ages and minority groups in decision-making. However, as one respondent stated: 'The idea of gender equality is something conceived at Headquarters which can seem irrelevant in the field (at times), especially in male dominated societies'. This suggests that culturally sensitive approaches should be employed, with input from Field Offices, to avoid creating unrealistic, or at worst, obstructive, targets in the field.
35. In conclusion, UNESCO is deemed to be highly relevant by Member States and by other external actors. The Organization has the mandate, instruments and convening power to lead international efforts to protect culture and promote cultural pluralism before, during and after a crisis. Member States suggest that UNESCO should place more emphasis on preparedness activities, whereas other external actors such as ICCROM and ICOMOS request deeper engagement ahead of implementation in order to leverage core competencies, increase transparency and reduce competition for limited funds for cultural projects. Finally, although in its nascent stage, UNESCO has taken great strides in taking social dimensions such as human rights and community voices into account when designing interventions, in particular gender equality. Yet, this is not yet systematic across all projects, nor are Member States aware of this community-level engagement.

Situating UNESCO's Mandate and Capacity to Deliver in Emergencies

36. This chapter examines whether UNESCO prioritises emergency work and if the Organization is institutionally set-up to deliver in an efficient manner on its stated priority.

Strategic and Organizational Set-up for Emergency Work

37. **On paper, the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism in emergencies is a strategic priority for UNESCO's Culture Sector.** This is evident at the strategic level with the adoption of the 2015 Strategy, the 2017 Addendum to the Strategy and the 2015 – 2021 Action Plan. In these guiding documents, clear objectives and priority areas of action and activities are outlined. The Action Plan also works to build consensus and buy-in with Member States. In addition, UNESCO created the dedicated Expected Result 5 (ER5)¹² in the C/5 Programme and Budget for 2018-2019 which beyond having a budget line, also specifies indicators and targets from which UNESCO is to measure its performance in emergency work. A similar ER has been included in the 40C/5 Programme and Budget for 2020-2021. Furthermore, the Director-General and the Assistant Director-General for Culture have, on numerous occasions, recalled the strategic importance of this area of work.

¹² ER5: Culture protected and cultural pluralism promoted in emergencies through better preparedness and response, in particular through the effective implementation of UNESCO's cultural standard-setting instruments.

38. At the structural and operational level, UNESCO established the EPR Unit in 2014 and the Culture and Emergencies Entity (CLT/CEM) in 2018. The Entity is in charge of programmes related to the 1954, 1970 and 2001 Conventions, as well as the Movable Heritage and Museums Unit and the EPR Unit. Furthermore, the World Heritage Centre (1972 Convention), the Living Heritage Entity (2003 Convention) and the Diversity of Cultural Expressions Entity (2005 Convention) provide emergency assistance and therefore work closely with the CLT/CEM. Each of the Conventions' Secretariats also have focal points for emergencies to further ensure streamlining of efforts at an operational level.
39. The EPR Unit manages the Heritage Emergency Fund (HEF) to enable UNESCO to 'respond quickly and effectively to crises resulting from armed conflicts and disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards all over the world'¹³. The HEF is a multi-donor and non-earmarked fund and therefore provides UNESCO with the flexibility it requires to respond to each unique emergency scenario. Furthermore, it can be utilised for both preparedness and response activities (with the exception of interventions of statutory origin, such as the reactive monitoring missions or the Scientific and Technical Advisory Body (STAB) missions foreseen in the framework of the 1972 and 2001 Conventions respectively).
40. **Much has been accomplished in a relatively short period at the strategic and structural levels to suggest emergency work is prioritised and operational efficiency has been improved.** The 2015 Strategy, Action Plan, ER5, HEF, roster of experts and institutional set-up have a synergetic effect on UNESCO's efforts to adequately tackle emergency work by setting objectives and targets, building consensus with Member States and aligning UNESCO's work internally through the CLT/CEM.
41. Nevertheless, challenges remain that hinder the Culture Sector's emergency work.

¹³ Heritage Emergency Fund: How does it work?

Institutional and Operational Challenges

42. UNESCO's capacity to respond to emergencies in a timely manner has historically been weak – across all Sectors of the Organization¹⁴, not just the Culture Sector. This is a commonly held view among internal and external stakeholders, and is well documented, including in the 2016 *Audit of UNESCO's Framework and Capacity for and Support to Crisis and Transition Response*¹⁵.
43. **The Culture Sector has responded to many of the stated Audit recommendations at the strategic and structural levels, as outlined in the previous sub-section. Yet the evaluation reveals that a number of underlying and interconnected challenges persist that limit UNESCO's ability to efficiently deliver** and give mixed messages to external stakeholders and Member States on the prioritization of emergency work. If not addressed, these challenges could hurt UNESCO's long-term legitimacy and credibility in this area.
44. **First, very limited regular programme funding is available to support emergency work.** For the 40C/5, only 2% (USD 270,800) of the activity budget for Culture was allocated to ER5, the lowest total of any Culture Sector ER¹⁶. UNESCO has a funding gap of approximately USD 4.6 million to achieve ER5 objectives, which represents 87% of the stated required funds. The funding was similarly low in the 39C/5¹⁷. As such, while emergency work is a clear strategic priority, it does not appear to be a financial one.
45. **To overcome this gap, UNESCO's emergency assistance can be funded through several extra-budgetary modalities (see Table 1), including the HEF.** Whilst all of the mechanisms are important as they work to bridge the funding

¹⁴ See the Evaluation of UNESCO's role in education in emergencies and protracted crises

¹⁵ The 2016 audit outlines six key areas: (1) UNESCO lacks a clear strategic framework to support crisis response; (2) UNESCO's overall capacity to support response to crisis and transition is weak; (3) UNESCO lacks operational procedures to support crisis and transition response; (4) Late fund availability postpones the start of project implementation; (5) Lengthy recruitment procedures postpone the start of activities; and (6) Delayed procurement and contracting impair project implementation. The Audit also details a number of recommendations for UNESCO to consider, including the development of an Organization wide strategic framework; identification of internal and external roster of experts who can quickly be deployed via fast-tracking procurement mechanisms; the establishment of an emergency fund; and development of capacity statements which clearly detail UNESCO's value addition in crisis scenarios.

¹⁶ 40C/5 integrated budget based on the appropriated regular programme budget of \$534.6 million.

¹⁷ USD 280,000 was allocated to ER5 under the 39C/5 integrated budget based on the appropriated regular programme budget of \$518 million.

gap, each comes with its own conditions and ceiling amounts. This can work to complicate delivery as application procedures, approval times and uses vary. This also causes some confusion and complexity for UNESCO staff, Member States and other external actors in regards to which fund to pursue. Simplification of funding modalities would be welcomed by all key stakeholders or at a minimum, guidelines on which funding modality to turn to in specific situations.



Weaver in Bayan, Lombok.
Source: (c) E. Sediakina Rivière

Table 1: UNESCO Funds to Protect Culture in Emergencies

Convention	Funding Modality	Conditions	Amount	Timeline for Approval	Who can Apply	Some Key Facts
All	Heritage Emergency Fund	Non-earmarked. Can be used for preparedness, response or planning for recovery. Concerns interventions related to one or more of the domains covered by the Culture Conventions, or culture as a whole.	Up to USD 100,000	On average from 1 week to 1 month. Can be accessed at any time.	UNESCO Member States through Field Offices or Headquarters	Approx. USD 838,000 spent in 2018 ¹⁸ . USD 2 million per annum available.
1954	Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Can be used for preparedness or immediate recovery after the end of hostilities (after armed conflict).	Any amount, but limited funds; requests typically up to USD 50,000	Funding decisions made yearly by the Committee. Funding requests have to be submitted six months before the ordinary meeting of the 1999 Second Protocol Intergovernmental Committee. Requests for emergency measures can be submitted at any time. Notwithstanding the six-month deadline, given their urgency, the Committee will consider them as soon as possible.	States Parties to the 1999 Second Protocol may request the 1999 Second Protocol Intergovernmental Committee to provide international and other forms of assistance. In some circumstances, a party to a conflict which is not a Party to the 1999 Second Protocol but which accepts and applies the provisions of the Protocol may request international and other forms of assistance during the conflict.	In 2017, only USD 85, 000 disbursed ¹⁹ .
1970	Fund of the 1970 Convention	The fund can be used for capacity-building activities, awareness-raising and communication, the development of inventories and the monitoring of internet sales.	Any amount in accordance with the Percentage of the resources under the Fund	Can be accessed any time.	UNESCO Member States or Associate Members	The total funds available as at 31 December 2018 were at USD 121,822 ²⁰ . It relies on voluntary contributions.
1972	World Heritage Fund – Emergency Assistance	Properties inscribed on World Heritage List or List of World Heritage in Danger	Up to USD 75,000	Requests can be submitted anytime.	States Parties to the 1972 Convention provided they have paid their contributions	Approx. USD 1 million disbursed since 2015 for emergency assistance ²¹ .

¹⁸ Heritage Emergency Fund Annual Report 2018, p 82-83

¹⁹ 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection Of Cultural Property In The Event Of Armed Conflict: Twelfth Meeting of the High Contracting Parties (2017)

²⁰ 1970 Convention: 5th Meeting of States Parties

²¹ World Heritage Fund: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/intassistance#statistics>

Convention	Funding Modality	Conditions	Amount	Timeline for Approval	Who can Apply	Some Key Facts
	Rapid Response Facility	Natural World Heritage Sites	Up to USD 30,000	Within 8 working days. Can be accessed at any time.	Restricted to countries eligible for official development assistance as determined by OECD	USD one million since 2006 ²² .
2003	Intangible Cultural Heritage Fund - Emergency Assistance	Purposes include: safeguarding of elements on the Urgent Safeguarding List; preparation of inventories; support for programmes, projects and activities aimed at safeguarding ICH; and any other purposes the Committee may deem necessary	No specific amount	Emergency requests, are examined and approved by the Bureau of the Committee. Average approval time is between 6-8 months from date of receipt.	States Parties to the 2003 Convention	Since 2013 USD 988,416 disbursed for emergency international assistance. Recent emergency assistance includes Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Vanuatu ²³ .
2001	Fund for Underwater Cultural Heritage	Could support STAB assistance missions, subject to the agreement of the Meeting of States Parties	No funds available	No funds available	States Parties to the Convention	Not used as no funds are available for the moment.
2005	International Fund for Cultural Diversity	Projects focused on supporting a dynamic cultural sector.	Up to USD 100,000	Annual call for funds. Annual approval by the Intergovernmental Committee.	Eligible countries NGOs from eligible countries INGOs registered in countries which are Parties to the Convention	USD 8 324 802 disbursed since 2010, but not clear which funds used for emergency related work ²⁴ .

Source: UNESCO Internal Documentation

46. **The second challenge relates to the speed of funding disbursement.** For UNESCO to demonstrate that emergency work is an operational priority, funds need to be disbursed in a timely manner so projects can be launched on time. The HEF is an excellent means of rapid disbursement, but there is room for improvement. Whilst UNESCO Culture Staff recognise that the HEF has drastically improved the status quo, with authorisation for the disbursement of funds often coming within a week or two, some Culture Staff report delays. In Lombok, the request for funding to support weaving communities was made in early November 2018, but not authorised until December 13th; therefore, delaying the implementation of activities

²² Rapid Response Facility: <http://www.rapid-response.org/http://www.rapid-response.org/>


²³ ICH Fund: <https://ich.unesco.org/en/requesting-assistance-00039> and <https://ich.unesco.org/en/project>

²⁴ <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/ifcd/projects> <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/ifcd/projects>

to January 2019. The delay for processing requests usually stems from gaps found within the funding proposal. However, funding can also be delayed based on when the request was made, like in the case of Lombok. For example, the end of year period (December) is typically slow, even in the case of emergency-related funding, given the high volume of requests the Culture Sector's Administrative Officer has to manage. It is therefore important that the Culture Sector is aware of this end of year challenge and finds remedies to ensure emergency work can still be funded on time. The timeline for funding approval can also depend on the type of emergency. UNESCO's funding approval for a response to an armed conflict, for example, usually requires more time for analysis as there is much greater risk associated to early intervention (e.g. safety and security of UNESCO staff and intended beneficiaries alike).

47. In addition, the EPR Unit was moved from the Executive Office, reporting directly to the Assistant Director-General for Culture, to being placed within CLT/CEM. According to some staff, this has significantly reduced the operational efficiency of the EPR Unit, as decision-making and timely authorisation of HEF funds must now go through additional layers of approval. Figure 2 below gives an overview of the HEF approval process, with each step representing hurdles that could block timely disbursement.

Figure 3: Heritage Emergency Fund Authorisation Process²⁵



Source: Culture Sector Administrative Office

48. **Third, UNESCO lacks both the technical emergency-related expertise and the operational deployment mechanisms to respond to emergencies on the ground in a timely manner.** Specialised technical expertise is required to prepare for or respond to specific emergencies, along with local language capacity, in-country experience, and sufficient political acumen to engage with Member States. Finding this combination in a short period of time is extremely challenging and UNESCO field office staff are often alone in implementing UNESCO's entire culture programme, including emergencies, in their respective countries and/or regions. As illustrated in Annex D, in the recent Bandiagara mission in Mali, UNESCO

²⁵ HEF documentation states that average time required for fund authorisation is one week for 'response' activities and two weeks for 'preparedness' activities. However, the evaluation team notes that it can take much longer, like in the case of early-recovery support for traditional weavers in Lombok, in which it took approximately one month.

had managed to convene a local expert team of high calibre. However, the Bamako Office had to overcome many logistical challenges to have the team in place.

49. As a consequence, UNESCO staff broadly think that the Organization should not intervene if it does not have a local field office presence. Yet, as the only UN Agency with a mandate for culture, Member States expect UNESCO to intervene. In this sense, UNESCO is left with a difficult choice: refrain from responding to an emergency and be accused of inaction or non-prioritisation, or respond with an inadequate intervention capacity and be criticised for inefficacy. Regardless, for UNESCO to demonstrate emergency work is an operational priority, finding and deploying specialised expertise in a timely manner is a significant hurdle that needs to be overcome.
50. A good example of this is UNESCO's limited pool of in-house technical experts capable of delivering digital outputs. As a response to recent destruction and looting of cultural sites across the Middle Eastern and North African region, practitioners' (including UNESCO's) approaches for cultural protection in emergency scenarios are increasingly focused on the use of digital technology. For example, satellite imagery is a reliable tool for the monitoring of sites in inaccessible areas which can inform decisions about where to intervene. Digital recording of sites and objects is increasingly used to enhance conservation documentation and preservation techniques, create 3D models and reproductions of objects, and contribute to awareness raising campaigns for cultural heritage protection. Digital technology is increasingly sophisticated, requiring highly trained engineers and operators. Some capacity exists in 3D modelling and usage, and optimisation of UNESCO's storage system. Yet this expertise is in short supply and the gap between those who can operate these systems and those who cannot, is extremely wide, making it difficult for UNESCO to be a relevant actor in the digital sphere. See the full Case Study on 'The use of digital technology on strategies for cultural protection' in Annex D.
51. UNESCO's recent response to overcome challenges relating to response capacity was to establish the Rapid Response Mechanism, based on a Roster of Experts. This is an initial list of 50 vetted experts to be deployed in rapid assessment and advisory missions to assist national authorities where needed. Whilst this is certainly a step in the right direction, the Roster has only recently been made operational at the time of finalization of the present evaluation. The yielded effects of this mechanism can therefore not yet be fully measured. In addition, UNESCO field staff suggest that a global list is insufficient given the highly specialised nature of emergency

work. Instead, they propose that a list of experts per region or country, articulated in different thematic areas and ready to be deployed at short notice, would be more useful. The 2001 Convention already has such a body of experts in the form of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Body (STAB), which consists of 14 state-nominated experts from across the globe, who are ready to be deployed in case of an emergency specifically related to underwater cultural heritage. Whilst the STAB is a good example, the nomination of members by Member States and the necessity to receive formal authorization of the Meeting of States Parties prior to the launch of the mission prevent it from acting in a short timeframe required for emergency work. The Roster of Experts would require more flexibility for accelerated action. As a result, it should be pointed out that the relation of the Expert Roster to the 2001 Convention's (state-nominated) Scientific and Technical Advisory Body is unclear.

52. **Fourth, the EPR Unit, which coordinates the bulk of UNESCO's emergency preparedness and response work, is composed of four programme staff, only one of which (the Head of Unit) is on a fixed-term post.** The HEF Coordinator (funded by the HEF), and two project officers (one responsible for armed conflict and the other for disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards) are on short-term contracts funded through extrabudgetary resources. It is implausible to think that four individuals can coordinate the UNESCO Culture Sector's preparedness and response activities given there are 193 Member States, or to think they could adequately deal with more than a few requests at a time. This is particularly true given the risk of high turnover, if just the EPR Unit Head is a permanent staff member. If emergency work is a priority for UNESCO, adequate long-term staffing is required for the EPR Unit to coordinate efforts and ensure timely delivery.
53. In conclusion, UNESCO has made great strides in a short period of time at the strategic and structural levels to demonstrate that it prioritises culture in emergencies work. The evaluation reveals however that UNESCO does not have the financial or human resources in place to always effectively respond in a timely manner. Whilst extrabudgetary attempts to resolve efficiency and resource issues have certainly addressed some of the issues outlined in this chapter, they have also added to the multiplicity of operations and confusion for UNESCO staff members, instead of simplifying an already complex system.

When to Intervene in Emergencies

54. This chapter examines the appropriate time for UNESCO to intervene in protecting culture in emergencies. Findings here build upon external perspectives, UNESCO's mandate and available resources for delivery.

External Actor Perspectives

55. **There is general consensus amongst Member States that UNESCO is relevant at all three stages of emergency interventions: preparedness, response and recovery.** As one Member State respondent suggests:

'Given its global recognition, UNESCO is in the best position to deter the deliberate destruction and movement of cultural property in times of conflict as well as over the long term, in recovery activities.'

Source: Member State Respondent

56. To complement this, **interviews and field visits found evidence of a broad range of activities at each stage.** For example, in Mali, the First Aid Course for the protection of Cultural Heritage in Time of Crisis (FAC) training of cultural practitioners in 2018 was prevention-oriented; whereas the intervention at the Cliffs of Bandiagara in 2019 was in response to conflict. In Lombok, the support provided to weaving communities in 2019 was an early-recovery project. UNESCO also delivers awareness-raising campaigns (preparedness); ensures the inclusion of culture in PDNAs²⁶ (response and knock-on recovery); and macro-level advocacy, strategy and action plan setting (preparedness), among others. More on the results of UNESCO's work in all three phases is presented in the next chapter of this report.
57. Yet, given the Organization's limited funds and lack of specialised staff in the specific field of emergencies, **a majority of respondents remark that UNESCO has also tried 'to do too much' across all three stages.** Some respondent organizations

²⁶ Since 2015, UNESCO, with the support of HEF, has supported the inclusion of the Culture Volume on PDNAs in Haiti (2016), Ecuador (2016), Dominica (2017), Ecuador (2016), Peru (2017), Kerala (2018), Lao People's Democratic Republic (2018) and Odisha (2019).

and advisory bodies suggest that UNESCO's attempt to provide such a variety of solutions for culture in emergencies has diluted its effectiveness. There is a sense that UNESCO should narrow its focus and prioritise depth of impact in some areas over breadth of ad-hoc activity implementation. Many respondents urge UNESCO to retain focus on its core strengths of convening and advocating at the global level. UNESCO could use its powerful brand to bring the right actors and experts together and direct much needed attention to emergency situations, as well as to advocate for funding.

58. **Currently, the majority of UNESCO's culture in emergencies resources are utilised for response interventions.** For example, in 2018, approximately USD 700,000 from the HEF was spent on emergency response, whereas only USD 137,000 was spent on preparedness activities. More money is spent on response because 80% of the HEF applications received relate to emergency response interventions. Furthermore, interviews with UNESCO staff also reveal that it is also easier for UNESCO to build consensus internally on response interventions, not to mention the headlines that these can create, providing visibility for UNESCO and donors alike.
59. **However, Member States and Advisory Bodies believe that UNESCO should place more emphasis on and has the opportunity to champion preparedness.** There was a general call from Member States for UNESCO to focus more of its attention and resources on preparedness-oriented activities. As the UN agency with an international mandate to protect culture, including in emergencies, it was said that UNESCO should set the standard on the 'hard and thankless work' at the preparedness stage. UNESCO staff commented that the Conventions are well placed to manage the design and implementation of preparedness activities through their focus on policy and legislation and their existing capacity building activities.

'As a popular saying goes « Il vaut mieux prévenir que guérir » (prevention is better than a cure). Therefore, it is important to define strategies in peace as much as in war. In this way we will be able to save a lot of property instead of waiting for the act to happen.'

Source: Member State Respondent

60. An argument could be made that **UNESCO is institutionally better set up for preparedness and recovery** because overall UNESCO does not have the processes and systems in place for quality emergency response, which thereby means that it cannot deliver 'true' response in the traditional sense of humanitarian relief. In both Mali and Lombok, the evaluation found that culture 'response' interventions cannot follow the same timeline as humanitarian responses, as the protection of culture will always be second to health, safety and security of affected populations after a crisis. UNESCO could have more success as an early-recovery operator, when culture-related interventions would be more welcomed by communities once the situation on the ground has been stabilised.
61. Furthermore, a **focus on preparedness and recovery could allow UNESCO to clearly delineate roles between divisions, better coordinate work internally, and simplify the process of supporting requests.** As outlined in the previous chapter, the EPR Unit and the Conventions' Secretariats work across all three phases and offer competing funding modalities with different conditions (see Table 1), application processes and timelines for approval. These factors create confusion for UNESCO's field staff as to which entity to approach and which funding modality is best suited for their emergency-related needs.
62. Given the HEF was designed to be a non-earmarked rapid response mechanism with funds being approved as fast as within one week, UNESCO staff suggested the EPR Unit could become the response unit to immediate emergency-related needs. These could include emergency requests just before an imminent disaster (e.g. emergency evacuation of collections 72 hours prior to a cyclone making landfall), during or immediately after a crisis. In this case, it would then be clear to field staff as to when to apply for HEF funding (e.g. funding is needed within a few weeks) and it would also allow the Unit's limited human resources to better cope with requests.
63. Conventions' Secretariats, on the other hand, could then champion longer-term preparedness and recovery work within the scope of their respective mandates and through their governing bodies. For example, ICH related preparedness activities would be channelled through the 2003 Convention Secretariat, built heritage through the 1972 Convention Secretariat, and so on. Given the often lengthy approval processes through governing bodies, Convention Funds may be better suited to work on preparedness and recovery, while also clarifying to field staff when to approach them (e.g. funding can wait for more than two weeks). Furthermore, by

taking the lead on longer-term preparedness and recovery activities, Conventions are provided with a platform from which to be more prominent and therefore potentially more effective in emergencies.

Case by Case Approach

64. **The question should not be about the stage of intervention, as UNESCO has and will continue to be requested to intervene at all three stages by Member States. Rather, the question should be if UNESCO can provide a quality solution - on a case by case basis.** Each emergency situation is unique and UNESCO's operational capacity in each country is very different. Sometimes the Organization is well placed to intervene and other times not, regardless of the stage of intervention. There are clearly strong arguments for UNESCO to operate primarily at a strategic level given its core strengths of advocacy and convening power. Yet there are also many occasions in which UNESCO is uniquely well-placed to implement direct technical action in response to an emergency, by virtue of being the sole organization in place to do so with adequate in-house technical capacity. It would be unrealistic to expect UNESCO to maintain a state of operational readiness in each country, but it should intervene when it has the means and technical teams in place to respond.
65. **Clearly there is a balance to be struck between providing strategic leadership and technical interventions. The multiplicity of operational contexts in which UNESCO operates demands that these lines are carefully drawn on a country-by-country basis.** In order for UNESCO to directly intervene in an emergency, it should have the relevant technical and language capacity in place to do so, along with previous in country experience. In the context of emergencies stemming from armed conflict, prior adequate civil-military liaising is required as well as an enabling security environment. It is likely that there will be occasions in which all these conditions are not in place, and therefore many instances in which UNESCO is unable to adequately respond. In such cases, UNESCO should have the confidence not to directly intervene and/or to partner with international and local organizations that are better placed to provide quality solutions.

Missing Elements

66. **There is currently no collective trigger mechanism to guide UNESCO field staff in determining on whether to intervene or not.** Currently, UNESCO lacks an organization-wide definition of an emergency. For example, the HEF and ICH Fund each have their own definitions of emergency in order to trigger funding:

Figure 4: Examples of Definitions of Emergency

HEF Definition: *a situation of imminent threat to heritage, resulting from natural or human-made hazards, including armed conflict, in which a Member State finds itself unable to overcome the severe consequences on the protection, promotion and transmission of heritage or on efforts to foster creativity and protect the diversity of cultural expressions, and where immediate action is required.*

Source: HEF Guidelines

ICH Definition: *an emergency shall be considered to exist when a State Party finds itself unable to overcome on its own any circumstance due to calamity, natural disaster, armed conflict, serious epidemic or any other natural or human event that has severe consequences for the intangible cultural heritage as well as communities, groups and, if applicable, individuals who are the bearers of that heritage.*

Source: ICH Requesting International Assistance

67. Each has similarities, but also their own distinctions. Furthermore, each definition is long and complex, incorporating many different types of specialised interventions into one definition, which leaves much room for interpretation by UNESCO staff. Finally, words and phrases such as 'severe', 'serious', 'unable to overcome', would require their own definition in order to guide UNESCO staff in making an appropriate judgement on whether or not the intervention constitutes an emergency.
68. **The evaluation found that clear statements of capacity – managerial and/or technical – are currently missing at the country level.** These statements would outline UNESCO's added value, capacity and experience in areas where the organization typically intervenes in emergency situations. The development of such statements at the country level would provide clarity of responsibilities between UNESCO, Member States and potential implementing partners, strengthen coordination, and speed up decision-making and response times.
69. More broadly, **there is currently no guidance for UNESCO field staff in analysing the situation.** A 'go/no go' checklist could incorporate a clear and concise definition of emergency, as well as other decision-making factors such as potential impact on communities, access to internal and external expertise, the appropriate funding mechanism, UNESCO's operational capacity, and strategic opportunity. Such a checklist would better facilitate bottom-up decision-making and provide much needed clarity to UNESCO field staff on whether the Organization should intervene or not. Some suggestions on a possible way forward on the development of a checklist can be found in Table 2: Draft Intervention Checklist below.
70. In conclusion, as the UN Agency mandated for culture in emergencies work, UNESCO will continue to be requested to intervene at all three stages by Member States. The question then becomes whether UNESCO *should* intervene when requested, how to make such a decision, which funding mechanism to activate and which entity (e.g. EPR, Conventions' Secretariats, etc.) should take the lead. This chapter reveals that responsibilities for protecting culture in emergencies should lie amongst the various entities within the Culture Sector, depending on the response phase. A definition of 'emergency' is currently lacking and so are statements of managerial and technical capacity at the country level to facilitate decision making of staff before engaging in emergency work.

Table 2: Draft Intervention Checklist**Impact:**

- Who are the direct beneficiaries at the community level?
- Will the intervention be useful for the communities it intends to serve?
- Are other organizations already operating a similar project?
- Will our work facilitate Member State ownership of the process (at some point at local or national levels)?
- Are we intervening at the right time? Health, safety and security have already been addressed?
- Is there an opportunity for this intervention to have a catalytic effect?

Expertise:

- What do we know about the situation on the ground? What issue(s) are we being asked to address?
- Do we have the internal expertise required to provide an adequate solution?
- If not, can we find the required expertise within our network in a timely manner (partner organization or technical expert)?

Funding:

- Is it an emergency request? For example, is funding required within two weeks?
- What type of intervention is it (Conflict or Disaster caused by natural or human induced hazards)?
- How much funding is required to address the need?
- Based on above, X is the best funding modality. OR Based on the above, no adequate funding modality is available. Based on the funding modality, a decision could be made on which entity would take responsibility for implementation (e.g. EPR Unit or Conventions)

Operations:

- Do we have a field office in the Member State?
- If not, do we have significant experience operating in the Member State?
- If not, do we have a trusted and reliable partner that can implement on our behalf?

Opportunity:

- Based on the above, what role can we play during implementation (managerial or technical; or both)?
- Is the role within our core strengths?
- Is it strategic for UNESCO?

Source: Authors

Results

71. This chapter examines the effectiveness of UNESCO's work to protect culture in emergencies. Results found here are taken from the Culture Sector's ER5, HEF and available Culture Conventions' reporting as well as interviews with UNESCO HQ and Field Office staff, UN Sister Agencies, Advisory Bodies, partner organizations, and external experts.

Overview of Culture Conventions' Contributions

72. **The 1954, 1970, 1972 Conventions have made significant contributions to UNESCO's emergency work.** UNESCO Culture Sector respondents noted that, thus far, there has been a focus on the role of tangible heritage in emergencies (rather than the role of culture in emergencies more generally) and that this is due to a) a historic organizational focus on monuments, buildings and sites and b) the position of the EPR Unit in the Culture Sector's organigram as it sits beside other units with a focus on tangible heritage (Underwater Cultural Heritage, Cultural Heritage Protections Treaties, Movable Heritage & Museums). **While the most significant contributions to emergencies work have been from Conventions focused on tangible heritage, some significant work has also been done by the 2003 and 2005 Conventions in this regard.** These results are highlighted in the subsequent sub-sections.
73. **In terms of synergies with the Conventions, UNESCO is well set up to deal with conflict related emergencies due to the 1954 Convention and its Protocols, which deal specifically with armed conflict.** Although the 1972 Convention protects both cultural and natural heritage, there is no instrument that deals specifically with natural disasters. External experts noted that this results in attempts to match aspects of disasters work with relevant sections from across all the Conventions, which increases bureaucratic hurdles and can impede response times.
74. **External experts highlighted the challenges of an approach to emergencies that brings together conflict and disasters under one Strategy.** These respondents noted that the two situations require a rather different set of interventions and considerations. A response to a conflict, such as in the Syrian

Arab Republic, would have to engage with more overt politics than that to a disaster, for example. As demonstrated by the situation in Mali, conflict-related emergencies may also require a series of interventions spanning a longer period of time. This long-term approach even led some interviewees to question whether such interventions could still be considered as emergency work. Each response also requires a different network of organizations and individuals with whom UNESCO must work. In terms of preparation, conflict and disaster situations also require different approaches, such as emergency plans and risk mitigation strategies.

International Agenda Setting

75. UNESCO has been effective in integrating culture into a number of notable international security frameworks and strategies, in collaboration with the 1954 Convention (and its two protocols) and the 1970 Convention.

Security

76. **Since the protection of culture has emerged as a 'security' issue, culture has been included on the agendas of UN agencies and partners with a security mandate.** In 2015, the UN Security Council declared the protection of culture a security issue and recognised that the *'eradication of cultural heritage and trafficking of cultural property...constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security'* (Resolution 2249). This followed related UN Security Council Resolutions, 2199 and 2347, which included sections on the relationship between cultural protection, security and peace-keeping, outlining that threats to and the destruction of cultural sites, objects and practices represent a threat to people's identity and collective memory, and therefore their 'ontological security' or ways of being in the world. These shifts in the understanding of illicit trafficking and heritage destruction as a security matter have made way for emergencies work by the 1954 and 1970 Conventions, in particular.

Illicit Trafficking

77. In the wake of UN Security Council Resolutions 2249, 2199 and 2347, cooperation was strengthened between UNESCO and law enforcement in the context of the implementation of the 1970 Convention. In April 2015, UNESCO convened a meeting

with all the international agencies, NGOs and INGOs that deal with illicit trafficking to discuss strengthened collaboration. Subsequently, UNESCO developed stronger relationships with the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) with the objective of curbing the illicit trafficking of cultural property through sensitisation and capacity building workshops as well as training for customs, police and judiciary officers. In Southern Africa, according to UNESCO's ER5 reporting, cooperation with INTERPOL and the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization resulted in the structuring of the national specialised police units for the prevention of illicit traffic in cultural goods.

78. **Effective collaboration between the 1970 Convention Secretariat and the WCO has further strengthened UNESCO's emergency work.** The WCO now reports on illicit trafficking of cultural goods at the 1970 Convention Subsidiary Committee, which meets annually. Since 2017, UNESCO and WCO have conducted trainings of customs officers, funded by UNESCO. Respondents from WCO observed that this training is effective due to a balance between UNESCO promoting the ratification of the 1970 Convention, the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Convention, the 2001 Convention, and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, with an additional focus on concrete factors such as toolkits for identifying illegal trade. These respondents added that UNESCO's convening power could further harmonise this interagency cooperation and dialogue with national actors such as Ministries of Culture or National Museums to allow for seized objects to move beyond customs offices.

Military Strategies

79. **Following UN Security Council Resolutions 2249, 2199 and 2347, UNESCO has also made significant progress in terms of putting cultural protection on the military agenda.** In 2018, the 1954 Convention Secretariat has collaborated closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the NATO Bi Strategic Command Directive, 'Implementing Cultural Property in NATO Operations and Missions' (2019) which marks the first time cultural heritage has been included on such a directive. In April 2019, followed the first international conference on Cultural Property Protection organized by NATO: *NATO and Cultural Property Protection – Embracing New Challenges in the Era of Identity Wars, at NATO Headquarters, Brussels*. NATO currently includes cultural heritage protection in simulated

and live military exercises and has invited UNESCO to participate in its scripting workshops for command post exercises so that the cross-cutting topic of cultural property protection is a structural part of command level training.

80. **UNESCO reaches out to state military forces involved in conflict and peacekeeping operations to promote the ratification of the 1954 Convention and its two protocols** and has undertaken workshops in Lebanon (with UNIFIL, aimed at female soldiers), Georgia and Egypt in this regard. In Mali, UNESCO cooperated with the Alioune Blondin Beye School of Peacekeeping to integrate cultural heritage protection in the training of Malian armed forces. UNESCO Staff respondents outlined the current need to: a) empower military alliances and political bodies with a security mandate, such as the African Union, to come out in support of cultural protection, b) include cultural protection on all military curricula, and c) for every soldier to have a baseline understanding of the value of cultural heritage.

Peacekeeping

81. **The integration of culture into peacekeeping agendas is still at a nascent stage.** The case of Mali is a success in this regard. From 2013 to 2017, MINUSMA's cultural mandate was explicit following UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) which requested it to ensure the safeguarding of cultural heritage sites in Mali in collaboration with UNESCO. This represents the first time that the protection of cultural and historic sites was included in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation and it has significantly raised global awareness of this issue. UN Agency respondents noted that collaboration between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UNESCO in Mali was used as an example of interagency cooperation in the context of the UN Integrated Strategic Framework as part of a report of a fact-finding mission to Mali undertaken by UNDPKO. While cultural heritage was moved down in the mandate in 2018, cultural awareness training has remained a core part of the four-day induction week for all MINUSMA personnel. To date, close to 5,000 peacekeepers have been trained by UNESCO. However, respondents from UN Agencies noted that MINUSMA's revised mandate was unclear and asked for more guidance and concrete directives concerning heritage protection.

Post-Disaster Needs Assessments

82. **UNESCO has also been very effective in playing a central role in post-disaster needs assessments (PDNAs) at the international and inter-agency level in the field of culture.** PDNAs are a strong, well-developed and broadly recognised methodology for national recovery after a major natural or human-induced disaster. In 2013, a chapter on culture was included in the PDNA process (after the Haiti earthquake of 2010). The PDNA culture chapter is focused on restoring cultural assets and practices to their pre-disaster condition, bringing together the culture sector of the Member State and identifying gaps or weaknesses within the sector for further support. Since 2015, several PDNAs have included culture, including those conducted in Nepal (2015), Ecuador (October 2016), Haiti (December 2016), and Antigua and Barbuda (October 2017). After culture was successfully addressed in a PDNA in Kerala (2018), the Government of another Indian state, Odisha, took the initiative to include culture after a cyclone hit the state in 2019. In Mozambique, culture was included as part of the PDNA process following Tropical Cyclone Idai in March 2019 and one month later, when Tropical Cyclone Kenneth hit the country, the Ministry of Culture contacted UNESCO to request for assistance in applying the PDNA methodology to assess the effects and impact on the culture sector, including at the World Heritage Property of the Island of Mozambique.
83. **The PDNA-Culture Volume is still at a nascent stage so the tool is not yet widely known amongst Member States.** A PDNA conducted in Albania in 2015 after flooding included culture under the tourism chapter rather than seeing culture as sufficiently important to have its own category. UNESCO Field Offices with strong local networks can play a crucial role in advocating for the culture chapter at national level. UNESCO's Culture Sector is taking significant steps to raise awareness about the culture chapter and has supported workshops on the PDNA methodology in Jamaica in 2018, with the support of the HEF.

A Human Centric Approach

84. In collaboration with the World Bank, UNESCO has established a framework for the integration of culture in processes of urban reconstruction. The Culture in City Reconstruction and Recovery (CURE Framework) outlines a specific 'culture-based' approach to the reconstruction of cities. The objectives are to put people and cultural traditions and industries, rather than physical buildings, at the forefront of reconstruction work, from damage assessments to planning and implementation.

This is an endeavour cited by UNESCO staff as a crucial factor in raising awareness as to the value of culture for reconstruction. The framework was published in 2018 so it is hard to gauge impacts as yet.

Intangible Cultural Heritage

85. **The contribution of the 2003 Convention to emergencies work remains in the initial stages.** Thus far, steps have been taken and there is a broad recognition amongst UNESCO Culture Staff and external experts that ICH has a significant role to play in both disaster mitigation and recovery.
86. Research into the role of ICH in emergencies has been commissioned by UNESCO, such as a desk-based study on *Safeguarding and Mobilising Intangible Cultural Heritage in the Context of Natural and Human-induced Hazards* and a survey report on *Intangible Cultural Heritage of Displaced Syrians*. **The former report shows that ICH can contribute to mitigating the risks of disasters on communities.** Following these reports, ICH experts have been engaged to create capacity-building materials to support safeguarding of ICH in disasters. These ICH experts advise that UNESCO should further develop relations between the 2003 Convention and disaster relief specialists and develop a model to understand how ICH is transmitted. An ICH transmission model would both enable UNESCO to better protect ICH and develop understanding of how ICH can contribute further to disaster risk management, including deepening understanding of how local technical knowledge or know-how relates to disaster mitigation. The Intergovernmental Committee for the 2003 Convention, requested that the UNESCO Secretariat "continue its efforts to develop a capacity-building approach to operationalize the proposed principles and modalities and build awareness of their importance among actors in the field of heritage safeguarding, including non-governmental organizations accredited to the 2003 Convention, as well as other fields related to emergency management." ICH as a tool for recovery is highlighted in Focus Box 2 below, which details the rehabilitation of weaving communities in Lombok.
87. **The PDNA methodology includes an assessment of the effects and impacts of a disaster specifically on Intangible Cultural Heritage.** While the PDNA for the 2015 earthquake in Nepal made only limited reference to damage and loss for intangible heritage, it did highlight the important role of ICH in the recovery phase. ICH has been included in PDNAs in Vanuatu (2015), Fiji (2016), Haiti (2016), Dominica (2017), Lao PDR (2018), Kerala (2018), Iran (2019), and Odisha (2019).

Focus Box 2: Lombok: ICH as a Tool for Community Recovery



Source: Lombok Case Study
(Annex D)

In August 2018, a series of earthquakes hit northern Lombok, Indonesia, killing over 550 people, injuring 1,000 more and displacing over 400,000. In response, in collaboration with The Cultural Values Preservation Office (BPNB) of Bali Province, the UNESCO Office in Jakarta prepared a request to the HEF for the project “Needs assessment and technical assistance for weavers in North and East Lombok” for a total of USD 70,000.

Weaving has been part of Lombok’s traditional culture for centuries. Every village has its own techniques, patterns and stories that have been passed down through generations of women. Weaving contributes to communities’ ceremonies and rituals, and in more recent times, to their livelihoods. When the earthquakes struck northern Lombok, weaving activity stopped. Interviews with the BPNB, the North Lombok District officials, and the Bayan village local government all confirm that weaving was essential in order to return to normality.

This project used weaving as a tool for trauma healing and recovery. Weaving is inherently a social activity among women and the opportunity to weave again brought smiles, joy, laughter, and the opportunity to ‘forget the disaster’. Many of the women interviewed described how the trainings and new knowledge acquired through the project gave them the skills and confidence in their craft and that they felt more empowered, both at the workplace and at home. The project reportedly reinforced their strong belief in the preservation of their weaving culture, and the importance of weaving as a transmission of their traditions and stories. It has also brought about economic development opportunities for the communities.

A weaver in Pringgasela demonstrating the natural dye creation process, a key training activity of the project

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Diversity of Cultural Expressions

88. **The 2005 Convention has contributed to emergencies work** through the Wassla (Connection) Reviving cultural life in the city of Mosul project which includes support for the music sector and for citizens of Mosul to have access to cultural life. This project was funded by the HEF, and implemented by the NGO Action for Hope.

Expected Result 5

89. **At the operational activity level, UNESCO has met or exceeded almost all of its 2018 – 2019 targets in relation to the 39 C/5 ER5 reporting framework.** These are the overarching indicators used to measure the effectiveness of UNESCO Culture Sector’s implementation of the 2015 Strategy and Action Plan. The results

presented in Table 3 below are taken from the EPR Unit’s internal reporting documentation and provide an overview of the indicators, targets and results for 2018 – 2019. It is clear that in order to meet these targets, UNESCO has delivered a broad range of activities at all stages of intervention. Despite clearly meeting or exceeding most targets, UNESCO’s indicators are largely focused on measuring outputs rather than outcomes or impact on communities. As such, they are not useful in gauging the effectiveness of UNESCO’s interventions. What is more important than counting deployments or interventions, is to try and measure what those deployments or interventions led to, and the knock-on possible impact on the communities they aimed to serve. This highlights the need for more effective reporting structures, which is outlined in the next chapter: Evidence, Learning and Communication.

Table 3: 39 C/5 ER5 Targets and Results Summary

Target and Indicator	Result
18 (1 of which in Africa) specific conservation projects at World Heritage properties related to emergency preparedness and response in (post-) conflict or (post-) disaster countries	UNESCO notes 25 specific conservation projects related to emergencies have taken place at World Heritage sites , of which 7 have been in Africa. Examples of this work include the reinstallation of a Monument and two Museums in Timbuktu, the rehabilitation of a Mosque in Sankoré, and a museum in Gao, Mali. In Yemen, UNESCO supported the rehabilitation of the National Museum of Sana'a in partnership with the Social Fund for Development and the General Organization for Antiquities and Museums.
3 successful cases of return and restitution of cultural property from countries in emergency situations and/or related to terrorism financing.	UNESCO notes three successful cases of return and restitution of cultural property (although the evidence to substantiate this claim is lacking).
4 (1 in Africa 1 in SIDS) initiatives implementing the 1954 Convention and its two Protocols in line with the Strategy for Reinforcing UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict.	Six initiatives implementing the 1954 Convention and its two Protocols (including one in Africa and two in SIDS) have taken place, including a workshop in Sudan with the Sudanese National Commission to promote the ratification of the 1999 Second Protocol.
10 (2 in Africa; 1 in SIDS) plans, policies and programmes aimed at integrating the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage in emergency contexts, including for preparedness and recovery.	UNESCO notes four 'plans, policies and programmes' aimed at integrating the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage in emergency contexts were carried out. Examples include the July 2019 needs assessment in Bandiagara, Mali, which contained a component on intangible cultural heritage (see the case study in Annex D for more detail) and the ongoing integration of intangible heritage elements in educational curricula, through close collaboration with the Education Sector.
10 (2 in Africa; 1 in SIDS) cultural policies and measures to promote and protect the status of artists and artistic freedom, including for emergency situations, and global survey submitted on policies that recognize the social and economic rights of artists, including in emergency situations	UNESCO notes two cultural policies and measures to promote and protect the status of artists and artistic freedom, including for emergency situations. In addition, 52 Member States participated in the global survey on policies and measures taken around the world to support the economic and social rights of artists.
149 Initiatives contributing to awareness-raising, education for the promotion of cultural pluralism and the respect for cultural heritage, with an aim to build more tolerant and inclusive societies.	179 activities were implemented with regards to awareness-raising and education for the promotion of cultural pluralism and respect for cultural heritage through its field offices. Activities included photo exhibitions, videos, social media campaigns, documentaries and events.
10 deployments completed with the consent of authorities, including in Africa, through the Rapid Response Mechanism (only extrabudgetary)	Seven supported Member States of which two in Africa and 2 in SIDS. International Assistance was provided through the sending of nine rapid assessment and advisory missions supported through the HEF, notably in Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Togo and Tonga. For example, UNESCO deployed a mission in September 2018 to the National Museum in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, following a devastating fire, to assess damage and support planning for recovery. Another mission was carried out from 19 to 24 August 2018 to the World Heritage property of Koutammakou, Togo, to assess damage caused by heavy rainfall.
Maintenance of a roster of heritage experts with consideration given to gender equality and geographically balanced representation.	An online platform containing a database comprised of an initial group of 50 experts has been set up and online training materials have been developed. Yet, the Roster of Experts has only recently become operational and maintaining a roster of vetted experts with the appropriate technical and language skills and cultural sensitivities is a challenge.
10 mission reports received on initiatives undertaken for emergency assessment and safeguarding through the Rapid Response Mechanism	UNESCO notes 9 assessment missions and therefore 9 reports were produced.

Target and Indicator	Result
10 decisions adopted, such as UN Security Council, UN General Assembly or Human Rights Council Resolutions, and actions taken at national level for their implementation; transformative action taken to include culture in capacity-building and sensitization initiatives	UNESCO notes 24 policy decisions and actions taken by supported Member States and relevant intergovernmental actors. There is however not much evidence to substantiate this claim.
Partnerships entered with UNESCO reflecting level of UN engagement and crisis coordination. No target	<p>UNESCO provides the following evidence in regards to partnerships, but without a target and baseline, difficult to measure the success of such partnership oriented activities.</p> <p>As part of the EU-funded project “Protecting Cultural Heritage and Diversity in Complex Emergencies for Stability and Peace”, UNESCO organized an expert meeting with UNHCR, UN-Habitat and NGOs to develop a methodology to collect cultural resources of displaced communities in June 2019 in Beirut, Lebanon. It was piloted in August 2019 among five Syrian refugee communities in Northern Lebanon with the UNHCR and the NGO Action for Hope.</p> <p>UNESCO, in cooperation with ICCROM, implemented a “First Aid Course for the protection of Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis” training in Mali in November 2018 for 21 cultural experts and emergency actors from 19 countries, including 17 participants from Africa and 8 women. With support from the HEF, a conference on disaster recovery and heritage preservation was organized in August 2018 by the Caribbean Branch of the International Council on Archives in response to widespread impacts to cultural heritage following the 2017 Hurricane season.</p> <p>In the context of the initiative “Reviving the spirit of Mosul”, UNESCO cooperated with UN-Habitat to develop an initial framework for reconstruction for the city, based on extensive primary and secondary data collection, integrated as well in a GIS database for the city.</p>
	<p>Cooperation was strengthened with actors outside of the culture sector, mostly law enforcement and peacekeeping in the context of the implementation of the 1954 and 1970 Conventions, with a view to enabling a better protection of culture and promotion of cultural pluralism. In the context of the implementation plan of the Reparations Order issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Al-Mahdi case, UNESCO provided technical advice and support to the International Trust Fund for Victims, charged by the ICC with the design of the Order's implementation plan, which was submitted to the ICC Chamber in November 2018.</p> <p>Finally, innovative financing and implementation partnerships are also pursued, including with ALIPH. The USD 1.9 million project submitted by UNESCO to ALIPH for the Safeguarding of the Archaeological Remains and Minaret of Jam was approved in June 2019.</p>
Culture included in 5 final reports on assessments of needs in post-disaster/post-conflict situations	5 post-disaster assessments undertaken by Member States which include culture. In the context of the UN/European Union/World Bank joint PDNA methodology, UNESCO contributed to the post-disaster needs assessments of the culture sector in India, Iran, Lao PDR, and Mozambique, with the support of the HEF.
Level of donor mobilization for culture-related rehabilitation post-disaster/post-conflict. No target.	No clear evidence provided. The HEF's donor base still remains limited, which can jeopardise the Fund's sustainability. While there is a powerful discourse about emergency work internationally, there are few donors (Member States) willing to fund the HEF in part due to many donors' preference for earmarked contributions that give them higher visibility. At the same time, UNESCO has been able attract new donors in recent years.

Source: EPR Unit, Culture and Emergencies Entity

90. In conclusion, UNESCO has been relatively effective in achieving its intended targets. UNESCO has conducted a broad range of activities across all stages of intervention and can demonstrate that the *intention* of these activities was to strengthen Member State capacity and to incorporate the protection of culture into international agendas (two objectives of the 2015 Strategy). Yet the evaluation

reveals that the evidence collected by UNESCO – in particular as it pertains to ER5 reporting - falls short in demonstrating what outcomes these activities led to beyond counting deployments or interventions. A systemic rethinking of indicator design and information collected would be welcome and is discussed in the next chapter.

Evidence, Learning and Communication

91. This chapter examines the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms UNESCO has in place and whether or not these mechanisms have been effective for internal learning purposes, to measure achievements and report on results. It also provides insights into UNESCO's planning efforts towards possible 2030 Agenda impact contributions. Finally, this section assesses UNESCO's communications capability in order to determine if results are being disseminated in a meaningful way.

Review of Guiding Documents and Known Frameworks

92. **A Theory of Change (ToC) and detailed results framework (RF) that delineate progress towards outcomes and impact do not exist for UNESCO's culture in emergencies work as a whole. Furthermore, a guiding monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan for UNESCO staff that details data sources, collection cycles, storage and uses is absent.** Activities are guided by the 2015 Strategy, the 2017 Addendum to the Strategy, and the Action Plan. In these guiding documents, clear objectives and priority areas of action and activities are outlined. The 2015 Strategy set a goal to enhance UNESCO's capacity to have quality data and information. However, a detailed review of available documentation indicates the need for further work in this area, as information is fragmented, largely focussed on activities and outputs, and lacks linkages to assumptions, and the measurement of outcomes and beyond.
93. **Activities, associated targets and expected evidence are also guided by the key performance indicators found within ER5 of the 39C/5.** However, ER5 does not provide details on how interventions within the stated areas will lead to sustained long-term change. Whilst UNESCO has been effective in meeting these indicators, the framework only records *what has been done (outputs)*, as opposed to *what change has been achieved (outcomes)*.
94. **In contrast to the shortcomings noted above, the evaluation team found good evidence for stronger M&E practices within extra-budgetary projects, such as the HEF.** Key features of the HEF M&E system include: a well-developed intervention logic (causal pathways), a corresponding results framework and annual

reports that highlight key lessons learned and compelling stories of intervention from the ground. These features reflect the fact that the HEF is supported by external donors who have their own reporting requirements, but it provides a case study for how similar M&E structures could be rolled out across UNESCO's wider culture in emergencies work.

95. **HEF donors remark that they have confidence in HEF management because of the strong M&E system in place and annual reports.** The HEF is clearly able to illustrate how funds were spent and what results were achieved, including outcomes- and, when possible, impact-level stories from marginalised groups. This ensures that results are reported both in terms of achieving targets, and creating tangible, human-level impacts.
96. **UNESCO's Culture Sector has done some excellent work in mapping the areas in which it believes it can support Member States in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including specifically for ER5.** Culture in emergencies is to provide policy and capacity-building support to Member States to help meet 11 different SDG indicators (see Table 4 below) with specific attention to 11.4 '*Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage*'. All of UNESCO's work, including emergencies, aims to contribute to this indicator.
97. More recently, **UNESCO has developed the innovative and impressive 'Culture 2030 Indicators', a framework whose purpose is to 'measure and monitor the progress of culture's enabling contribution to the national and local implementation of the goal and targets of the 2030 SDGs'.** The Culture 2030 Indicators framework thereby provides guidance to UNESCO staff and tools to Member States (national and local authorities) to assess culture's contribution to the SDGs.
98. **Overall, the evaluation team found the Culture 2030 Indicators framework to be methodologically sound, as it makes explicit reference to data sources and articles within each of the six Cultural Conventions and other major international frameworks with elements of Culture (e.g. the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030).** The framework has also been designed to be user-friendly, with checklists of 'yes/no' indicators with attached evidence chosen as a path for implementation as opposed to overly complicated metrics. Donors remark that the *Culture 2030 Indicators* are setting the standard for understanding how organizations can measure contributions towards the SDG Agenda. Interviews with Member States from the EU, for example, show that the EU is looking at the Culture 2030 approach as a benchmark on how to develop a similar mechanism for its gender work.

99. Table 4 below provides an overview of strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms as well as their current uses.

Table 4: Strengths and Weaknesses of Known Emergency-Related Guiding Documents Linked to Emergency Evidence Collection

Document(s)	Strengths	Weaknesses	Uses
2015 Strategy and 2017 Addendum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Sets objectives (intended outcomes), priority actions and M&E expectations ▶ Useful for outcome level intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Broad in nature ▶ Does not make linkages between levels of actions listed ▶ No causal pathways 	Used to set strategic direction of UNESCO's emergency work.
Action Plan 2015 - 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Clear and detailed priority actions and activities ▶ Useful for activity/action grouping 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ No intervention logic ▶ Lists a number of different actions at short, medium and long-term ▶ They are a mixture of activities, outputs, or longer-term achievements 	Outlines priority actions over 7 years and anticipated budget requirements. Yet document does not appear to be used, as it has not been updated. Unclear which actions have been completed.
ER5 and 39C/5 December 2019 Report for ER5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Sets impact statement and linkages to SDGs, indicators and targets, activities ▶ Useful to gauge UNESCO's approach to measuring its effectiveness in emergency work. ▶ Narrative against outputs within workplans related to ER5. ▶ Useful to gauge how results are currently aggregated and disseminated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Missing results chain/linkages from activities to outputs to outcomes ▶ Does not outline the assumptions ▶ Generic and often confusing reporting; ▶ Missing outcome and contribution to impact narrative; ▶ Missing depth of insights and some data lacks evidence to substantiate claims. 	Used as the primary measurement framework of UNESCO's emergency work. The narrative makes loose linkages to the Action Plan priority areas. It is used as a reporting mechanism but staff suggest it is not useful from a learning perspective as results are focused on outputs as opposed to outcome level achievements.
Culture 2030 Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Clear methodology, sources and indicators related to disaster resilience, conflict and 2030 Agenda. ▶ Possible to include some indicators on contributions to impact reporting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ No glaring issues. However, it is new, yet to be piloted/utilised. ▶ How staff use the Culture 2030 Indicators in their work is unclear. 	Will be used to determine the contribution of culture to the SDGs. Too early to determine its utility as it is just being piloted at country level. Yet, framework and approach look promising.
Heritage Emergency Fund	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Clear intervention logic, results framework, indicators, targets and key activities. ▶ Useful to gauge how the EPR Unit establishes a results framework for a workplan. ▶ Compelling annual narrative to support data. Useful as a model for ToC construction. 	No major issues, yet, scope limited to HEF.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Used to measure and demonstrate success of HEF-funded interventions for donors. UNESCO staff use the data to improve HEF performance and can communicate compelling stories through the Annual Reports and HEF brochures. ▶ Excellent learning framework which is a model that could be replicated more broadly by CLT/CEM.

Source: UNESCO Internal Documentation

Potential of Culture 2030 Indicators for Emergencies Work

100. **Specifically for emergencies work, checklists for national (institutional and policy frameworks) and local actors (knowledge and cultural practices for resilience) have been created for disaster resilience under the *Environment and Resilience* dimension within the *Culture 2030 Indicators*.** For example, at the national level the checklist includes an indicator on the *Existence of national Disaster Risk Reduction Plan(s) for heritage sites/elements* and makes reference to the 1972 Convention. At the local level, the checklist includes *Examples of training courses on skills in the use of sustainable or natural construction materials supported by local and national authorities*, built on the Sendai Framework's Priority 4 *Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response*.
101. **Checklists for national and local actors also exist for the protection of culture in the event of armed conflict, with explicit reference to articles of the 1954 Convention.** Examples include '*Existence of specialized units in the armed forces, services whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property in the case of conflict*'; and '*Evidence of specific capacity-building and training programme(s), implemented in the last 5 years, to support armed forces expertise on the protection of cultural properties in the event of armed conflict*'.
102. Table 5 below provides specific examples of how UNESCO's Culture 2030 Indicators links UNESCO's work to the SDGs.

Table 5: Examples of Linkages between UNESCO's Work and SDG Contributions

Convention	Examples of Activities Linked to SDGs
1954 Convention	Emergency preparedness trainings with the armed forces, customs and police officials contributes to building skills for sustainable development (4.7) , including gender equality dimensions (5.5) .
1970 Convention	Core mandate of illicit trafficking of cultural goods in conflict and post-conflict contexts directly contributes to 16.4 , on the recovery of stolen assets. Educational awareness raising campaigns on illicit trafficking, including the protection and promotion of museums and collections (contributes to 4.7) and facilitates capacity building and exchange workshops, thereby contributing to the prevention of violence (16.a) .

Convention	Examples of Activities Linked to SDGs
1972 Convention	Promotes inclusive social development (5.5) . Contributes to Member State peace and security by facilitating conflict prevention and resolution activities and events (16.a) .
2001 Convention	Supports education for sustainable development (4.7) through its preparedness-oriented ocean literacy and ocean heritage teaching to encourage coastal societies to protect their underwater cultural identify.
2003 Convention	Safeguarding intangible cultural heritage can contribute to economic, social and environmental dimensions, while also contributing to peace and security. Some notable emergency-related contributions include strengthening resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters (13.1) , gender equality (5.5) , education for sustainable development (4.7) and non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development and conflict resolution (16) .
2005 Convention	The convention places emphasis on several emergency-related indicators (4, 5, 16 and 17) and therefore can claim to make contributions. Yet, the 2005 Convention has not embedded emergency-oriented activities into its work stream or its Funding modality and therefore leverages the HEF in order to fund its emergency work.

Source: Culture 2030 Indicators

103. **Perhaps most impressive in regards to the *Culture 2030 Indicators* including for emergency work, is the focus on, and the inclusion of people in the reporting checklists.** For example, '*Evidence of integrating cultural factors, including knowledge, traditions and practices of all people and communities into local strategies on environmental sustainability*'. Other indicators focus on people-centred prosperity and livelihoods. These are the elements which are largely missing from current UNESCO emergency work data collection and reporting. As such, CLT/CEM and the Culture Sector more broadly could look closely at these indicators as a means to structure ER reporting. If, for example, Member States can articulate through the Culture 2030 Indicators evidence collection that a specialised unit in the armed forces for the protection of cultural property exists, that capacity building for this specialised unit has taken place, that community members have been consulted in the design of cultural protection measures and planning, and that specific jobs have been created due to the aforementioned process, then

UNESCO has the evidence it requires to demonstrate its contribution to objective one of the 2015 Strategy in that country: *'Member States have strengthened capacity to prevent, mitigate and recover the loss of cultural heritage and diversity as a result of conflict or disaster'*. It would also have the specific evidence from which to develop a compelling story of change to increase an understanding of what UNESCO's advocacy leads to and the impact it has on real people.

Impact on Learning and Reporting

104. **The absence of a clear, coherent and overarching ToC and RF for emergencies work reflects the wider shortcoming of UNESCO's evidence and learning system.** Currently the primary ER5 framework, for example, only captures basic output data and does not record wider achievements or impacts. This significantly negates opportunities for learning and reflecting on implementation approaches. For example, UNESCO may have reached its target for number of trainings conducted, but if no one uses the skills they acquire, this is not a useful measure either of impact or success, and does not facilitate internal discussions around quality assurance, course content or suitability to the local context.
105. **As a result, UNESCO staff widely consider the results framework to be extraneous to their work.** The ER5 results framework exhibits many of the qualities typically associated with top-down policies. Field office staff were not systematically consulted in the design. Indicators are seen as irrelevant to the core work undertaken at field office level. It does not provide decision-driven data.

Impact on Data Storage

106. **A lack of a clear M&E system also negatively impacts data storage.** UNESCO staff suggest that data is not systematically stored on a central and shared server and therefore not leveraged for internal learning purposes, or reporting and communicating results. A clear example is UNESCO's work in the digital intervention sphere. The data collected by the contractor or partner is shared with the field office through PDFs or extensive photo folders on a hard drive. At the field office level, the data takes three paths: (1) some information is being shared on the mission website for communication purposes; (2) data remains on a hard drive or USB, is shelved and permanently offline/inaccessible; or (3) some data is provided

to national stakeholders or staff at UNESCO HQ, but there is a limited capacity to open or interpret data due to low technical capacity and/or lack of appropriate software to do so. Please refer to the *Digital Case Study* in Annex D for further details.

Power of Quality Data


107. **UNESCO staff suggest that a shift in mind-set is required within UNESCO's Culture Sector in regards to the importance of investment in quality evidence and learning systems.** This shift must focus not on outputs, but on people-centred data. As staff members remark:

'We need human impact stories to 'sell' our work (to donors) and more importantly to determine if we are actually making a difference on the ground.'

Source: UNESCO Staff Respondent

108. **To start this process, the evaluation team held a participatory workshop with the EPR Unit on the construction of a ToC for UNESCO's emergency work as a whole, including the Culture Conventions.** The aim was to bridge the gap between UNESCO's activities and longer-term outcomes found in the 2015 Strategy. The result of this process is highlighted in Figure 5. As is illustrated, activities are linked to tangible outputs and then to immediate and intermediate outcomes (achievements) focused on people, when appropriate. The next step is for UNESCO to further reflect on this process, with a particular focus on the views of field staff so that country offices are engaged in the design process, which will encourage greater buy-in.

Figure 5: Draft Culture in Emergencies Logic Model



Definition of Success

109. **Whilst ER5 may be UNESCO's stated ambition when it comes to its work in emergencies, it is not the commonly shared long-term definition of 'success'** held by UNESCO staff members. Staff interviewed often defined long-term success as the Organization's ability to overcome the operational challenges that limit its ability to deliver; meaning ER5 is not inspirational as it is not uniting staff in a clear vision of what UNESCO is trying to achieve. The evaluation reveals that a clear vision statement is missing in regards to emergency work that focuses on the Organization's intended impact on communities so it unites UNESCO towards a common purpose of 'serving'. ER5 is neither simple nor specific and it is difficult to measure; therefore, it perhaps is not realistic or easily understood by staff.
110. In conclusion, there is a considerable delta between the great thinking at the strategic level that has gone towards UNESCO's Culture 2030 Indicators process, and evidence collection at the operational level to demonstrate that the activities UNESCO implements in regards to its emergency work are indeed leading to/ contributing towards its impact ambitions. Again, this was the rationale behind the construction of the overarching ToC which should be considered a starting point and further reflected upon in the immediate future. In addition, the *2030 Culture Indicator* data collection pilot at the country level should be followed closely as the results from this process should provide insights on how UNESCO's emergency work is and/or can contribute to the SDG Agenda.

Communication

"UNESCO is a pearl, but a well-preserved secret"

Source: Member State Respondent

Lack of Evidence to Create Quality Communication Outputs

111. **As a consequence of poor evidence collection, UNESCO often does not have the information required to effectively communicate meaningful results, in particular to Member States and the broader public.** UNESCO publications are considered dry by Member States and partners because they typically offer output level results that do not connect with readers (See Figure 6). Key stakeholders remark that they are interested in people-centred results, which bring a 'human face' to UNESCO's work and are considered crucial to delivering compelling stories. To date, human stories from the ground are rarely communicated, which hampers UNESCO's ability to provide evidence to substantiate its advocacy for the role of culture in emergencies. Respondents noted that in order to convince a wider audience about the role of culture in peacebuilding, recovery and resilience in post-conflict or post-disaster situations, shareable, digital communication outputs and project brochures could focus more on human stories and testimonies from the ground (e.g. how local communities relate to heritage; how its destruction (and restoration) impacts their lives). A good example of this is the HEF project brochure of UNESCO's use of ICH (traditional weaving) as a tool for trauma healing after a series of earthquakes struck Lombok, Indonesia in August 2018. The brochure is succinct, focuses on how the project impacted the female weaving communities, offering pictures, testimonies and key results. Brochures like this should become commonplace across UNESCO's work in emergencies.

Figure 6: Power of Quality Data Example

What UNESCO does: *'We conducted 25 specific conservation projects at World Heritage properties related to emergency preparedness and response...'*

What UNESCO should be doing: *The conservation projects led to employment opportunities for 1,000 low-income individuals, of which 450 were women, including Rivka who learned...'*

Source: Authors and UNESCO ER5 Reporting

Institutional Communication Challenges

112. UNESCO's Strategic Transformation Unit found that **'UNESCO communications as a whole do not currently represent best practice: they fail to contribute sufficiently to the delivery of the Director-General's priorities and the enhancement of the Organization's reputation'**²⁷. The report, which was delivered to the Executive Board in spring 2019, highlighted five key findings: (1) The role of communications is unclear and undervalued; (2) the role of the Department of Public Information is confused; (3) the management, coordination and integration of communications functions within sectors and field offices is weak; (4) Cross-UNESCO communications planning is poor; and (5) UNESCO's role and positioning are not clearly defined. **As such, even if UNESCO had the people-centred data required to deliver a quality output, it does not yet have the internal communications capability to systematically craft a compelling message and disseminate it effectively.**
113. **First, the evaluation team found that UNESCO devotes few resources to press and communications, including on its emergencies work.** UNESCO has a team of 30 in the Division of Public Information, who work across all sectors, and only 2 dedicated Culture Communication Officers in the field (in Baghdad and Bangkok).

114. **Second, operationally UNESCO is not yet fit to communicate in the digital age.** For example, the Organization has only recently been able to use video for communication outputs; its tools are largely outdated, and staff generally lack the required digital capacity. Respondents remark that UNESCO needs a sincere commitment to train staff on how to adequately use modern technology, social media and to develop interesting stories for regular Web News dissemination.
115. **Third, several different entities are involved in approving emergency related communications, delaying timely dissemination.** These include the CLT/CEM (and within that the EPR), the WHC, the Division of Public Information and even the Cabinet when a high-level crisis takes place, such as the Notre Dame de Paris fire. As the Strategic Transformation Unit's report found, there is no internal coordination and planning to deal with this approval and decision-making issue, with each entity having a 'say' if demanded, ahead of message delivery.
116. **Finally, given shortfalls in resources and capacity, respondents remarked that UNESCO could build its communications capability slowly, prioritising human stories.** As with other areas of engagement, UNESCO should be pragmatic and deliver depth over breadth. Since emergency work is cross-cutting, human stories could be developed across built, moveable, and intangible heritage and the protection of cultural expressions.
117. In conclusion, UNESCO lacks a consolidated monitoring and evaluation approach across the entirety of its culture in emergencies work in order to clearly articulate its path to long-term success and evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of its activities. Without this strategic evidence and learning architecture (e.g. ToC), UNESCO will not be able to reflect upon and improve the manner in which its staff work or understand and communicate the impact of the Organization's work on the communities they serve. The ToC process conducted as part of this evaluation is a step in the right direction and can be further developed. In addition, UNESCO's Culture 2030 Indicator approach is worth further exploring once the results of the pilot phase have been analysed.

²⁷ UNESCO's STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION The Government and Public Sector Practice (WPP) "Building UNESCO's Communications Capability"

Sustainability of Efforts

118. This section outlines the sustainability of UNESCO's work in emergencies. The following areas were examined during the evaluation: exit strategy, risk management, learning, flexibility, advocacy to Member States and other organizations, and fundraising. However, the Strategy was adopted in 2015 and UNESCO is still in the initial stages of implementing this revised approach to protecting culture in emergencies. As such, it is too early to make definitive statements concerning the sustainability of many areas of this work. Therefore, this section provides some insights on three key areas which will prove instrumental to the sustainability of UNESCO's emergency work moving forward: (i) entry points for partnerships for effective implementation, (ii) exit strategies from projects and handover to relevant bodies for continuity, and (iii) knowledge retention by intended beneficiaries.

Entry Points for Partnerships

119. **Sustainable partnerships with external organizations are crucial to achieve UNESCO's objective of integrating culture into UN and other international frameworks and strategies for humanitarian action, peacebuilding processes and security strategies.** The UNESCO strategy thus far has been to establish fruitful partnerships with sister agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNDPKO and with key partner organizations such as NATO, the WCO and the World Bank, that have ensured that culture is integrated into humanitarian initiatives and security strategies at the interagency level.
120. These top-level interactions are clearly effective strategic entry points for UNESCO but as respondents from these UN Sister Agencies outlined, **it is the ability for UNESCO to make and maintain national and local level partnerships that will make the key difference in effective emergencies work.** Field Offices are crucial in this regard, and their networks of national cultural institutions, local NGOs and experts are the crucial strategic entry points for UNESCO's emergency work on the ground. One example is the established relationships between the UNESCO Office in Jakarta and, the Tokyo Restoration Centre, a Japanese NGO which had been working in the field for a long time, for the emergency assistance to the

Palu Museum in Central Sulawesi. A second example is its relationship with RedR Indonesia, a humanitarian organization which was instrumental in supporting the design and implementation of the early-recovery project with female weaving groups in Lombok.

121. **UNESCO plays a key role in the UN wide recovery and peacebuilding assessments (RPBA) working group** and has the same number of representatives at these meetings as UNICEF, for example. RPBA's are a high level, overarching framework for identifying the underlying causes and impacts of conflict and crisis, and to help governments assess their needs and develop a strategy for recovery and peacebuilding. RPBA's are the result of a tripartite agreement between the UN, European Union and World Bank to provide joint support for assessing and planning crisis recovery. As the methodology is still evolving there is room for culture to be more fully integrated, particularly on the peacebuilding side. A key entry point for UNESCO is conflict analysis, which is a core part of the early RPBA process. Culture – more specifically, cultural differences – often underpin violence between communities. Identifying the role of culture as a cause for conflict will help policy makers and implementers understand how to harness culture as a driver of reconciliation and peacebuilding. As with PDNAs, the key factor here is UNESCO's ability to find entry points at the national level early in the RPBA process. Field Offices and their networks are crucial in this respect. This is an area in which UNESCO is uniquely well-positioned to contribute, drawing on extensive engagement in conflict affected areas like Afghanistan and more recently, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Mali.
122. Peacebuilding is a long-term activity focused on transforming the cultural and structural conditions that lead to conflict which typically has multiple and interlinked stages (acknowledgement of conflict, conflict management, resolution, confidence building/truth telling, dealing with anger). However, UNESCO typically promotes a positive idea of culture, using case studies of its work that underpin this view. External expert respondents noted that if UNESCO is to partake in peacebuilding as part of RPBA's, then the processes of conflict analysis would necessarily entail discussions of some of the negative aspects of culture, for example its role in dividing communities, demarcating difference and justifying violence. Local NGOs with in-country experience are best placed to undertake such initiatives.

123. **First response clusters provide a potential entry point for embedding culture in future partnerships.** The Cluster approach was developed in 2005 as a way to provide timely and effective humanitarian action. UNESCO has a link to the core humanitarian first response group through its Education Cluster although at present there is no Culture Cluster. At country level, UNESCO Field Offices can attend Cluster coordination meetings, build the local and regional networks in order to mobilise technical help from other UN agencies, and gauge the appropriate time to intervene.
124. Other first response entry points mentioned by respondents from Advisory Bodies, are the further development of partnerships with organizations such as the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) to develop technical guidance for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) operations in managing cultural heritage sites affected by disaster as part of first response interventions.
125. In terms of key partners and advisory bodies, **crisis training is an important strategic entry point for UNESCO to embed culture into future partnerships, as highlighted by UNESCO's on-going institutional relationship with ICCROM.**

Exit Strategies

126. Activities funded through the HEF are required to report on the sustainability of the activity as well as whether or not the seed funds disbursed will attract follow up funding or have a catalytic effect. While this planning and reporting is commendable, the focus of the question on sustainability is on another 'long-term project' as opposed to deeper thought on how the local community/local authorities can sustain the benefits of the activity post-UNESCO's involvement. Furthermore, this is not necessarily common practice across all of UNESCO's work in emergencies.
127. **In regards to flagship projects, UNESCO could learn from its experience in Mali in which a co-dependent situation has emerged without a clear exit strategy.** UNESCO has been continuously providing support in Mali since 2012 and its Culture Sector has benefitted from the world-wide attention for its interventions, in particular in getting culture in emergencies on the international agenda. However, a situation of co-dependency persists with no end in sight, as the protracted conflict continues in the country. Interviews with UNESCO Culture Staff, reveal that in order to find sustainable solutions for the protection of cultural

heritage, UNESCO needs to further focus on incentivising local communities and actors in protecting heritage with the understanding that UNESCO's financial support may eventually run out. The lesson learned from the experience in Mali is that UNESCO needs to consider the long-term impacts of intervening, especially in areas of conflict. Risk and mitigation strategies should be put in place for all projects, but particular attention should be placed on large 'headline grabbing' efforts such as Mali, or now in the case of Mosul, Iraq.

Knowledge Retention

128. **As UNESCO Culture Staff readily admit, UNESCO's training activities in this area tend to be ad-hoc and therefore the retention of knowledge is difficult to ascertain.** A large percentage of UNESCO's preparedness activities are focused on intended beneficiaries learning new skills or being aware of new ideas. Whether it be specific capacity building courses, awareness raising events, advocacy, or offering support in the development of emergency response plans or imparting PDNA methodology approaches, the aim is for the beneficiaries to learn from the experience and then use these new skills to improve the status quo in their government, army, or organization. To be successful, this type of skill development – in particular in regards to the technical nature of the protection of culture and promotion of cultural pluralism – requires regular reinforcement of imparted knowledge and approaches. Yet, UNESCO Culture Staff state that the training approach is typically 'one-off' and follow-up is rarely done, in terms of reinforcement of skills but also in terms of measurement of results. For the FAC programme, for example, did the training participants use the information to influence policies and create an emergency plan? The evaluation mission to Mali found that this was indeed the case in certain instances (e.g. a Kenyan participant further replicated the training she had received in Mali in her own country hence increasing local capacities; some other trainees reported developing the baseline emergency plan they had drafted during the course, once they had returned to their home countries). However, although there may be some – albeit small scale results - UNESCO Staff rarely know the answer to this question. For UNESCO's knowledge transfer activities to be successful, the Organization could reduce its focus to a few key areas and invest in the reinforcement of training in crisis affected countries. This is more important than a high number of training activities and events across the globe and would lead to more effective and sustainable results.

129. In conclusion, sustainability of UNESCO's work in culture in emergencies is mixed, but it is too early to draw definitive conclusions. UNESCO has laid the foundation for strategic partnerships to be developed and/or further cultivated. Yet, clear exit strategies from projects to ensure sustainability of efforts are not common practice and 'co-dependency' can become an issue without proper planning. Finally, capacity building efforts tend to be ad-hoc and not properly monitored and therefore knowledge retention of intended beneficiaries largely unknown.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

130. All key stakeholder groups look to UNESCO to convene a global response when a disaster or armed conflict threatens culture. As the only UN Agency with an international mandate in culture and its unique standard-setting instruments, UNESCO addresses recognised needs, has the trust of Member States and the support of partners and other external actors to lead efforts to protect culture and promote cultural pluralism before, during, or after a crisis.
131. **At the strategic and structural levels, this evaluation has demonstrated that UNESCO prioritises emergency work.** Yet, UNESCO has many priorities, across all Sectors and all of them are important. Resource constraints mean that UNESCO has to make difficult budgeting decisions each biennium and unfortunately emergencies work does not receive the regular programme funding it requires to meet its objectives. Human resource constraints, the lack of emergency response systems, complex and often confusing application processes and the multiplicity of voluntary funding modalities can slow down response times, and hinder UNESCO's ability to provide the appropriate technical expertise at the right moment to each unique emergency situation. This, coupled with the pressure to intervene by Member States, means that UNESCO is often spread too thin, doing too many activities as opposed to delivering depth on a few. The risk is that **the Organization's credibility and long-term legitimacy in this field can be affected.**
132. Given the above, **UNESCO should be pragmatic.** At the global level, the majority of respondents encourage the Organization to retain focus on its core strengths of advocacy and convening power, whilst this evaluation reveals that the Organization should remain operationally dynamic on a case by case basis, if certain conditions such as field presence and the ability to access specialised expertise are met. Emergency work is highly specialised and UNESCO must understand when it adds value and when it does not in each specific circumstance. Entry points exist for UNESCO to strengthen its partnerships to meet emergency needs and ensure that culture is protected even when it cannot intervene on the ground.
133. Finally, as the leader in this field, **UNESCO has the opportunity to champion some of the 'hard and thankless' work** that does not grab headlines. Emergency response work which is focused on World Heritage sites tends to be at the forefront of the global consciousness. Preparedness-oriented activities and the role of intangible forms of heritage or cultural expressions in emergencies do not grab the same headlines. Yet, many respondents and in particular Member States called on UNESCO to lead the charge on preparing governments for example, for the likely increase in disasters related to climate change.
134. UNESCO has demonstrated through its work in Lombok that culture can be used as a tool for community recovery from trauma. The Organization can capitalise on these inexpensive and effective means to serve countries and communities. Yet, it also needs to systematically capture the human impact elements of these interventions so it can learn from its activities and communicate its work to the global public in a way that connects with people and demonstrates the importance of protecting their culture.

Recommendations

135. The analysis of the findings has led to the development of six recommendations for the Culture and Emergencies Entity, the Executive Office of the Culture Sector and for Field Offices. The recommendations are presented from macro level to more specific details and in order of priority by group. Suggestions are provided to ensure the recommendations are practical and actionable.

1	<p>Develop a simplified definition of 'emergency' to ensure a common understanding among Culture staff members of what constitutes an emergency intervention, when to pursue emergency channels of funding and implementation. Emergency could simply be defined as in response to a situation caused by armed conflict and disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards. Preparedness and recovery activities could be considered outside this scope and have their own definitions and subsequent channels for funding and implementation.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with the Executive Office and the Culture Conventions' Secretariats</i></p>
2	<p>Develop an overarching Theory of Change that consolidates UNESCO's culture in emergencies work under one framework, outlining causal pathways from activities to outputs to outcomes and impact. The impact ambition should consist of a SMART²⁸ people-centred vision statement for its culture in emergencies work. Figure 5 (in chapter 6 on Evidence, Learning and Communication) represents a first draft of the culture in emergencies intervention logic. This was designed in collaboration with the EPR Unit and the next step is for Culture Sector Staff at HQ and in the field to provide feedback to ensure it captures the right linkages and articulates assumptions. The vision statement should work to unite UNESCO and its staff towards a common purpose of serving communities as a measurement of 'success'. It should be simple and specific so it is easily understood by staff and realistic and measurable (within a specified period of time) so it can be achieved. A working draft could include language such as 'UNESCO will enable up to XXX people to benefit from the protection of culture and promotion of cultural pluralism by 2029²⁹'. Culture includes built, intangible, and moveable heritage and various forms of cultural expressions. Benefit also needs to be defined and understood and should include elements such as access, visits, practice, transmission, and employment.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity</i></p>
3	<p>Elaborate a communications strategy for culture in emergencies work focused on human stories. Stories posted on the UNESCO website and messages posted on social media should focus on the importance of protecting culture for the lives of women and men. How has UNESCO's work impacted their lives and the lives of their families (women, girls, men, and boys) and the community? This will give a 'face' to UNESCO's work, support fundraising capabilities and ultimately deliver a message coherent with longer-term impact aims, including the SDGs.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with the Department of Public Information</i></p>

²⁸ SMART: specific, measurable, actionable, realistic and time bound.

²⁹ 2029 is specified as this is the end of the next Mid-Term Strategy. It would provide a good opportunity to gauge contributions to longer-term impact ambitions and adjust ahead of the 2030 SDG Agenda.

4	<p>Create unique checklists to guide field staff in emergency intervention decision-making. A checklist is needed for armed conflict and another for disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards. The checklists should enable field office staff to make a 'go/no go' decision based on five main pillars: impact, expertise, funding, operations, and opportunity. The evaluation team suggests starting with impact to better facilitate bottom-up decision-making and the overarching 'people-centred' approach to working in emergencies. Some suggestions on how to formulate this checklist can be found in Table 2 of Chapter 4. It is suggested that the Culture and Emergencies Entity work with field office staff to ensure the checklists incorporate all of the right elements.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity</i></p>
5	<p>Establish clear statements of capacity for each Culture Unit at the field office level – managerial and/or technical. A statement of capacity should include an internal reflection on staff expertise, language skills and experience; as well as for Member States, external organizations and experts. Strengths and weaknesses will be identified within thematic areas and this would provide clarity of roles and responsibilities across implementing partners, strengthen coordination and speed-up decision-making and response times. Vendor IDs can be created in anticipation of an emergency.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: each Field Office in coordination with the Executive Office and the Culture and Emergencies Entity</i></p>
6	<p>Develop a strategy for the use of digital technology, outlining a clear vision for integrating solutions into emergency preparedness and response. This would include (i) Developing policies to strengthen current practices around data storage, data sharing and data ownership. These policies could also be shared with Member States to ensure close institutional alignment between relevant ministries and national-level stakeholders; (ii) Developing templates/guidance for terms of reference for digital technology services, to ensure that elements such as copyright, data ownership, file types, image resolution, and deliverables are specified clearly. Related to this, UNESCO could develop a standardised legal contract for service providers with a section on data ownership; (iii) Strengthening and clarifying quality standards for all digital data, building on the list already developed by the focal point for conflict at the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Unit. For example, when crowdsourcing images, parameters should be set (such as a minimum of pixels or specifying the type of smartphone device to be used); (iv) Building a centralised platform for sharing data internally and externally, optimised for large file formats.</p> <p><i>Addressed to: Culture and Emergencies Entity in coordination with Legal Affairs and the Division of Knowledge Management and Information Systems</i></p>



Annexes

Annex A: Evaluation Terms of Reference

Annex B: List of Documents Consulted

Annex C: Key informant interview list

Annex D: Case Studies

Annex E: Member State Survey Results

Annex F: Evaluation Index

Annex G: Interview Guidelines

Annex H: Biodata of the Evaluation Team



Annex A: Evaluation Terms of Reference

Evaluation of UNESCO's action to protect culture in emergencies

1. Background

Human-made (e.g. armed conflict) and disasters resulting from natural and human-induced hazards have affected humanity over the course of history. In more recent times, however, both have occurred in new and more complex ways than ever before. Earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and droughts have affected millions of people, threatening their livelihoods and development, and forcing them into migration. Moreover, natural hazards occurring in vulnerable countries, that already face civil or political unrest, often result in disasters. Terrorism and violent extremism have also contributed to increasing the frequency of armed conflicts over the past couple of years, causing unprecedented harm to the populations of many countries, and affecting ecological landscapes. Even epidemics, such as HIV and Ebola, are not a phenomenon of the past. Their impact on the development of both present and future generations has also been significant.

These emergency situations have also touched culture in many ways. They have influenced peoples' ways of living and their capacity to create, transmit and enjoy cultural heritage and the diversity of cultural expressions. Throughout history, culture has often also been deliberately targeted for its real or symbolic value as a marker of people's identity. In recent years, and fuelled by violent extremism, culture has even moved to the centre of destruction, with the illicit trafficking of cultural objects contributing to financing the machinery of terrorism. Attacks on culture also include the deliberate targeting of individuals based on their cultural, ethnic, gender or religious affiliation. As a result, (tangible and intangible) cultural heritage and diversity are threatened, and people are deprived of their human rights including their cultural rights. Internally displaced populations and refugees are particularly affected. Cultural heritage has also suffered from collateral damage, neglect, and the looting and illicit trafficking of cultural objects.

Cognizant of these challenges and of the urgency of the situation, UNESCO's General Conference adopted in 2015 the [Strategy for Reinforcing UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict \(38C/49\)](#) (hereafter the Strategy). Both the Strategy and the concerned 38C/Resolution explicitly mention the need to embed the protection of cultural heritage and the promotion of cultural pluralism in humanitarian action, global security strategies and peace-building processes, and to collaborate with relevant UN entities as appropriate. In 2017, UNESCO's General Conference approved an [Addendum the Strategy to include emergencies associated with disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards \(39C/57\)](#). An Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy and its Addendum was also approved.

UNESCO, as the only UN agency with an explicit mandate in culture, is particularly called upon not only to contribute to the safeguarding of cultural heritage and the promotion of cultural pluralism in emergencies, but also to harness their role in building resilience, strengthening social cohesion, and fostering economic development, which it has done for many years. The organization disposes of a unique regime of standard-setting instruments that are relevant in this context, especially the 1954 Convention and its two (1954 and 1999) Protocols and the 1970 Convention, but also the 1972, 2001, 2003 and 2005 Conventions. Recent years have seen important efforts to strengthen the policy and implementation linkages between the standard-setting work in culture and the international sustainable development agenda, as well as with initiatives for peace and security.

It should be pointed out, however, that "culture" is not a recognized field of international humanitarian response. The global cluster mechanism established by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) does not have a separate cluster for culture, as is the case for instance for education.

a. Situating the theme within UNESCO's Culture Sector and Programme and Budget

Addressing emergencies is a crosscutting theme that touches upon the mandate and scope of all of UNESCO's culture Conventions and related programmes. In order to promote a coordinated and integrated approach among all of these (and with its Field Office operations), however, UNESCO established, in late 2014, an Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit within the Culture Sector. The Unit was originally placed under the direct

supervision of the Assistant Director-General for Culture, due to its crosscutting mandate; then in 2016, it was moved to the newly created Division for Heritage, and in 2018 to the new entity for Culture and Emergencies. The Culture and Emergencies entity also houses the Secretariats of the [1954 Convention](#) on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the [1970 Convention](#) on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, the Museums Unit and the Secretariat of the [2001 Convention](#) on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage. UNESCO's [1972 Convention](#) and [2003 Convention](#) Secretariats that are not under this entity also established focal points for dealing with emergencies. Programme specialists and project officers throughout UNESCO's network of field offices also contribute to programme implementation.

UNESCO's Programme and Budget document for the current quadriennium (2018-2021), the [39C/5](#), includes a specific, crosscutting, expected result (ER) to further develop the Emergency Preparedness and Response programme of the Culture Sector in line with the relevant internationally agreed frameworks and policies such as the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, as well as in view of efficiently implementing the 38C/49 Strategy:

ER 5: Culture protected and cultural pluralism promoted in emergencies through better preparedness and response, in particular through the effective implementation of UNESCO's cultural standard-setting instruments.

The programme is funded by a combination of regular programme funds and extra-budgetary resources. However, the bulk of the regular programme funds from the Culture Conventions is used to finance statutory obligations, including the meetings of the governing bodies of the six Culture Conventions. Consequently, operational projects related to culture in emergencies rely mostly on voluntary contributions. One such fundraising modality includes the [Heritage Emergency Fund](#), a multi-donor non-earmarked funding mechanism, established in 2015 and dedicated entirely to this issue.

b. 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda

The 2030 Agenda calls for the respect of cultural diversity, inter-cultural understanding and the promotion of a culture of peace (target 4.7), emphasizes the need to protect and safeguard cultural heritage (target 11.4.), and addresses the recovery and return of stolen assets (target 16.4.) as part of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and providing access to justice for all. UNESCO's 39C/5 indicates a number of additional

targets of relevance to culture in emergencies such as 5.5 and 5.c on gender equality, 11.b on adaptation to climate change and resilience to disasters for cities and human settlements, 13.1 on adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters, 16.a on strengthening institutions to prevent violence and combat terrorism, and goal 17 on multi-stakeholder partnerships.

In 2015, at the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, which charts the global course for disaster risk reduction over the next 15 years. The Sendai Framework, which is guided by four Priority Areas, calls for the "substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries." The Framework clearly recognizes the essential relationship between different aspects of culture, resilience and disaster risk reduction, and calls for the following priorities for action that are specifically linked to cultural heritage:

- ▶ "Systematically evaluate, record, share and publicly account for disaster losses and understand the economic, social, health, education, environmental and **cultural heritage impacts**, as appropriate, in the context of event-specific hazard-exposure and vulnerability information."
- ▶ "Protect or support the protection of **cultural and collecting institutions and other sites** of historical, cultural heritage and religious interest."

Furthermore, the international community has adopted a number of [resolutions](#) with the aim of condemning the destruction of cultural heritage and underlining the importance of the protection of culture in peacebuilding.

2. Rationale for Evaluation

This year (2019) marks four years since the adoption of UNESCO's [Strategy for Reinforcing UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict \(38C/49\)](#), although the Strategy became fully operational in 2017, with the approval of the related Action Plan. Furthermore, during the past few years UNESCO's work to protect culture in emergencies has received significant attention from the international community. Now there is an opportunity to take stock of the achievements and challenges in order to inform the future work and strategic positioning of the Organization. The Evaluation Office recently completed the full cycle of

evaluations of UNESCO's six culture conventions³⁰; therefore, this is an opportune time to build on these evaluations in order to assess the contribution of these instruments to the Organization's emergency response.

3. Purpose and Scope

a. Objectives and Use

The main purpose of the evaluation is to generate findings, lessons learned and recommendations regarding the relevance and the effectiveness of UNESCO's work to support countries in protecting culture in emergencies.

While the evaluation will be mainly formative in its orientation – in line with the above purpose of the envisaged continuous improvement – it will include summative elements as it is essential to learn what has been working so far, why and under what circumstances, and what the challenges have been in order to extract lessons and identify possible improvements to ensure the effective implementation of the programme. The evaluation will also focus on the alignment and complementarity of the standard-setting work of the Culture Sector with UNESCO's global priorities Africa and Gender Equality, and its continued relevance, notably in the framework of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the Agenda 2063 of the African Union³¹.

The evaluation aims to help the UNESCO Culture Sector to strengthen, refocus and better coordinate the Organization's work in relation to the protection of culture in emergencies. The evaluation will feed into the next Strategic Results Report (due in early 2020) and aim to inform the next quadrennial programme and budget (2022-2025) as well as the Organization's future Medium-Term Strategy for 2022-2029. It also aims to serve as a learning exercise for managers and staff working on emergencies across the Culture Sector, as well as in other programme sectors and in UNESCO's extensive networks of partners.

The final evaluation report will be submitted to the UNESCO Culture Sector, presented to the spring session of the Executive Board in 2020 and made publicly available.

³⁰ UNESCO's Evaluation Office has undertaken evaluations of six of the Organization's normative instruments in culture, namely the 1954, 1970, 1972, 2001, 2003 and 2005 Conventions.

³¹ See the [Agenda 2063 Popular Version](#), particularly Aspiration 5 for 'An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics'

b. Scope and Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will assess UNESCO's work in the field of culture and emergencies within the framework of both the regular and extrabudgetary programmes from the past five years, 2015 to the present (end 2019). The evaluation shall integrate UNESCO's global priorities Gender Equality and Africa by seeking to collect data on gender-relevant matters as well as focusing, when appropriate, on the needs of the African continent.

Key evaluation questions will include the following:

Relevance:

- To what extent is the response to protect culture and promote cultural pluralism in emergencies a priority for UNESCO's Culture Sector, Member States and external partners?
- In which phase(s) of crises is UNESCO best placed to intervene: preparedness (prevention, mitigation), response, recovery, reconstruction?
- To what extent has the programme taken into consideration people with disabilities, older people, women, children, youth and other disadvantaged groups?
- Where does UNESCO's response to protect culture in emergencies fit within the work of other UN agencies, and notably those with a humanitarian, security, or peacebuilding mandate (e.g. the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPPA), United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), etc.)?
- What role does UNESCO play in Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs) and Recovery and Peace Building Assessments (RPBAs) in the field of culture?

Effectiveness:

- To what extent has UNESCO developed and implemented both a strategic and operational approach for its work in culture in emergencies, including in terms of organizational set up and the allocation of adequate structural resources?
- What results have been achieved in terms of protecting culture and promoting cultural pluralism in emergencies?
- How have UNESCO's standard-setting instruments in the field of culture contributed to the effective implementation of the Organization's emergency response?

- What contribution has the programme made to strengthening national preparedness and response systems?
- Efficiency:
- To what extent has UNESCO's Culture Sector been able to respond to emergencies in a timely manner?
- To what extent have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve UNESCO's objectives in protecting culture and promoting cultural pluralism?
- What mechanisms are in place for monitoring the implementation of the work in culture in emergencies?
- How does UNESCO raise resources for culture in emergencies? To what extent are the current resource mobilization strategies and tools appropriate? How can they be improved?

Sustainability:

- To what extent has UNESCO succeeded in integrating culture into UN and other international frameworks and strategies for humanitarian action, peacebuilding processes and security strategies?
- How can the Culture Sector's response to emergencies be considered a model to build an overall UNESCO response to emergencies?
- To what extent has UNESCO's work in culture in emergencies, and particularly its resource mobilization efforts, been affected by the emergence of new public/private actors working in this field?
- What are the most strategic entry points for UNESCO to embed culture into future partnerships and processes related to emergency preparedness and response?
- How is information on culture in emergencies managed and communicated both within UNESCO and to external partners?

A full list of evaluation questions will be developed during the Inception Phase of the evaluation.

4. Methodology

The evaluation may include some or all of the methodological elements below. The specific methods will be further refined during the inception phase and in consultation with the Evaluation Reference Group. The evaluation team will use a mixed method approach involving quantitative and qualitative data from multiple sources:

- Desk study: Strategy and related Action Plan, project progress and monitoring reports, UNESCO's culture conventions, UNESCO publications and communication materials related to culture and emergencies, UN Security Council resolutions and related reports, etc.
- Reconstruction / refinement of a Theory of Change for UNESCO's work in Culture in Emergencies including the results chain and its underlying assumptions.
- Structured and semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and via Skype) with stakeholders within and outside UNESCO.
- Case studies: one on UNESCO's response to a natural disaster and one to a conflict.
- Questionnaire(s) and/or survey(s) of all UNESCO Member States and UNESCO's partners.
- Participatory workshop to steer the evaluation and to discuss preliminary findings, lessons learned and recommendations.

Data collection, sampling and analysis must incorporate a gender equality perspective, be based on a human rights based approach, and take into consideration the diverse cultural contexts in which the activities are being implemented.

5. Roles and Responsibilities

The evaluation will be managed by UNESCO's Internal Oversight Service (IOS) Evaluation Office with the support of and input from two or three external consultants. They are expected to contribute specific expertise in the protection of culture, emergency response, and peacebuilding and security strategies in order to strengthen the technical quality of the data collection. They are further expected to contribute senior evaluation expertise to the evaluation design, approach and analysis. The external consultants will be responsible for the collection of data and analysis, including fieldwork, as well as for drafting the evaluation report in English and for producing other communication deliverables (see section below). Two evaluators from the UNESCO Evaluation Office will participate in data

collection and fieldwork. The exact distribution of roles and responsibilities of the team members will be further specified in the Inception Report once the external consultants have been selected.

An Evaluation Reference Group will be established to guide the evaluation process and ensure the quality of associated deliverables. The group will be composed of the evaluation manager from the Evaluation Office and representatives from the following entities: the Executive Office of the Culture Sector, the Entity for Culture and Emergencies, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit, the Secretariats of UNESCO's Culture Conventions, the Division of Field Support and Coordination, and from UNESCO Field Offices working in emergency settings.

6. Qualifications of External Experts

The evaluation team will be composed of two members of the IOS Evaluation Office and two to three external experts. Given the specific and technical nature of the evaluation, **a combination of expertise is being sought in the protection of cultural heritage, emergency response, and peacebuilding and security strategies.** Therefore, expressions of interest will be sought from teams or individuals with the following qualifications:

Thematic expert(s):

- ▶ Advanced university degree in areas relevant to the evaluation such as public international law, international relations, social sciences, public policy or related field
- ▶ Strong knowledge and understanding of protection of culture, emergency response, and peacebuilding and security strategies (demonstrated with examples of previous evaluation, research, publication, etc. on the subject area)
- ▶ Minimum 7 years work experience in the protection of culture

Senior evaluator:

- ▶ Advanced university degree in social sciences, political sciences, economics, or related field; specialized training in planning, monitoring and/or evaluation of social programme or policies will be an asset;
- ▶ At least 10 years of working experience in evaluation acquired at the international level or in an international setting;
- ▶ At least 5 experiences in evaluation leading an evaluation team;

- ▶ Knowledge of data collection and analysis methods (quantitative and qualitative).

Furthermore, both experts are required to have:

- ▶ No previous involvement in the implementation of UNESCO activities under review (occasional attendance of events or meetings may be accepted);
- ▶ Excellent language skills in English (oral communication and report writing) (as demonstrated in the expression of interest for this evaluation and in examples of previous publications submitted).

Moreover, it is desirable that the external consultant(s) possess the following qualifications:

- ▶ Knowledge of the role of the UN and its programming;
- ▶ Understanding and application of UN mandates in Human Rights and Gender Equality (for example through certification, training, examples of assignments);
- ▶ Experience with assignments for the UN;
- ▶ Other language skills, particularly French and other official UN languages (Arabic, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese) will be considered an advantage.

Verification of these qualifications will be based on the provided curriculum vitae. Candidates are also encouraged to submit other references such as research papers or articles that demonstrate their familiarity with the field of culture in emergencies. Attention will be paid to establish an evaluation team that is gender- and geographically balanced.

The evaluation will require two to three visits by the evaluation team to UNESCO Headquarters in Paris and two to three country visits for the case studies (to be determined during the Inception Phase). Each visit to UNESCO as well as to the countries will require three to five working days.

7. Deliverables and Schedule

The evaluation will take place between November 2019 and March 2020.

a. Deliverables

Inception note: An inception note containing the Theory of Change of UNESCO's work in Culture in Emergencies (based on the desk study and preliminary interviews), an evaluation plan with a timeline, detailed methodology including an evaluation matrix (with a full list of evaluation questions and subsequent methods for data collection), a stakeholder analysis and a list of documents.

Draft evaluation report: The draft evaluation report should be written in English, be comprised of no more than 30 pages and follow the IOS Evaluation Office template (to be shared).

Communication outputs: The evaluation team will prepare communication products targeting different users: a 2-page synthesis of the main findings from the evaluation; a PowerPoint presentation for the Stakeholder Workshop and any other products to be decided upon during the Inception Phase.

Summary Paper with Preliminary Findings for UNESCO's Strategic Results Report:

This summary paper will present the key findings from the evaluation in a succinct manner to enable for them to feed into the organization's Strategic Results Report, which is to be presented to the Executive Board in spring 2020.

Final evaluation report: The final evaluation report should incorporate comments provided by the Evaluation Reference Group without exceeding 30 pages (excluding Annexes). It should also include an Executive Summary and Annexes. The final report must comply with the [UNEG Evaluation Norms and Standards](#) and will be assessed against the [UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports](#) by an external reviewer. The evaluation will refer to the [UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation](#).

b. Schedule

Activity / Deliverable	Date
Finalization of Terms of Reference	September 2019
Call for Proposals and Selection of Consultants	September – October 2019
Launch of Evaluation – Inception Phase	November 2019
Inception Report	November 2019
Data Collection and Analysis	November 2019 – January 2020
Stakeholder Workshop with Presentation of Preliminary Findings	End January 2020
Summary Paper (2-3 pages) with Preliminary Findings for UNESCO's Strategic Results Report	End January 2020
Draft Evaluation Report	February 2020
Final Evaluation Report and other Communication Outputs	March 2020

8. References

- 39 C/5 Approved PROGRAMME AND BUDGET 2018-2019 First biennium of the 2018-2021 quadrennium – see pages 222-223 on Protecting culture in emergencies through preparedness and response
- Strategy for Reinforcing UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict (38C/49)
- Addendum the Strategy to include emergencies associated with disasters caused by natural and human-induced hazards (39C/57)

Previous evaluations of UNESCO's culture conventions:

- Evaluation of UNESCO's Standard-setting Work of the Culture Sector - Part I - 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
- Evaluation of UNESCO's Standard-setting Work of the Culture Sector - Part II - 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
- Evaluation of UNESCO's Standard-setting Work of the Culture Sector - Part III - 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
- Evaluation of UNESCO's Standard-setting Work of the Culture Sector - Part IV - 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
- Evaluation of UNESCO's Standard-setting Work of the Culture Sector – Part V – 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols (1954 and 1999)
- Evaluation of UNESCO's standard-setting work of the Culture Sector, part VI – 2001 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage
- UNESCO's role and action to protect and safeguard cultural heritage and to promote cultural pluralism in crisis situations, case study: lessons learned from Mali

Annex B: List of Key Documents Consulted

UNESCO Conventions

- 1954. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
- 1970. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
- 1972. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.
- 2001. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.
- 2003. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.
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Documents from International Organizations

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Other International Organizations

- Bennoune, K. 2016. Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 August.
- Geneva Call. 2018. Culture Under Fire: Armed Non State Actors and Cultural Heritage in Wartime, October.
- Government of Albania, PDNA Volume A report. February 2020.
- Government of Dominica. PDNA Hurricane Maria, 15 November 2017.
- Government of Fiji. PDNA report, May 2016.
- Government of India, Cyclone Fani Damage Loss and Needs Assessment, Odisha. May 2019.

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Allen, K. M. 2006. 'Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation: local capacity building in the Philippines', *Disasters*. Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 81–101.

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Websites

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Aliph Foundation – Protecting Heritage to Build Peace

<https://www.aliph-foundation.org/>

British Council, Cultural Protection Fund

<https://www.britishcouncil.org/arts/culture-development/cultural-protection-fund>

Culture 2030 Indicators

<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000371562>

Factum Arte

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Global Heritage Fund

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ICONEM

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Rapid Response Facility (RRF)

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Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

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World Bank and UN. Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments. Fast Facts

https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/sites/fpi/files/rpba/rpba_fast_facts.pdf

Annex C: Key Informant List

Interviewees are presented by category and in alphabetical order. Please refer to the annexes of the individual Case Studies for key informants consulted

UNESCO Headquarters, Paris

Surname	Name	Unit	Function
Abraham	Sophie	Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Junior Professional Officer
Besimensky	Tania	World Heritage Centre (CLT/EO/AO)	Administrative Officer
Boccardi	Giovanni	Emergency Preparedness and Response, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Chief of Unit
Borchi	Alessandra	Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Project Officer
Eloundou	Lazare	Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Director
Evers	Léonie	Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Associate Project Officer
Guerin	Ulrike	Underwater Cultural Heritage Team (CLT/CEM/UCH)	Programme Specialist
Guevel	Matthieu	Division of Public Information	Director
Hopkins	Juliette	Capacity Building and Heritage Policy Unit, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Associate Programme Specialist
Kleijn	Erik	Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties Unit, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM/CHP)	Senior Technical Advisor
Langlois	Francois	Programme Management and Coordination (CLT/EO/PMC), Executive Office	Programme Specialist
Minana	Maria	Moveable Heritage and Museums (CLT/CEM/MHM)	Associate Programme Specialist

Surname	Name	Unit	Function
Mustafayev	Tural	Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties Team, Culture and Emergencies (CLT/CEM)	Associate Programme Specialist,
Noshadi	Sara	Cabinet of the Director-General	Senior Coordinator, Mosul
Ottone Ramirez	Ernesto	Office of the ADG (ADG/CLT)	Assistant Director General
Pitzalis	Denis	Department of Public Information, Web Section	Website Architect / Lead Developer
Rosler	Mechtild	World Heritage Centre (CLT/WHC)	Director
Shaer	May	Arab States Unit, World Heritage Centre (CLT/WH/ARB)	Head of Unit
Stehl	David	Africa Unit, Culture (CLT/WHC/AFR)	Programme Specialist
Yoshida	Reiko	Policy and Research Unit (CLT/DCE/P)	Programme Specialist
Zako	Bernards Alens	Moveable Heritage and Museums (CLT/CEM/MHM)	Programme Specialist

UNESCO Field Offices

Surname	Name	Field Office	Function
Acetoso	Maria	Erbil	Senior Project Officer, Culture
Brugman	Fernando	Doha	Culture Programme Specialist
Chiba	Moe	Jakarta	Culture Programme Specialist
Dijakovic	Damir	Harare	Regional Cultural Advisor for Southern Africa
Freixa Matalonga	Oriol	Brussels	Culture Project Officer
Haxthausen	Louise	Brussels	Director of the Liaison Office and UNESCO Representation to the European Union
Menegazzi	Cristina	Amman	Project Officer
Munier	Caroline	San Jose	Culture Specialist
Peshkov	Yuri	Kingston	Culture Programme Specialist
Sesum	Sinisa	Sarajevo	Head of Office
Takahashi	Akatsuki	Cairo	Culture Programme Specialist
Unakul	Montira	Bangkok	Culture Programme Specialist

Representatives of Donors to the Heritage Emergency Fund

Surname	Name	Mission or Department	Function	Country
Eller	Eike	Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU	Cultural Attaché in Brussels and in Paris	Estonia
Guérin	Lyn	Department of Canadian Heritage	Senior Policy Analyst	Canada
Al Sulaiti	Shaikha Khater	Permanent Delegation of the State of Qatar to UNESCO	Counsellor	Qatar
Bratlie	Grethe Sofie	Permanent Delegation of the Kingdom of Norway to UNESCO	Deputy Permanent Delegate	Norway
Karlsen	Kristin	Permanent Delegation of the Kingdom of Norway to UNESCO	Chargé de mission	Norway

Intergovernmental Organizations

Surname	Name	Institution	Function
Banz	Claudia	United Nations Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA/DPO)	Deputy Director, Western Africa Division
Baehncke	Anja Bille	UNDP	Programme Specialist
Polner	Mariya	World Customs Organization, Enforcement and Compliance Sub Directorate	Senior Policy Advisor
Schneider	Marina	UNIDROIT	Senior Legal Officer
Tonutti	Marianna	NATO	Governance Advisor, J9 Division, CIMIC Liaison Branch

Partners and other cultural bodies

Surname	Name	Institution	Function
Albuerne	Alejandra	Institute for Sustainable Heritage, University College London	Lecturer
Ballard	Chris	School of Culture, History & Language, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific	Senior Fellow
Bongard	Pascal	Geneva Call	Head of Policy and Legal Unit
Cuno	James	J. Paul Getty Trust	President and CEO
Delepierre	Sophie	ICOM	Head of Heritage Protection and Capacity Building Department
Durighello	Regina	ICOMOS	Director of Advisory and Monitoring Unit
El Husseiny	Basma	Action for Hope	Director
Feibig	Alexandra	Aliph	Project Manager
Freland	Valéry	Aliph	Executive Director
Hosking	Nada	Global Heritage Fund	Executive Director
Joffroy	Thierry	CRATERRE	Architect
Jungeblodt	Gaia	ICOMOS	Director, International Secretariat
Kellner	Alexander	National Museum of Brazil	Director
Pedersoli	José Luiz	ICCROM	Unit Manager of Strategic Planning
Selter	Elke	N/A	Independent Heritage Consultant
Stone	Peter	UNESCO Chair in Protection of Cultural Property and Peace, Newcastle University	Professor
Tandon	Aparna	ICCROM	Project Manager
Weiss	Thomas	The City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center	Professor of Political Science

Annex D: Case Studies

The use of digital technology in strategies for cultural protection

Background



Temple of Baal, Palmyra, before and after its destruction by ISIL, Source: UNOSAT-UNITAR images

As a response to recent destruction and looting of cultural sites across the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region, cultural practitioners' (including UNESCO's) approaches for cultural protection in emergency scenarios are increasingly focused on the use of digital technology. For example, satellite imagery is a reliable tool for the monitoring of sites in inaccessible areas which can inform decisions about where to intervene. Digital recording of sites and objects is increasingly used to enhance conservation documentation and preservation techniques, create 3D models and reproductions of objects, and contribute to awareness raising campaigns for cultural heritage protection.

Digital technologies therefore have the potential to strengthen UNESCO's work to protect culture. If harnessed correctly, they can record, document and, in some cases, recreate culture damaged by armed conflict, or disasters caused by natural or human-induced hazards.

This case study provides a consolidated analysis of how digital technology is currently used in cultural protection as a whole and by UNESCO specifically. It contains observations on the extent to which UNESCO has the capacity structurally and systemically to employ

these technologies and provides some suggestions for how these technologies can be harnessed by UNESCO to strengthen existing approaches. This case study forms part of a wider evaluation of UNESCO's action to protect culture in emergencies. The findings presented here will be further contextualised in a deeper evaluative report. This case study was guided by four key questions:

- What digital technology is currently available to protect culture in emergencies?
- How have UNESCO and its partners used digital technology in emergencies to date?
- How has digital technology contributed to UNESCO's response in protecting culture in emergencies?
- How can UNESCO potentially strengthen its use of digital technology in strategies for cultural protection?


Applications

To date, UNESCO has partnered with other UN agencies such as UNOSAT and private companies such as ICONEM and Cyark, on initiatives that mobilise digital technology, and is currently exploring possible partnerships with a range of other organizations.

There are six main applications of digital tools technologies available for emergency preparedness and response: (1) satellite imagery, which is used to monitoring sites from above, facilitate access and assess damage and looting; (2) drones and (3) laser scanning, used to provide 3D data; (4) crowdsourced images, largely used to raise awareness of the importance of cultural heritage; (5) digitisation, allowing for materials to be converted into a digital format; and (6) 3D printing which creates physical objects from a three dimensional digital model.

Figure 1 on the next page outlines and delves into the applications of the six tools. It illustrates the usefulness and importance of each approach and some of the associated operational challenges. It is not a comprehensive list of all technologies available, but provides a synthesis of common applications highlighted by key informants (UNESCO staff and expert stakeholders), and corroborated by a high-level literature review (including a report compiled by the UNESCO EPR Unit focal point for armed conflict).


Figure 1: Uses and importance of digital technologies in emergency preparedness and response



UNESCO and its partners have employed these techniques in a variety of preparedness and response interventions. Figure 2 on the next page provides seven specific examples of digital technology employed by UNESCO and its partners through preparedness and response interventions, including the outputs and when possible the outcomes (achievements) of using these technologies. Digital work has been delivered in Syria with UNOSAT, IFPO and Dubai's Museum of the Future Foundation and the Institute for Digital Technology. Activities included a country-wide survey of sites using satellite imagery, digitisation of materials, and 3D printing of Syrian archaeological monument, displayed in London to raise awareness of the threat to Syria's rich cultural heritage. UNESCO also partnered with ICONEM in Afghanistan at the Minaret of Jam, using drones and laser scanning and photogrammetry to inform an action plan for conservation activities. In Indonesia, UNESCO partnered with Gadjah Mada University to digitise a map of culture at risk to raise awareness of disaster management.

To date there have been fewer preparedness interventions using digital technologies than response interventions. The digital tool mainly used in preparedness activities is digitisation, and the other five applications have seen little use in these types of activities. This area warrants further exploration, specifically the use of scientific models or satellite imagery that could help in creating warning systems or 'imagery dome'. This idea was developed by UNOSAT (see box in Figure 2 on next page) but remains unexplored due to lack of capacity and human resources at UNESCO. The dome would provide a near real-time alert system that automatically detects changes to cultural monuments using satellite imagery, and notifies observers by e-mail. Other partners have been using 3D laser techniques and drones for preventive measures. For instance, anticipating the potential threat to cultural locations in Damascus, the Syrian Directorate General of Antiquities and Museum, Cyark, Yale and ICOMOS with the Anqa project, documented six historic architectural sites around the city, a typological variety of small or middle-sized urban historical buildings. Digital scanning technology allowed the teams to record imagery quickly and accurately during a period of calm during the protracted conflict.

Figure 2: Examples of digital technologies employed by UNESCO and its partners



Institutional Challenges

Strategy

It is important to note that UNESCO is recognised as a thought leader in the field of culture, and organizations remark that they are seeking guidance and best-practices to be shared with them on the use of digital technologies.

Having said this, while UNESCO has stated a clear ambition to embrace digital technology³², there is currently no strategy in place at UNESCO for how it could and should be employed to enhance actions to protect culture in emergencies. This leads to a number of challenges. Among the most prominent, interviewees noted missed opportunities to employ digital technology as UNESCO culture programme specialists and local stakeholders are often unaware of the types of digital technology solutions available to them. More generally, the limited use of digital technologies for preparedness activities prevents UNESCO from having or providing the data required during an emergency response to understand the extent damage inflicted on cultural heritage. Having digital lists of inventories or 3D images of monuments for example, would allow technical response teams to better understand the gravity of each situation.

Technical Capacity and Awareness

Digital technology is increasingly sophisticated, requiring highly trained engineers and operators. Within UNESCO, there is a limited pool of in-house technical experts capable of delivering digital outputs. The available expertise ranges from 3D modelling and usage to optimisation of UNESCO's storage system. Yet this expertise is in short supply and the gap between those who can operate these systems and those who cannot, is extremely wide.

Challenges highlighted by interviewees include a limited capacity within UNESCO to conduct quality assurance of data, as there are few people with the knowledge or expertise to scrutinise complex technical data. There was strong consensus among interviewees that UNESCO should have this skillset in house. In general, due to low awareness and understanding of how such tools can be employed, digital tools are underutilised. Typically they are used purely as a means of creating visual impact on communications and media pieces. Finally, individuals rarely have the capacity to develop accurate and technical

terms of references which in turn provides limited guidance to service providers, leading to partial data transfer, or restricted data use. This also leads to a difficulty in evaluating the performance of digital technology service providers.

Data Storage


The absence of clear policies around data storage and ownership have caused a number of difficulties. Figure 3, below, is based on direct examples provided by interviewees. It illustrates the flow of data from service provider to UNESCO HQ (from left to right on the graph), and demonstrates how data is often siloed in national offices before it reaches national stakeholders or UNESCO HQ.

The data collected by the contractor or partner is shared with the field office through PDFs or extensive photo folders on a hard drive. At the field office level, the data takes three paths: (1) some information is being shared on the mission website for communication purposes until it closes; (2) data remains on hard drive or USB, is shelved and permanently offline/inaccessible; or (3) some data is provided to national stakeholders or staff at UNESCO HQ but there is a limited capacity to open or interpret data due to low technical capacity and/or lack of appropriate software to do so.

This is partly a function of the fact that UNESCO itself does not have a centralised user-platform optimised for large data formats, however it does have a cloud that could be used for this purpose.

³² 2015 Strategy, p. 6: '...the use of innovative technologies, such as satellite imagery, for monitoring and assessment purposes will be further developed notably in the context of the recent partnership established with UNOSAT'.

Figure 3: Example of data journey from collection to storage



Some of the common challenges mentioned by interviewees included the confusion over data ownership and intellectual rights which leads to 'technology lock', where data is withheld from UNESCO or national stakeholders by the service provider. This has already happened during partnerships with private organizations and has incurred significant cost to UNESCO, which has been forced to spend additional funds conducting duplicate research to create data that can be shared. In addition, as illustrated by figure 3, disorganised, missing or scattered data across multiple storage/hosting structures at UNESCO, leads to uncertainty around issues of personal privacy and data protection.

Way Forward

The observations above raise a number of considerations that UNESCO may wish to pursue. We are cautious about making suggestions based on a small number of qualitative interviews. The following section should therefore be treated as guidance rather than recommendations.

- With a neutral, 'for all' agenda, UNESCO is well-positioned to take a leading role in formulating and promoting a more coherent approach to using digital technology for cultural protection both within the organization itself and among practitioners more widely. There is certainly a broader opportunity here for UNESCO to build consensus among practitioners and develop common standards and policies for the use of digital technologies, in coordination with UNOSAT.
- As part of this, UNESCO may wish to develop a global strategy for the use of digital technology, outlining a clear vision for integrating solutions into emergency preparedness and response. The strategy would serve the dual purpose of creating a framework for employing digital solutions, and (importantly) raising awareness among UNESCO field offices about the range and types of digital technology available to their programmes. Within this body of work, UNESCO could also consider:
 - i. Developing policies to strengthen current practices around data storage, data sharing and data ownership. These policies could also be shared with Member States to ensure close institutional alignment between relevant ministries and national-level stakeholders;
 - ii. Developing templates/guidance for terms of reference for digital technology services, to ensure that elements such as copyright, data ownership, file types, image resolution, and deliverables are specified clearly. Related to this,

UNESCO could develop a standardised legal contract for service providers with a section on data ownership;

- iii. Strengthening and clarifying quality standards for all digital data, building on the list already developed by the focal point for conflict at the Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit (EPRU). For example, when crowdsourcing images, parameters should be set (such as a minimum of pixels or specifying the type of smart phone device to be used);
 - iv. Building a centralised platform for sharing data internally and externally, optimised for large file formats.
- The strategy could be accompanied by structural adjustments within UNESCO (across all Units) to create a global focal point for digital technology. This could take the form of a digital steering committee, reference group or working group, comprising tech-competent practitioners. The role of such a group would be to provide direction-setting within UNESCO, to act as a knowledge resource, and to promote the use of digital technology across UNESCO's global portfolio. It could also serve as a focal point for capacity building within UNESCO, helping to ensure that field offices are equipped with the skills and knowledge to manage more effectively digital technology service providers and the information they create.
 - UNESCO's work to encourage Member States to capture baseline data on cultural sites using digital mapping technologies is highly relevant, and should remain a key focus. The absence of such baseline data makes it difficult to account for damage to cultural sites after they have experienced a disaster.

Annex

Methodology Note

Methods used consisted of a desk review and key informant interviews (KIs). Information was sourced from a variety of literature from internal sources as well as documents sent by the interviewees. Interviews were conducted face-to-face and via telephone. In order to gather a wide range of views and expertise, interviews were conducted with UNESCO HQ and field staff, UNESCO's technical implementing partners, contractors and experts.

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List of partners and websites

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Post-Disaster Early Recovery of Lombok Traditional Weavers

Introduction

In August 2018, a series of earthquakes hit northern Lombok, Indonesia, killing over 550 people, injuring 1000 more and displacing over 400,000. The earthquakes caused severe damage to housing and infrastructure and resulted in a drastic decrease in tourism to the island. Communities' livelihoods were severely affected and people spent months sleeping outdoors in fear of aftershocks. Initial relief efforts led by the Indonesian government focussed on basic needs such as shelter, food, water, sanitation and security. In the fall, the Cultural Values Preservation Office (BPNB) of Bali Province, which covers Lombok, conducted a series of consultations with communities and civil society organizations to identify the demand for support to the intangible cultural heritage (ICH) practices on the island. In response, the UNESCO Jakarta Office Culture Unit prepared a request to UNESCO's Heritage Emergency Fund (HEF) for the project "Needs assessment and technical assistance for weavers in North and East Lombok" for a total of US 70 000. Funding was approved on 13 December 2018, implementation began in January 2019 and the project was closed in November 2019.



A young girl in Bayan learning to weave as part of an extracurricular training course. The project has inspired youth to engage in weaving activities.

Source: Authors


This case study assesses UNESCO's response to the earthquake in Lombok with a focus on its relevance for the local context, but also in terms of the broader humanitarian response; the results achieved on the ground to help the affected communities, and the sustainability of these efforts in the long-term. It also aims to examine the role of culture in the overall post-earthquake recovery of the communities with a particular focus on marginalised groups (women, youth and the elderly).

The methodology for this case study included a thorough document review, interviews with implementing partners in Yogyakarta, site visits for interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries in North and East Lombok, as well as interviews with UNESCO project staff in Jakarta, all during January 2020. The lessons learned from this case study shall feed into the wider evaluation of UNESCO's action to protect culture in emergencies.

The project commenced with a participatory community-based needs assessment, which identified infrastructure and asset replacement and several technical training activities as key to the communities' short-term weaving recovery. Building structures were restored and equipment such as looms, laptops, printers and weaving materials were purchased so that production could resume. With the aim to increase production, technical training focussed on product development and marketing practices, an introduction to social media, digitization of motifs, disaster risk reduction planning, study tours in Yogyakarta and mentoring by fashion designers. All activities were conceived to bring the weaving groups together, to provide critical social interactions, by utilising ICH as a mechanism to overcome the trauma caused by the earthquakes.

The timeline on the subsequent page provides an overview of major activities, outputs and stakeholders of UNESCO's intervention.

Timeline of Major Project Activities



Source: Authors

Situating UNESCO's response to the Lombok earthquake

Weaving has been part of Lombok's traditional culture for centuries. Every village has its own techniques, patterns and stories that have been passed on through generations. The art of weaving is considered to contribute to communities' ceremonies and rituals, and in more recent times, to their livelihoods. When the earthquakes struck northern Lombok, the epicentre being near Bayan village at the base of Mount Rinjani, weaving activity stopped. The BPNB identified the need to support the weavers in resuming their activities due to the important role that the weaving was deemed to play in the recovery of their communities. Interviews with the BPNB, the North Lombok District officials, and the Bayan village local government all confirm that weaving was essential for the return to normality. This was defined both in terms of psychosocial support through the preservation of key cultural traditions and through the economic recovery. As no other organization was providing support to the weavers, UNESCO's support was found to constitute a niche.

The decision to provide recovery support to the village of Bayan was appropriate. Located near the epicentre of the earthquake in North Lombok district, the village experienced significant damage to its infrastructure, economic and social activity, and community members suffered much trauma. Local and regional government stakeholders deemed the situation as an emergency and UNESCO's project provided timely support for the community's recovery from the disaster.

Bayan *tenun* is considered unique in Lombok and represents an important part of the community's rituals and culture. Prior to UNESCO's intervention, the weaving techniques had never been documented and the community had not received any support from regional authorities. To date, the unique Bayan *tenun* patterns are not protected by any law, thereby also putting them at risk of being copied.

On the other hand, the decision to provide recovery support to Pringgasela village can be questioned. This community did not suffer from much physical damage to its infrastructure, as it is located in East Lombok, further away from the epicentre. Interviews with local government, civil society and the villagers themselves do confirm that the community was in much need of support for its weaving activity, but this support was needed more in the long-term and not in response to a particular emergency. Furthermore, the Pringgasela *tenun* already featured on the national ICH list, following targeted support from the BPNB, including for a book on the Pringgasela *tenun*, and its weavers had already benefited from the assistance of a local civil society organization since 2017. In addition,

some of the activities conducted by UNESCO – in particular the product and marketing activities – had already been provided by the local NGO.

Whilst it is true that UNESCO cannot intervene unless requested to do so by the government as was the case with Pringgasela, the Organization could have recommended that emergency response funds would be better spent elsewhere. Stakeholders indicated that the project could have focussed exclusively on Bayan in order to provide more depth to the trainings offered, or supported other weaving communities nearby that were amongst the worst hit by the earthquake.

In developing the project design, UNESCO successfully applied a participatory bottom-up approach through consultations with regional and local stakeholders during the needs assessment that took place in January 2019. The communities themselves confirmed that they were able to express their needs directly to UNESCO as well as to the local government and that these were taken on board in the project's subsequent activities. Evaluation interviews with all stakeholders from government officials to the women weavers themselves and even youth show that the activities undertaken encouraged "togetherness", which was key both for the social cohesion of the communities as well as for the economic benefits that can be brought by the weaving. The choice of target groups, almost all women, including teenage girls and several elderly and non-married female members of the community was found to be very relevant, particularly in Bayan village, as these groups had not received support for their activity before. All the women interviewed indicated that they had felt empowered by the project.

The implementation of the UNESCO project was found to be timely. Interviews with government officials indicate that during the first three months following the earthquake the priority was to rebuild housing and provide food. As basic needs were met, attention could shift to psychosocial support and culture was seen as an important driver of this process. Despite initial administration delays, both the local government and communities themselves indicated that the UNESCO support came at the right time in their recovery process.



A weaver in Pringgasela demonstrating the natural dye creation process, a key training

Source: Authors

Significant results of UNESCO's work

First and foremost, the project succeeded in utilising weaving as a tool for trauma healing of affected communities. Weaving is inherently a social activity among women. It brought smiles, joy, laughter, and the opportunity to 'forget the disaster'. In Bayan, the project helped restart extracurricular weaving activities for young girls and thereby also contributed to a return of a sense of normality. This in and itself is a significant result and demonstrates the power of culture as part of post-disaster recovery.

Second, many of the women interviewed felt empowered, both at the workplace and at home. The trainings and new knowledge acquired gave them the skills and confidence in their craft. They now have personal income to cover their own educational expenses or to contribute to the household, thereby making them less dependent on their husbands. The women also said the project has given them the confidence to seek the attention of the local and regional government's support for their work, such as by applying for subsidies for additional weaving equipment.

Third, the project reinforced their strong belief in the preservation of their weaving culture and the importance of weaving as a transmission of their traditions and stories. This was seen as a priority above economic benefits, particularly in Bayan where the weavers had previously received offers to sell their designs to manufacturers, but had always refused. As one government official put it "money is not a priority, togetherness is".

Fourth, it is clear that the weaving communities have developed a number of new skills, which they continue to use. Interviews with the weavers show that learning how to sew, produce natural dyes and apply them and how to design new products are of particular value.

These new skillsets allow weavers to make fashionable new products such as shirts, bags, pencil cases, dresses, etc. by blending traditional motifs with other fabrics while ensuring an air authenticity by utilising natural colours. The effect has been threefold: 1) there is renewed awareness in traditional motifs because they are visible in modern clothing and accessories; 2) demand and therefore sales have increased because the products are considered fashionable and are more affordable; and 3) weavers have the opportunity to keep a higher percentage of the price as they can now make the end products. For example, blended shirts retail for as much as 350,000 IDR (US 25) in markets such as Yogyakarta and are much




Cotton thread left to dry after application of natural dye in Pringgasela.

Source: Authors



Blended Male Shirt sold in Yogyakarta

Source: Authors



Value Chain of Blended Male Shirt Retailing in Yogyakarta

Source: Authors

faster to produce and require less of the motif textile. The following simple value chain captures the unit economics for a male shirt sold in Yogyakarta.

When selling just the textile, the weavers would only earn 50,000 IDR (US 3.60) per unit, or 14% of the retail price. Now that they can make their own products, they have the opportunity to earn a higher share of the product's value, selling directly to wholesalers or even retailers.

The new product designs and increase in demand and sales has also had a knock on effect of attracting the younger generation to start weaving. Young women are interested in the idea of designing clothes and accessories and welcome the opportunity to earn income to provide for their families and been seen more on equal terms as men. In Bayan, for example, young weavers get to keep 50% of the retail price of items they make. One young weaver remarked that she earns 35,000 IDR (US 2.50) per bag produced, while it sells from the shop for 70,000 IDR (US 5). Consequently, economic recovery compliments and contributes to the psychosocial recovery of the community.

The marketing and social media training has also been of great value to the weaving groups, in particular to the group leaders and younger generation, to build demand and increase sales. The weaving groups have learned how to display products in their shops to be more attractive to potential buyers. They have learned the power of marketing on Instagram and the weaving groups now have profiles with hundreds of followers. The training also taught them how to create stories around their products, how often to publish new posts to keep interest of followers, and in some cases even how to use hashtags such as #tenunlombok so that awareness of their products can be raised more widely. Finally, the weaver groups learned to add their WhatsApp number to their Instagram profiles, so that interested parties

could contact them directly to inquire for products. In Bayan, one weaving group stated that 50% of sales now come via WhatsApp and many of those orders are posted to distant domestic buyers such as in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.

In Pringgasela the project's beneficiaries learned valuable skills in the administration and management of their weaving group, which was created just three years ago. Members learned how to manage cash inflow, conduct inventory of materials, and to divide tasks and responsibilities among the group, skills that they still apply today.

Thanks to the attention brought to weaving by the project, the local governments in North and East Lombok are now more aware of the importance of protecting this element of intangible cultural heritage. Every Thursday all civil servants in both districts wear traditional clothing with local motifs. Even though this practice was in place prior to the UNESCO project, the products produced with the Organization's support have become more affordable given the new blended approach, which has allowed the government to place larger orders. Second, the local government in Bayan is now aware of the need to protect weaving by law and is working with other relevant authorities to make this happen.

UNESCO also helped complete the first step in a process of documenting the practice by producing a book on the Bayan and Pringgasela *tenun* with an anthropologist. Unique stories related to the *tenun* in Bayan are currently only known by the grandfather of the family. The project documented these stories in the book to allow for their dissemination in the wider community and for their preservation in the long-term. The book should assist in nominating Bayan on the national list of intangible cultural heritage.

Interviews with the weaving groups on the subject of the digitization training show a mixed picture. In theory, the idea was sound as the aim was to ensure that the *tenun* designs were recorded for their long-term preservation while at the same time introducing a new technical skill to weaving communities to modernise their operations. Yet in reality, most of the knowledge around the designs sit with the elderly female weavers who have little to no computer literacy. Several youth members of the groups appreciated the opportunity to learn new skills and admitted that the trainings made their activity look more modern. At the same time, they considered that the training delivered to them both in India and in Lombok was not so useful for a number of reasons. First, the software used in the training was not fit for purpose, as it required knowledge of the imperial system for measurement as opposed to the metric system widely used in Indonesia. The incompatibility of the software with the looms used in Lombok added an additional challenge. Language barriers between the trainers and the communities did not facilitate the communication of trainings, which were deemed much too complex and too short in length. Finally, two

out of the four participants of the training given in India were not weavers themselves, but were rather responsible for the business operations of their respective groups and the training was therefore not so relevant for them. As such, expecting any sustainable results from this process as it was designed was unlikely. As of January 2020, the digitization of motifs has not become practice and the software is not being used. The weavers rather continue the age-old tradition of weaving through memory and teaching via word of mouth.

Moving Forward

UNESCO's support to the weavers in Bayan and Pringgasela resulted in strong relationships built not only within the communities themselves, but also between them and the local government, as well as with UNESCO Jakarta and fashion designers in Yogyakarta. This has resulted in all stakeholders undertaking initiatives for the further preservation of the local culture as well as the strengthening of activities related to the communities' livelihoods.

The new visibility of the two communities' *tenun* and their newfound awareness of its importance to their local cultures has generated interest to tell the stories behind the weaving. All the stakeholders interviewed see the weaving as only one element of their culture that is intertwined with beliefs, rituals, ceremonies, music and even dance. The necessity to preserve all of these together has been underlined by many.

The weavers in Bayan have started working with the BPNB on the documentation of their *tenun* in view of its nomination for the national ICH list. They hope to attract more nationwide attention to their designs, receive more orders and to legally protect their motifs against copying. Furthermore, both weaving groups from Bayan and Pringgasela are now aware and better equipped to prepare requests for financial support from the BPNB for up to 20 million IDR (US 1 500) per year and state they are in the process of preparing their applications. Both groups have also voiced their demands locally to their village and district governments, who are now supporting the groups through purchases of civil servants' attire.

UNESCO's project offered a wide variety of training in a very short time period and most of the skills continue to be used today. Many weavers would have liked for the trainings to have been longer in duration and targeted to different individuals' competencies and skillsets. For example, the youth who already mastered the technical skills of social media would have benefited from deeper training in storytelling through this medium. The women who are involved in marketing and customer service would have also liked to receive basic training in English language so they could better interact with foreign

buyers (e.g. tourists). Future digitization trainings should focus on the youth, capitalising on their more advanced technical know-how and deeper interest learning such skills, and be delivered over a longer period of time by local experts.

All three weaving groups are interested in increasing their activity for the dual purpose of cultural preservation and their communities' economic development. However, economic development should not come at the expense of cultural preservation. All groups remarked that this requires a delicate balancing act.

To meet the increasing demand for their products the groups require more equipment (looms, cotton thread, fabrics, etc.), additional capacity building, as well as more weavers. UNESCO is attempting to secure funds from CITI Bank, as part of a broader ongoing project in Indonesia. In addition, UNESCO could engage with the Secretariats of the 2003 and 2005 Conventions, both of which have funds that could potentially be utilised for longer-term recovery of the weaving activities. This would also be in-line with UNESCO's broader effort to communicate, coordinate and collaborate within the Culture Sector as a whole.

Conclusion

The evaluation team found that this project was relevant to the context, addressed an emergency need (in the case of Bayan), was well conceived, delivered in a timely manner and represented considerable value for money. Whilst lessons have been drawn for the improvement of such projects in the future, UNESCO should consider this project as an example of relative success that should be emulated. The Organization found its niche; leveraged its core capabilities of convening, organising and drawing attention; developed the activities through a consultative bottom-up approach; selected local partners (for the most part) that could hit the ground running; supported low-income marginalised groups; and perhaps most importantly, demonstrated the utility of ICH as an emergency recovery mechanism. Thanks in part to the project, the weaving groups have recovered from the trauma of the earthquakes, earn more money and have a renewed sense of pride and understanding of preserving their culture.

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank all the stakeholders interviewed for sharing their experience in this project. The team extends special thanks to Ms. Diana Setiawati for the coordination of the evaluation mission and to the interpreters Ms. Gina Niluh Gede Krisnari and Ms. Dita for ensuring smooth communication during the interviews and focus group discussions.

Annex

Methodology Note

A desk review was conducted followed by primary qualitative data collection in Indonesia. Interviewees were selected to ensure top-down and bottom-up perspectives, allowing for triangulation of meaningful results. Key Informant Interviews and paired interviews were conducted with government officials, leaders of the weaving groups, UNESCO Jakarta, local NGOs and implementing partners. Focus Group Discussions were held with weaving groups to encourage an organic and free-flowing conversation. Men and women were interviewed separately in Bayan given the power dynamics in the weaving group.

List of Key Documents Consulted

RedR: Field Assessment Report (and Annexes)
 RedR: Technical Capacity Building for the Traditional Weavers in Lombok (and Annexes)
 RedR: The Damages and Needs of Traditional Weavers in Earthquake-Affected Areas in Lombok (and Annexes)
 Yvoire Stradcom: Final Narrative report, Technical support for the traditional weavers in Lombok
 UNESCO Heritage Emergency Fund Reporting Form for Lombok (and Annexes)
 UNESCO Jakarta Project Sheet: Post-Disaster Early Recovery of Lombok Traditional Weavers
 Implementing Partner Contracts

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Mr. Theo RIDZKY, Fashion Designer
Ms. ENDERWATI, Fashion Designer
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Ms. Rupaiah alias Inaq ROSIHAN, Treasurer

Ms. Nely SOFIANA, Accountant

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Mr. Raden GEDARIP, Weaver

Ms. Denda JUNITA, Trainer

Ms. LIRI, Weaver

Mr. Raden Efta NATASAPUTRA, Head of Group

Ms. Denda SUMUR, Weaver

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Ms. GWEN, Weaver

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Mali: Examples of UNESCO's Preparedness and Response Interventions during a protracted conflict

Introduction

Malian cultural life came under threat in 2012 when terrorist groups took control of the three northern regions of the country, which namely resulted in the deliberate destruction of symbolic monuments such as the mausoleums, mosques, collections of manuscripts from the Ahmed Baba Institute and the Al Farouk monument in Timbuktu. UNESCO spearheaded efforts to rehabilitate these and has actively assisted the Malian government in preserving heritage and raising awareness on the importance of protecting heritage since then.

With attacks on cultural heritage across the world rising in 2015, Mali became a symbol of "cultural cleansing"³³: the deliberate targeting of cultural symbols aimed at dismantling the peaceful bonds between various communities living together and undermining the local faiths and cultural practices. As culture was being used as a "tactic of war to terrify populations"³⁴, the international community sought to underline how it could also be a tool for peace. In other words, UNESCO attempted to promote valued cultural sites and intangible cultural heritage practices as vehicles of peace, based on the assumption that the "deprivation of cultural rights experienced by populations affected by conflict (...) is likely – in the short term – to deepen the root causes of the conflict and to generate tensions among affected populations"³⁵. Mali thus spurred the adoption of a series of international rules aimed at incorporating culture in the broader humanitarian frameworks, including UNESCO's 2015 Strategy for the Reinforcement of the Organization's Actions for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict (38C/49).

In line with this Strategy, UNESCO's activities in Mali fall into two broad categories: preparedness and response.

³³ Former UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova, Speech, 2 June 2015, see <https://en.unesco.org/news/struggle-against-cultural-cleansing-security-imperative> (accessed on 14 February 2020)

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ UNESCO, 2015 Strategy for the Reinforcement of the Organization's Actions for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict, 38C/49, para 7.

UNESCO has organized capacity-building courses to prepare relevant actors for the protection of culture in conflict scenarios. UNESCO has namely engaged with the military since 2013 through training the Malian armed forces (FAMA) and agents of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)³⁶ on the importance of heritage protection. More recently, UNESCO also sought to strengthen

heritage professionals' skills in emergency scenarios by co-organizing the first African edition of the First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis course (FAC-Africa), held in Bamako from 12th to 30th November 2018, with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM).

In line with its longstanding strategy, UNESCO also organizes rapid assessment missions to respond quickly to the punctual destruction of heritage. After the 2012 attacks in Timbuktu, the local community questioned the power of religion and traditions. The international community needed to rebuild quickly to prove that terrorist groups could not undermine the country's values and culture. The belief was also that rebuilding tangible heritage would have a trickle-down effect on broader aspects of society by reconvening people around the rehabilitated sites, bringing about cultural exchanges, reviving the local communities' social practices and, ultimately, the tourism industry, which sustained local economies. By rehabilitating Timbuktu's mausoleums, the Al Farouk monument and the Djenné mosque, UNESCO worked in part towards restoring symbols of togetherness for communities and participated in recreating a sense of belonging. However, it is difficult to assess whether these interventions can be said to have restored peace as the situation remains dangerous.

³⁶ MINUSMA was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap (ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country).

Today, the residual violence initially prevalent in the North has spread towards the central regions of Mopti and Ségou. In early 2019, the villages located within the vicinity of the Cliffs of Bandiagara (Land of Dogons) World Heritage site were the subject of a series of attacks, which resulted in the death of over 100 people and significant damage to heritage. The reasons for the resurgence of violence in this region are not clearly established, but it reflects a growing tension, mainly between two communities: the Dogons and the Fulas, amid a widespread context of terrorism-related insecurity. Following attacks in April and June 2019, UNESCO, in cooperation with the Malian Ministry of Culture, dispatched an emergency assessment mission to Bandiagara from 22nd to 28th July 2019, whose results and recommendations were presented at a restitution workshop on 29th August. The Bandiagara mission clearly sought to look beyond heritage, into the ways in which culture could help restore peace in the area. This is the first instance in Mali where a response activity also includes a long-term recovery component as foreseen in the 2015 Strategy. As such, it is interesting to assess whether this shifting approach brought about more tangible outcomes than the previous rehabilitation-focused approach.

This case study assesses these two areas of intervention (trainings and the Bandiagara mission) and looks at their relevance for the local context and broader humanitarian response, the results achieved on the ground to help the affected communities, and the sustainability of these efforts in the long-term. It also aims to examine the role of culture in the overall peacebuilding effort and the appropriateness of UNESCO's strategy in doing so. The lessons learned from this case study shall feed into the wider evaluation of UNESCO's action to protect culture in emergencies.



Preparedness: Training

UNESCO has delivered a number of training courses to build national capacity for the protection of Mali's cultural heritage. A review of these courses is provided below.

First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis (FAC) 2018 - Training of Cultural Practitioners

The 2018 edition of the FAC training in Bamako was the eighth training of the same kind to take place worldwide. Both organisations behind the training, ICCROM and UNESCO, were keen for it to take place in Mali in order to draw on the country's experiences in heritage site management in crises since 2012 and local expertise of emergency actors (e.g. conservation experts, military trainers). This course targeted all heritage professionals who might play a role in an emergency setting: museum curators, archivists, government representatives in charge of heritage conservation at the national and regional levels as well as engineers specialised in disaster risk management. The overall objective of the FAC training was to prepare cultural first-aiders in an emergency context, with the supporting three aims: (1) to develop a culture of preparedness, (2) to strengthen ongoing risk management practices and (3) to strengthen coordination between emergency response actors (civil protection, civil defence, military) and cultural heritage professionals.

Course content and organisation

In general, the participants thought the course content was rich and informative. They felt the course taught them the thought process needed in an emergency setting and how to identify the relevant stakeholders to address in such scenarios (e.g. civil protection, military personnel and local authorities). Overall, participants felt more confident about their capacity to intervene in the event of an emergency. They also valued the practical elements, which involved emergency simulations and the formulation of a basis for an action plan specific to the site whose protection they must ensure in their home countries.



FAC Africa Course: Damage assessment exercise in the garden of the National Museum of Mali.
© FAC training final report, November 2018

Nevertheless, due to budget constraints, the course was shortened from four weeks to three, which resulted in a number of frustrations among participants regarding the training format and content. For instance, the scenario-based training took place around models, rather than at Malian heritage sites, thereby losing a level of relevance and tangibility for participants. Moreover, the three weeks focused heavily on tangible heritage. Less attention was given to the methodological approach, and the specific risks associated with intervening to save cultural heritage in an emergency context. In light of the Bandiagara intervention, it also appears that gathering data on the state of heritage in times of peace is essential if experts are to assess the extent of damage once a crisis emerges. Otherwise, the assessment will only be partial. Future training would benefit from the inclusion of additional material on this aspect. Finally, too little time was set aside to finish developing thorough action plans, which would have bolstered the training's ability to meet the objective of strengthening ongoing risk management practices.

To keep the training's international dimension and accommodate participants coming from the African continent and beyond, the training was in French and English. The poor quality of the translation however slowed down the courses. Some of the participants and trainers had to step in to translate for their peers. UNESCO's slow release of regular programme funds also caused operational difficulties, as it could not adapt quickly enough to unforeseeable logistical changes.³⁷

Sustainability

Participant selection for the training was strong³⁸, resulting in a diverse mix of professionals thereby creating useful opportunities for building new partnerships and collaborations. As an example, after the training, the head of the Gao Cultural Mission and a representative from the Italian NGO specialized in intangible cultural heritage, Archi Media Trust Onlus, pitched a project to ALIPH together for the reconstruction of a site in Gao. However, despite the development of an informal network, no formal group or platform was set up following the training to facilitate inter-group exchanges and collaboration.

³⁷ In one instance, griots were invited. Despite the fact that they were not part of the initial plan, they were crucial in explaining traditional ways of mediation. ICCROM had to cover this new operational cost.

³⁸ Course participants were selected from a range of cultural and emergency response organisations. The course screening process used measures such as the need to be mid-career professionals, relevant work experience [professionals from the fields of cultural heritage (movable, immovable, tangible and intangible) or professionals responsible for disaster risk management, crisis response and emergency management (military, civil defence or civil protection); as well as prior experience of working in an emergency situation or are responsible for protecting cultural heritage from disasters.]

The course was also more far-reaching than the 22 trainees that went to Bamako. Indeed, in one standalone example, one of them independently organised a staff sensitisation training for 25 people at the Fort Jesus World Heritage Site (Mombasa, Kenya) to teach heritage professionals how to safeguard artefacts in emergency situations. Yet, unfortunately, neither the Member States whose nationals participated in the FAC training nor UNSECO itself have leveraged this new network. Seemingly, there is no record of an institution having requested one of the trainee's assistance in an emergency setting. More specifically, in the Malian context, one participant noted that none of the five Malians trained in the FAC-Africa course participated in UNESCO's emergency intervention in Bandiagara. This particular point is important to highlight as this combines two expected outcomes defined by ICCROM and UNESCO when creating the course: developing coordination between various bodies and being able to carry out on-site damage and risk assessments for cultural heritage in emergency situations. Not using these resources is a missed opportunity.

MINUSMA - Training of International Forces

MINUSMA oversees a broad portfolio of humanitarian and development interventions and must constantly re-balance priorities to respond to Mali's highly kinetic operational context. This follows a similar strategic pattern to any peacekeeping mission. From 2013 to 2017, MINUSMA's cultural mandate was explicitly stated in UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) – and subsequent resolutions – which requested it to ensure the safeguarding of cultural heritage sites in Mali in collaboration with UNESCO³⁹. However, a recent rebalancing in 2018 saw the role of culture adjusted in Resolution 2423⁴⁰, causing concerns at UNESCO that culture had been 'downgraded' compared to other priorities. However, MINUSMA reassures that culture remains as much a priority as ever, notwithstanding the changes to the resolutions. Indeed, cultural awareness training is still a core part of the four-day induction week for all MINUSMA personnel.

Since 2013, the training delivered at MINUSMA by UNESCO is a one-hour class divided in two parts: Course 1: protection of cultural heritage and Course 2: Malian culture. The aim of this training is to: (1) raise awareness with the military, police and civilian personnel of MINUSMA about the importance of protecting and respecting Mali's cultural heritage, and (2) provide them with the tools to recognize cultural heritage and to adopt culturally sensitive behaviours that are respectful of this heritage.

³⁹ Support for cultural preservation - To assist the Malian authorities, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO (Resolution 2100, paragraph 16bf)

⁴⁰ Requests MINUSMA to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites (Resolution 2423, para 67)

Efficiency

Since 2013, around 4,800 individuals have been trained. As the weekly satisfaction indicators show, MINUSMA agents are generally positive towards the training (between February and September 2018, participants, on average, gave an 85% and 95% satisfaction rating to courses 1 and 2 respectively). Nevertheless, the field visit highlighted a number of challenges, mainly stemming from a funding issue. From 2013 to 2017, the Rehabilitation Programme for cultural heritage and the safeguarding of the ancient manuscripts of Mali (mainly funded by the European Union (EU)) financed the hiring of several trainers and allowed for printing of the course-related materials. In October 2017, the 1954 Convention Secretariat funded a module revision through UNESCO Regular Programme funds. However, since then, no dedicated funding has been allocated to this programme and resources earmarked for other projects are used on an ad hoc basis to uphold the training.

As a result, since 2017, the course content has not been updated and course-related materials - the Mali Heritage Passport, a summary of the training and the Red list – could no longer be printed. This issue was raised within UNESCO and is reflected by the participants' comments on the format and content. Logistical constraints (e.g. unavailability of the facilitators or absence of transport) have sometimes also interfered with the delivery of the training and could over time jeopardize the maintenance of this course in the MINUSMA induction programme. Whilst the UNESCO Bamako Office's ability to maintain these courses in light of the scarce resources available is commendable, this approach is unsustainable. The successful integration of this course in the induction training has certainly contributed to it being continuously delivered despite fluctuating budgets.

Course content

"It is interesting on a personal level but will not have an impact on us as we will not leave the camp"

MINUSMA Focus Group participant

Participants felt that course 1 content could have been better tailored to their skills and needs. They questioned the value of this part of the course, as the importance of

protecting cultural heritage, they remark, is generally well recognised. Their priority, as an international force, is the protection of human life, rather than the UNESCO conventions and legal terms. According to the participants, cultural heritage sites (alongside the locations of religious sites, hospitals and schools) are taken into account when developing operational strategies on the ground. Therefore, they assume the relevant people have this information.

For course 2, the content was generally well received, although more information was requested in a number of areas such as local religious beliefs, women's rights, appropriate dress codes, and more generally the way they should interact with Malians on the ground. However, once again the relevance of the audience was raised as some of MINUSMA's personnel do not leave its camps. That being said, selecting a more specific audience for the training and tailoring to their exact needs will be challenging, as this course is mandatory for all MINUSMA personnel.

Overall, peacekeepers hoped for a broader focus on the Malian cultural way of life and less so on protection measures. However, this begs the question of whether this is indeed UNESCO's role. It is probably more appropriate for national actors to do this, as demonstrated by the trainees' appreciation of the course being delivered by a Malian. When needed, the MINUSMA has always been able to replace facilitators for this second part of the course whereas finding the appropriate skillsets and knowledge for the first has proven more difficult. UNESCO's added value is thus clearly course 1 on heritage protection measures. Its efforts should be concentrated on better communicating the importance of these measures and the MINUSMA's contribution to their implementation. As highlighted by one of the trainees, this particular point may require some clarifications given the peacekeeping mission's changed mandate.

In terms of format, the course's PowerPoint presentation lacked interactive elements. One participant mentioned the importance of strong footage such as the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan to illustrate the issue at hand. Including footage or videos specific to the Malian context would prove useful. This is particularly important as participants felt overwhelmed by the amount of content during their induction training and could not absorb all the information. For greater impact, they asked for simple 'rules' or principles to bear in mind when implementing their activities, rather than detailed explanations of each UNESCO Convention. The overloaded schedule is outside of UNESCO's realm and the Organisation may not have any influence over this aspect, however it is something to be aware of, while developing the content.

Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) – Training of the Local Army

Compared to the international forces, there was less awareness-raising on heritage issues with the local army. It received only three three-day training sessions conducted in 2017 in different locations. The aims of the trainings were to: (1) better understand heritage in all its dimensions, (2) discuss potential and real threats to heritage in the context of armed conflict, (3) and understand the protection measures planned by fundamental conventions and texts, at the national and international levels. Beyond the training, it is important to note that a Military Manual exists on the protection of heritage – however its dissemination and use was unclear. Encouragingly, despite the lack of a formal cooperation between UNESCO and the FAMA and the trainings being done outside of the military training curriculum, there is a strong will on the military side to include the training in their curriculum.



Trainee receiving certificate of training in Ségou
© Report on the training for trainers' workshop for armed forces on the 1954 Convention and other cultural heritage protection measures, 22-23 June 2017

Findings here are presented with the caveat that only three people were interviewed who were involved in this course (one trainee and two trainers). The courses provided a good understanding of the heritage landscape and the danger it is facing and highlighted the relevant preventive measures and partners. However, the participants were randomly selected by the national army body, and with different ranks coming together under the same training, the material was not tailored to their needs and slightly repetitive. For future training, the course material needs to be adapted to different types of participants – with an understanding of who are the decision makers that need to know about the operational risks around heritage sites.

Way Forward

Trainings are a core part of UNESCO's preparedness strategy and budgets need to be allocated to those. All trainings need to be reviewed to guarantee a coherent general emergency strategy.

Tailored content – Content should be tailored more specifically to the needs, skillsets and capacity of participants. It is important to do a full review of both the content and the format of the training material as well as the budget associated with it. The 1954 Convention Secretariat needs to be involved in these changes, as it has been working with Newcastle University on some training material specifically dedicated to military personnel and piloting it. However, any core modules need to be reviewed at the Field Office level with both the context and the audience in mind.

Audience awareness – It would be important to liaise with armed forces, in particular policy and decision-makers who to understand who are the relevant bodies that make strategic decisions on operations and create two sets of trainings (some more general and another set with the exact locations of heritage sites).

Institutional integration – As with any training, it is important to integrate it as much as possible with existing institutional curriculum. This has been the case with the MINUSMA training, however a formal partnership needs to be signed with the Malian Army and an understanding of how cultural awareness and sensitivity can be integrated in their curriculum. More adequate follow-up to the training should be conducted to ensure that the skills developed are used in the required context. It is important to include trainees in interventions developed in their own country, both as a means of further strengthening national capacity, and demonstrating tangible links between training content and 'real-world' implementation.

Budget – For the MINUSMA training, UNESCO should re-allocate the appropriate budget from the 1954 Convention, in order to hire several external consultants to undertake the training (for both the English and French sessions) and thus ensure their systematic presence.

Response: The Cliffs of Bandiagara

The purpose of the intervention was twofold: (1) to assess the damage to cultural heritage – both built and intangible – and (2) to foster peacebuilding and encourage dialogue through the identification and leveraging of traditional intercultural dialogue systems. In half of the villages assessed, the mission established that 134 traditional houses, 126 cellars for food conservation and 56 cultural areas (namely 3 traditional assembly areas – togunas) were destroyed⁴¹. The mission further found that the destruction of homes had triggered an important exodus towards cities and other nearby shelters. As a result, the intangible cultural heritage was considerably affected too as those who sustained

⁴¹ Mission report – Joint UNESCO/Ministry of Culture mission to the Cliffs of Bandiagara, Annex 7.

the different traditional practices (officiating of weddings, the Yaara! Degal ceremony or the traditional circumcision ceremony in Songo) had gone. Likewise, the fear of venturing into markets and the decline in tourism affected craftsmen's livelihoods and the creative industries. The results of the mission were made official during a restitution workshop organized in Bandiagara on 28th August 2019, during which an Action Plan and recommendations were adopted.

Relevance

“Beyond the challenges related to heritage, these are people seeking food. And their common claim is security. Everywhere we went, people said ‘we want to feel safe, we want security’. People do not even express concerns about their heritage. They seek to eat and live.”

Mr. Moulaye Coulibaly, National Director for Cultural Heritage

In the aftermath of the attacks, local populations needed immediate care. With state representatives forced to flee their constituencies due to serious threats against them, few institutional representatives remained in the region. Other international agencies intervened to provide relief (e.g. FAO). However, none had ventured further than Bandiagara to meet the villagers. UNESCO, alongside the Malian Ministry of Culture, was the first international agency to dispatch a delegation directly to the villages. Therefore, the communities were very pleased to host an official delegation to listen to their needs in their homes. However, their primary need was not directed towards culture. Rather, they expressed a need to secure shelter, food, healthcare and above all long-term security.

This raises the question of the sequencing and timeline of the mission. All interviewees agreed that humanitarian needs were of a greater priority than cultural needs in the wake of an attack. As the Head of the Bandiagara Cultural Mission put it, “the return of the displaced, food and security are prerequisites for the protection of heritage” and culture more broadly. Hence, although UNESCO was deemed to be best placed to undertake this mission given its unique mandate in culture, most interviewees felt that the intervention was not timely. Focusing on culture so soon after the attacks was deemed insensitive and inappropriate given people's trauma. Whilst this element had been raised in preparatory meetings, it seems there was little regard to the timing and there was no room for discussion on this aspect.

In the aftermath of the attacks, local populations needed immediate care. With state representatives forced to flee their constituencies due to serious threats against them, few institutional representatives remained in the region. Other international agencies intervened to provide relief (e.g. FAO). However, none had ventured further than Bandiagara to meet the villagers. UNESCO, alongside the Malian Ministry of Culture, was the first international agency to dispatch a

Mission Methodology

The evaluation mission

The multidisciplinary nature of the mission was appreciated. The presence of various experts – conservation specialist, architect and culture of peace expert – allowed them to cover a basic assessment of the built heritage, objects, cultural banks and practices in the limited timeframe). Ensuring the presence of a woman among the experts also allowed them to explore women's and youth particular interests. The fact they were Malian nationals, two of whom had extensive experience in the Land of Dogon, further contributed to the effectiveness of the mission. Indeed, relying on local expertise was viewed as particularly important in a crisis as their familiarity with the context and knowledge of local languages facilitated a speedy assessment. Furthermore, national actors were able to operate with greater freedom of movement than international experts due to differing security risk profiles (see below). Finally, resorting to local specialists allows UNESCO to strengthen national capacities in line with its capacity-building mandate.

The expert team visited eight villages within three days. On average, they spent two hours per village. Whilst this allowed them to cover a significant number of affected areas, it was insufficient time to conduct a thorough scientific assessment on the site, especially for the architect's measurement of the damage inflicted on built heritage. All the more so as, due to lack of data on the state of heritage prior to the attacks, the experts relied partly on local communities to identify missing objects and needs. The architect thus stayed an additional two days to complete the assessment.

This raises an underlying question on the design of the mission. Preparatory meetings were almost exclusively dedicated to security aspects. As a result, there was very limited community involvement in the design of the mission, which later raised issues. Most notably, no clear selection criteria were established to select the eight villages, besides that of having been attacked. This alone however could have the unforeseen effect of exacerbating tensions. For instance, the village of Ogossagou hosts two adjacent Dogon and Fula communities separated by a narrow path. The mission however only visited the Dogon village that had been attacked without consulting the Fula members of the



Burnt central toguna in Diombolo © Mission report

community. Likewise, the absence of a translator made exchanges with Fula-speaking villagers more difficult⁴². Such choices could be construed as the authorities granting more importance to one community over the other. To avoid such unintended outcomes, UNESCO should have designed the mission along with local actors that were better acquainted with the situation. Whilst it has consistently done so in non-emergency settings in other areas of Mali, this emergency assessment mission did not sufficiently include local communities beforehand.

The restitution workshop



Participants at the restitution workshop, 29 August 2019 © Mission report

The restitution workshop held in August 2019 was highly successful and garnered much attention, attracting more attendees than initially foreseen (over 60 participants). All stakeholder groups were adequately represented (youth, women's associations and heads of villages, including those that had not participated in the evaluation mission). The presence of the Minister of Culture and the UNESCO Head of Office granted further political and symbolic value to the exercise. The mission experts presented a 1.631 Million CFA Francs (USD 2,679) Action Plan around five main objectives: (1) the rehabilitation of destroyed built heritage, especially traditional housing, (2) the elaboration of participatory inventories of damaged objects and (3) endangered intangible cultural heritage, (4) the assessment of the attack's impact on social practices and education, and finally (5) the promotion of intercultural dialogue for peace and social cohesion. It is interesting to note that this is a well-rounded proposal that goes beyond heritage matters alone. The last two objectives of the Action Plan contribute towards socio-economic needs and peacebuilding mechanisms by suggesting solutions on how culture can be used to reconstruct the community as a whole and return to a normal setting in these villages (through education, tourism-derived and other socio-economic activities).

⁴² In one instance, an expert could not communicate with a Fula-speaking woman.

“Many things have been done here at Mopti, where there have been many meetings, a lot of analysis regarding what the people are currently going through. But they are now waiting for actions.”

Mr Dicko, Youth representative

The local authorities present at the workshop welcomed this approach and approved the Action Plan. These points were further discussed in the restitution workshop where local communities particularly brought attention to the importance of reviving traditional peacebuilding mechanisms such as the 'alliance à plaisanterie' or solidarity among members of a

common age group regardless of ethnicity. These are aimed at encouraging the opposing communities to renew practices that encourage dialogue and mutual respect. UNESCO presented the workshop itself as an opportunity for heterogeneous groups to exchange ideas and foster peacebuilding. Discussions were indeed rife and warranted more time. Nevertheless, these groups had already met several times before, and the definite impact of this workshop on peacebuilding ambitions is difficult to gauge. The success of the workshop will be measured through the outcomes reached through the actions undertaken to implement the Action Plan and the recommendations issued in August 2019.

However, to date, there has been no follow-up action on these elements. This is partly explained by insufficient communication of the Action Plan and a level of confusion on responsibilities. Although the Action Plan explicitly divides responsibilities for its implementation, it is not clear who bears the responsibility of allocating resources. For the time being, UNESCO has no immediate funding available for this purpose⁴³. Likewise, the Malian Ministry of Culture has insufficient resources; culture representing merely 0.21% of the national budget. Workshop participants even called for additional resources for the Bandiagara Cultural mission to implement the Action Plan⁴⁴. That being said, the current political focus on culture in Mali may perhaps impact positively on this budget.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the proposed Action Plan needs to be disseminated more broadly in order to launch fundraising activities to meet the local communities' expectations.

⁴³ Since 2014, the UNESCO Bamako Office's Regular Programme Budget for Culture has averaged 15,000 USD per biennium, supplemented by a small share of the Dakar Office's budget. Most of its activities are funded through ad hoc funding allocated through UNESCO's different international assistance mechanisms or extra budgetary sources (EU Rehabilitation programme for the manuscripts in Timbuktu, Spanish Cooperation's funds for the solar electrification of the Djenné Mosque; MINUSMA Quick impact programme funding mechanism).

⁴⁴ Restitution workshop for the Bandiagara evaluation mission, (29 August 2019), Recommendation 7

⁴⁵ A project to create a Fund for the support to the management and conservation of cultural project is under negotiation at the Cabinet level; Malian President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, was appointed the African Unions' Champion for Arts, Culture and Heritage in February 2019; In October 2019, the "Bamako call" was an opportunity to request international actors to encourage a culture of peace.

UNESCO's intervention capacity

The Malian government's request for funding through the UNESCO Heritage Emergency Fund (HEF) was received on May 22nd, 2019. The 35,931 USD granted was disbursed very quickly to the Bamako Office through an accelerated derogation process allowing administrative officers in the field to directly access the HEF special account at Headquarters through a decentralization memo. Experts were also identified relatively swiftly. The mission was however delayed due to logistical reasons.

The most significant hurdles were security constraints. The situation in Bandiagara and neighbouring counties remained highly volatile for many weeks. The mission was postponed twice to accommodate a safer moment for travel. Once security clearance was issued, the MINUSMA however only guaranteed security up to Bandiagara. As a result, the two UNESCO staff included in the mission were unable to go directly to the sites. Only the national experts and ministerial staff, who were not bound by the same security restrictions as international staff, could fulfil the mission. This situation highlights how UNESCO's capacity to react in emergencies is highly dependent on the MINUSMA. Although the two institutions maintain a good relationship, the removal of culture from the MINUSMA's mandate in 2018 implies that there is no longer any legal obligation for the MINUSMA to assist UNESCO. The lack of a legal framework of cooperation and the non-replacement of a Culture Focal Point at MINUSMA with whom to coordinate logistical aspects have impacted negatively on UNESCO's capacity to react as it has become more difficult to access MINUSMA flights and for culture to be seen as a priority.

In MINUSMA's absence, two Malian army vehicles escorted the evaluation mission on the last leg of the trip from Bandiagara to the villages. However, distrust towards both the MINUSMA and the FAMA is strong in the region, hence the Malian military's presence could have an undesired effect on the mission itself. Some interviewees indicated that some community members feared retaliation from nearby attackers. Discretion is essential in this type of intervention so as not to compromise the mission. To the extent possible, UN missions should avoid being escorted by armed entities in order not to have their independence questioned.

UNESCO's own administrative processes further curtailed the mission. Stringent and slow contractual processes made it challenging for the Bamako Office to issue contracts for the experts. This was thus delegated to the Ministry of Culture to ease the dispatch of the mission. Indeed, besides the decentralized memo, UNESCO has not developed the necessary tools to address emergencies. A number of stakeholders interviewed believed

this illustrated how UNESCO is ill-equipped to intervene in such conflict situations. UNESCO cannot be viewed as an emergency actor without foreseeing derogatory measures that would facilitate rapid interventions.

Way Forward

UNESCO reacted rapidly and included national actors in the process. Its mission provided the authorities with the necessary information and suggestions to take up actions to implement the Action Plan and rehabilitate the area. However, in future, UNESCO should consider adopting the following measures.

Include local communities and actors – Including them in the design of the mission methodology is key to ensure all relevant considerations are taken into account and limit the likelihood of unintended effects emerging. This is particularly important to understand the dynamics on the ground and properly analyse conflict sensitivities. Intervening in a conflict context is not benign and can be highly political. Local communities will help better grasp the context. This will further give them more ownership of their own heritage.

Develop indicators to measure the effectiveness of recovery activities – These should be designed in consultation with local communities to best fit their needs and ensure ownership of the suggested solutions.

Combine response and recovery measures – Follow the Bandiagara model of using culture as a means to achieve broader socio-economic outcomes. Whilst tangible heritage can be an important vehicle for social cohesion, other forms for heritage and dialogue-enhancing mechanisms should be further brought to the fore. Using the full breadth of UNESCO's mandate by integrating cultural elements into activities related to social and human sciences or education would also greatly benefit this new aspect of culture. UNESCO Bamako Office has already started leveraging intersectoral cooperation opportunities and this avenue should be pursued.

Maintain discretion in its activities - Excessive communication around an intervention may have an adverse effect on it. Its visibility must always be weighed against communities' expectations and interests.

Coordinate with other UN agencies – Humanitarian responses in emergency contexts are typically organised and timed in a way that has been coordinated between several actors. Other UN agencies in times of emergencies work with the protection and emergency clusters, as well as with a coordinated security management team. UNESCO

needs to be conscious that its work in emergency is new, and therefore should be inscribed in the One UN Strategy, and not as a stand-alone new field of intervention. UNESCO is already present and active in UN Country Team meetings and viewed by many actors as a relevant entity, entitled to act particularly on matters related to heritage. It should leverage this position and reputation to consider a concerted action in the immediate response by intervening at the same time as other actors in the humanitarian framework, especially whenever a crisis happens near a heritage site.

Match an emergency intervention with a rapid follow-up process – The mission raised local communities' expectations. The consultants that took part in the mission noted the urgency of the follow-up.⁴⁶ The absence of concrete intervention measures in the aftermath of the evaluation process further hinders the reconstruction process and generates false hope amongst local populations, which often leads to a mistrust of institutions. To avoid this, UNESCO should be mindful of the timing of its interventions and clarify from the onset the different responsibilities in implementing the Action Plan, recommendations and fundraising activities.

Conclusion

UNESCO should use its unique and broad mandate to continue supporting the Malian government to address the root causes of the conflict and through culture foster dialogue and encourage peace. It is through its broad mandate that it can prove its most valuable for States in conflict situations. For such approaches to succeed, community involvement and proper communication are essential. To date, lack of community involvement has led to misunderstandings regarding UNESCO's role. The UNESCO Bamako Office is aware of this and staff are working increasingly to involve the wider community in their projects whether in the design phase or through awareness raising. This will be a determining factor in advancing peace through culture.

⁴⁶ Without exaggerating, it is necessary to raise the alarm for the urgent and efficient implementation of actions to support the site and its inhabitants. To strengthen the resilience and resistance of the communities, it is highly recommended to mobilize the international community and organize an emergency response' (p.33, Mission Report – Joint UNESCO/Ministry of Culture mission to the Cliffs of Bandiagara)

Annex

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank all the stakeholders interviewed for sharing their experience in this project. The team extends special thanks to Mr Ali Daou, Modibo Bagayoko and Fidèle Guirou for the coordination of the evaluation mission.

Methodology Note

A desk review was conducted followed by primary qualitative data collection in Bamako, Mali. Interviewees were selected to ensure top-down and bottom-up perspectives, allowing for triangulation of meaningful results. Key Informant Interviews and paired interviews were conducted with government officials, donors, UNESCO Bamako staff, local NGOs, implementing partners and beneficiaries of the trainings. The evaluators further observed a MINUSMA training session, followed by a Focus Group Discussion held with the trainees from the MINUSMA course to encourage an organic and free-flowing conversation. Interviews in Bamako are supplemented by face-to-face and teleconference interviews with stakeholders and members of the Culture Sector at UNESCO Headquarters both before and after the field mission.

List of Key Documents Consulted

Trainings

FAC-Africa course content of the training materials; programme and list of participants

UN Security Council Resolutions related to the MINUSMA mandate

MINUSMA reports on the situation in Mali (2012-2019)

Content of the MUNISMA training materials

Final report, Workshop for the training of trainers of the Malian armed and security forces on the UNESCO 1954 Convention and other measures for the protection of cultural heritage – Segou (June 2017), Sikasso (Aug 2017) and Bamako (Oct 2017) sessions

Bandiagara evaluation mission

State of conservation reports for the Cliffs of Bandiagara (2014-2019)

World Heritage Committee reports on the Cliff of Bandiagara (Land of dogons) (34COM - 40COM)

Mission report – Joint UNESCO/Ministry of Culture mission to the Cliffs of Bandiagara, Mali (22-28 July 2019)

Heritage Emergency Fund report for the evaluation mission to the Cliffs of Bandiagara

Transcripts of the recorded conversations with community members and authorities on the evaluation mission to the Cliffs of Bandiagara

Other

Action Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Damaged Cultural Heritage in northern Mali

EU Final activity report – Damaged heritage of the northern regions of Mali project (2014-19)

EU Project Document - Action Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Cultural Heritage and the Safeguarding of Ancient Manuscripts of Mali – Phase II (2017-2020)

UNESCO Bamako Office 2018 Annual Report

UNESCO Country Strategy for Mali 2017-19

UNESCO-IOE Role and action of UNESCO in the protection and safeguarding of cultural heritage and the promotion of cultural pluralism in crisis situations – Mali Case study (April 2017)

UNESCO-IOE Final Evaluation Report of the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Sites in the Event of Armed Conflict and its associated 1954 and 1999 Protocols – Mali Case Study (Nov 2018)

UNESCO-Ministry of Reconciliation Framework Document for the National Program for the Culture of Peace

List of Interviewees

UNESCO Headquarters

Mr Lazare ELOUNDOU ASSOMO, Director of the Culture and Emergencies Entity and former Head of the Bamako Office (2013-16)

Ms Léonie EVERS, former Programme Specialist, EPR Unit, Focal point for armed conflict

Mr Hervé HUOT-MARCHAND, former Head of the Bamako Office (2016-19)

Mr Tural MUSTAFAYEV, Associate Programme Specialist, Cultural Heritage Protection Unit

Mr David STEHL, Programme Specialist, Africa Unit, World Heritage Centre

UNESCO Bamako

Ms Souhir BERRICHE, Administrative Officer

Mr Modibo BOGAYAKO, Programme Assistant, Culture Unit

Mr Ali DAOU, Chief, Culture Unit

Ms Albane DORSAZ, Programme Coordinator, Social and human sciences Unit

Mr Gonogo Fidèle GUIROU, Programme coordinator, Culture Unit

Mr Fallo Baba KEITA, Consultant

Mr Edmond MOUKALA, Head of the Bamako Office

Mr Pierre SAYE, Programme Officer, Education Unit

Participants of the FAC-Africa 2018 training course

Mr Almoubareck BEN AHMED, Sociologist/Cultural heritage manager, Scan agent at SAVAMA-DCI

Mr El-Boukhari BEN ESSAYOUTI, Head, Timbuktu Cultural Mission

Ms Claudia CANCELOTTI, Programme Director on Intangible Cultural Heritage, Archi Media Trust Onlus

Mr Moussa Moriba DIAKITE, Head, Djenné Cultural Mission

Mr Pierre GUINDO, Head, Bandiagara Cultural Mission

Colonel Aissata KONE, Deputy Director of Relief and Safety Operations, Civil Protection

Ms Saadu RASHID HAASHIM, Coordinator, Kenya Heritage Training Institute, National Museum of Kenya

Mr Mamadou SAMAKE, Head, Gao Cultural Mission

Commandant Oumou Toumani SANGARE, Conservation expert; Army Museum of Mali

Participants of the MINUSMA training course

Mr Mohammad ELFAWAIR, Military wing, Jordan

Mr Adam GHAIBI, Military wing, UK

Mr Alexander KNIELING, Military wing, Germany

Mr Tomas MADAR, Military wing, Czech Republic

Mr Stefan RAUH, Civil wing, Germany

Mr Matthias SCHUESSLER, Military wing, Germany

Mr Gordon STUETZ, Military wing, Germany

Mr Christofer TESCHKE, Military wing, Germany

Partners

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Mr Gaspard BILEMBE, Training Officer, Integrated Mission Training Centre, MINUSMA

Mr Alpha Oumar SANKARELA DIALLO, Chief, Integrated Mission Training Centre, MINUSMA

Commissioner El Hadj WANGARA, Focal Point for INTERPOL in Mali

Donors

Mr Florian DELAUNAY, Trust Fund Manager, Stabilization and Recovery Section, MINUSMA

Mr Philippe DELERS, Programme coordinator, Cooperation, EU Delegation to the Republic of Mali

Mr Juan OVEJERO DOHN, General Coordinator, Technical Bureau of Cooperation, Spanish Cooperation in Mali

Mr Bougadar KANTE, Programme Officer, Officer in Charge Quick Impact Project Unit, Stabilization and Recovery Section, MINUSMA

Government and local Representatives

Mr Moulaye COULIBALY, National Director of Cultural Heritage, Ministry of Culture

Mr Ali DOLLO, Mayor of Sangha

Mr Yamoussa FANE, Technical counsellor, Ministry of Culture

Mr Oussemi SAYE, Mayor of Bandiagara

Colonel Batio TOURE, former Defence liaison officer at the Ministry of Culture

Others

Dr Kadiatou BABY MAIGA, Culture of peace expert, specialised in education, gender, youth

Mr Lassana CISSE, Expert on cultural heritage, former Head of the Bandiagara Cultural Mission and former National Director of Cultural Heritage

Mr Gédéon KASSOGUE, President of the Dogon Initiative Association

Mr Mamadou KONE, Architect

Dr Salia MALE, Former Deputy Director of the National Museum of Mali

Annexes E, F, G:

Member State Survey Results

Evaluation Index

Interview Guidelines

Available on request. Please contact ios@unesco.org.

Annex H: Biodata of the Evaluation Team

Daniel Skillings – Senior Evaluator

Daniel Skillings is a founding Director of Aleph Strategies. Daniel has 11 years of evaluation experience in education, agriculture, private sector development, media, governance and culture; predominantly in developing and fragile contexts such as Kenya, Somalia, Afghanistan and South Sudan. He has developed an expertise in impact, performance and process evaluations, developing theory of change and results frameworks, key performance indicators, and both quantitative and qualitative tools and analysis. Prior to launching Aleph Strategies, Daniel was a Director for Altai Consulting and before that was the Program Coordinator for the Preventive Diplomacy Initiative at the EastWest Institute in Brussels. Daniel holds a MA in International Relations (Distinction) from the University of Kent, Canterbury where he specialized in the political and security dynamics, and also a BCom in International Business and Entrepreneurship from the University of Victoria in Canada.

Constance Wyndham – Thematic Expert

Constance Wyndham is an academic and heritage consultant with more than 10 years teaching, research and project management experience in the field of heritage preservation in (post) conflict scenarios, specifically Afghanistan. She is currently completing a PhD at the Institute of Archaeology, University College London, focused on the relationship between cultural heritage and national reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2001. Prior to entering academia she worked as a heritage consultant and project manager for a range of international organizations such as the US State Department, the British Museum and Turquoise Mountain Foundation.

Flore de Taisne – Research Analyst

Flore de Taisne read History at King's College, followed by a dual masters from Sciences Po Paris and the London School of Economics in Economic Policy as an Entente Cordiale Scholar. Over the last eight years she has built an expertise in designing and implementing cultural development programs in conflict and post-conflict countries. Starting out as an evaluation consultant for organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations, she went on to work for Turquoise Mountain in Afghanistan, before becoming the Deputy Country Director in Jordan. In 2016 she co-founded ISHKAR, a social enterprise, which creates opportunities for artists and artisans from countries which have been cut off from international markets. Flore is Forbes 30 under 30 for her work in social enterprise.